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This thesis is an analysis of contemporary American political history, examining 
conservative Republican rhetoric as it relates to polarisation, four-party politics and a 
governing philosophy. 
In particular, it analyses conservative Republican rhetoric and the strong emphasis 
associated with the socialist label, especially how the socialist label is employed as a critique 
against the New Deal and its ongoing political legacy – the modern American welfare state. 
I compare the difference in how conservative Republicans employ the socialist label in the 
context of being the majority party, as well as of being the minority party. I utilise James 
MacGregor Burns’ original four-party politics argument and reorganise it in order to best 
explain American domestic politics in the post-Cold War era – separating the Republican 
presidential party from its congressional party. 
The thesis examines how conservative Republican rhetoric is strategic. It is effective at 
casting a negative light on the opposition, but creates a false impression of a conservative 
Republican governing philosophy. 
Conservative Republican rhetoric is strongest when it opposes something, usually big 
government in some way, such as opposing national health care reform. On the other hand, 
once conservative Republicans are in a position of power, they have to scale back their anti-
statist rhetoric so that it leads to lasting accomplishments, instead of railing against 
government and shirking the responsibilities of governing. This involves a combination of 
pragmatism and ideology – which becomes harder to achieve as the GOP moves further 
rightward.  
Conservative Republican rhetoric has evolved over time from its original libertarian 
economic-centred argument against the New Deal. In the post-Cold War era, this rhetoric 
still draws on the “less government” economic argument, whilst also calling for more 
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Introduction – The Red Tandem  
Under the tousled boyish haircut [of JFK] it is still old Karl Marx – first launched a century 
ago. There is nothing new in the idea of government being Big Brother to us all. Hitler 
called his “State Socialism” and way before him it was “benevolent monarchy”. 
-Ronald Reagan1 
The America in which we grew up is vastly different from the America the secular-socialist 
Left want to create. And that's why saving America is the fundamental challenge of our 
time. The secular-socialist machine represents as great a threat to America as Nazi 
Germany or the Soviet Union once did.   
-Newt Gingrich2    
 In contemporary America, conservative Republicans have used the socialist label to 
smear and discredit Democrats in an attempt to portray the Republican Party as the 
defenders of American values, all whilst accusing Democrats of pursuing un-American goals 
that will undermine these ideals. They use specific rhetoric in order to construct their 
argument against Democrats, and to bolster their assertions that the terms Democrat, liberal 
and socialist are interchangeable.   
The opening quotations by Gingrich and Reagan demonstrate the overall critique that 
conservative Republicans employ against liberal Democrats. They consider them to be 
socialists, whilst equating all socialists with Nazis. Both quotations reflect a longstanding 
belief that the “Red Fascism” of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia were similar forms of 
totalitarianism. Many Americans considered both the Nazis and the Soviets to be one and the 
same during the 1930s, whilst during World War II, Germany became the focus of American 
enmity, and in the Cold War-era the Soviet Union became the sole enemy.3 A growing trend 
                                                          
1Reagan wrote this remark in a letter to Richard Nixon on 15 July 1960. Taken from: Kiron K. Skinner, 
Annelise Anderson and Martin Anderson, eds., Reagan: A Life in Letters (New York: Free Press, 2003), 705. 
 2Newt Gingrich, To Save America: Stopping Obama's Secular-Socialist Machine (Washington, DC: 
Regnery, 2010), 4. 
3For more, see: Les Adler and Thomas Paterson, “Red Fascism: The Merger of Nazi Germany and 
Soviet Russia in the American Image of Totalitarianism, 1930’s-1950’s”, The American Historical Review 75, 
no. 4 (April 1970): 1046-1064, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1852269 (accessed 24 September 2011).  
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in the post-Cold War era, however, has been to state that all Democrats are liberals – as well 
as being socialists. But why is this case?     
According to political scientist Terence Ball, the use of the "socialist” label has 
intensified during the Obama presidency because "the `L' word (liberal) has lost it[s] shock 
value".4 Another view is that of conservative scholar Steven F. Hayward who asserts:  
If we understand socialism in its strict definition — central economic planning and 
public ownership of the means of production — then the president [Obama] is 
obviously not a socialist (with a mild caveat for the auto bailouts, the banks, etc).  
But if we step back a moment and consider “socialism” more broadly as a 
step increase in political control of or intervention in the economy — whether it be 
through a revival of Keynesian-style stimulus and things like “cash for clunkers” 
subsidies, or through a government semi-takeover of the health care sector — then 
the charge appears more salient.5  
On the other hand, historian Andrew Hartman states: “In short, lumping socialism together 
with all things liberal has a long history. It’s no surprise that such rhetoric has not gone the 
way of the cold war” [emphasis added].6 
 But what has changed in the post-Cold War era is the makeup of the political parties, 
transforming how the socialist label can be used against a Democratic Party that no longer 
has a conservative wing.   
 
 
                                                          
4The quotation is from: David Crary, “Obama 'Socialist' Claim Persists On Right Despite Inaccuracies”, 
Associated Press, 4 June 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/04/obama-socialist-claim-
history_n_1568470.html (accessed 4 March 2014). 
5The quotation is from: The Editors, “What Is Socialism in 2009”? New York Times blog, 14 
September 2009, http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/14/what-is-socialism-in-2009/ (accessed 
27 May 2014). 
6Ibid. John White, however, argues the opposite – the rhetoric did go away because the end of the 
Cold War removed the fear of the red label. For more, consult: John Kenneth White, Still Seeing Red: How the 




My Contribution to the Field 
The key question I set out to address is: 
 Is the socialist label strategic rhetoric or is it merely part of conservative Republican 
vernacular?  
I also examine two secondary questions, which are:  
1. What is the relationship between rhetoric, polarisation and “four-party politics”? 
2. Do conservative Republicans have a governing philosophy, or is their anti-statist 
rhetoric creating a misrepresentation of what can be accomplished versus an 
entrenched New Deal state? 
My methodology comprises the use of both primary and secondary sources, and the 
unique aspect of this approach is its originality in analysing how the socialist label is 
important to conservative Republican rhetoric. Other scholars tend to overlook or downplay 
the significance of the label in its relation to conservative ideology, party politics and policy 
initiatives.  
The answers to these questions will help address how conservative Republicans rely 
on rhetoric as a political strategy, one that produces two important outcomes. Firstly, it is 
effective at casting a negative light on the opposition. Secondly, it creates a false impression 
of a conservative Republican governing philosophy. In the post-Cold War era, conservative 
Republicans have consistently argued for less government on economic issues, but, 
increasingly, they also have argued for more government on socio-moral issues. The 
combination of free-market economics and moral traditionalism, at first glance, offer two 
differing interpretations on the role of government, but another rationale is also possible. 
The two views may seem to call for opposing government roles, but on the issues of limited 
government this is not as clear cut as it may seem. Limited government only refers to the 
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size of the federal government in relation to its tax base and revenue spending. The rise in 
importance of social issues does not necessarily relate to an increase in the size of 
government, but rather a shift in how a conservative-led GOP is attempting to defend what it 
believes is an attack against traditional moral values. This position is streamlined with the 
conservative Republican economic argument against the welfare state since the FDR 
presidency. 
 This thesis is a work of political history, and examines politics from a historical 
perspective. It is a long study particularly concerned about public rhetoric. The majority of 
the thesis analyses post-1994 GOP conservatism. However, the introduction, first chapter 
and second chapter also examine the pre-1994 history to provide insight into the changing 
nature of GOP politics. Public records, memoirs, diaries and interviews give sufficient 
patterns of political strategy and rhetoric. Archives would have been a pre-1990s set up, 
whereas the body of work is contemporary history, post-1990s archival records are not yet 
fully accessible.  
 What I add to the field is the following: how rhetoric is a key part of Republican 
political strategy to gain political power, and what is its utility for producing a Republican 
majority; and how historical study illuminates contemporary Republican conservatism. This 
study therefore addresses the evolution of conservative Republicanism from the 1930s 
through the 1980s as a prelude to its primary focus on post-1994 party reconfiguration. 
 How does this thesis relate to bigger issues and the broader historical and political 
science scholarship? Regarding history, many contemporary works focus on “the rise of 
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conservatism”.7 My focus is on what conservatism can achieve politically in the aftermath of 
this rise. Works that form an important framework for this thesis include Donald Critchlow’s 
The Conservative Ascendancy and Gregory Schneider’s The Conservative Century, for their 
analysis of conservative Republicanism into the 21st Century.8 I also draw on James 
MacGregor Burns’ The Deadlock of Democracy for the concept of four-party politics.9 The 
works of David Farber and Lee Edwards discuss how key individuals like Robert Taft, Barry 
Goldwater, William Buckley, Phyllis Schlafly, Ronald Reagan, Newt Gingrich and George 
W. Bush have shaped conservative Republicanism.10 And lastly, Sean Wilentz’s The Age of 
Reagan provides an analysis on the lasting influence of Reagan in American politics from 
the 1970s into the 21st century, whilst Patrick Allitt’s The Conservatives shows in-depth 
research on American conservatism from the Early Republic (1780s) into the 21st Century.11  
 On the subject of political science works, I want to contribute to understanding how 
polarisation can both embolden and impede conservatism, with a focus on the dynamic 
                                                          
7For more, see: Julian E. Zelizer, “What Political Science Can Learn from the New Political History”, 
Annual Review of Political Science 13 (May 2010): 28-29, 
http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.polsci.032708.120246. For more of the ongoing 
debate within the field since 1994, refer to: Alan Brinkley, “The Problem of American Conservatism”, The 
American Historical Review 99, no. 2 (April 1994): 409-429, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2167281; Leo P. 
Ribuffo, “The Discovery and Rediscovery of American Conservatism Broadly Conceived”, OAH Magazine of 
History 17, no. 2 (January 2003): 5-10, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25163573; Julian E. Zelizer, “Rethinking 
the History of American Conservatism”, Reviews in American History 38, no. 2 (June 2010): 367-392, 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/reviews_in_history/v038/38.2.zelizer.pdf; Kim Phillips-Fein, “Conservatism: A 
State of Field”, The Journal of American History 98, no. 3 (December 2011): 723-743, 
http://jah.oxfordjournals.org/content/98/3/723.full.pdf+html. All were accessed 7 February 2015.   
8Donald T. Critchlow, The Conservative Ascendancy: How the Republican Right Rose to Power in 
Modern America, 2nd ed. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011; and Gregory L. Schneider, The 
Conservative Century: From Reaction to Revolution (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009). 
9James MacGregor Burns, The Deadlock of Democracy: Four-Party Politics in America (Englewood, NJ: 
Prentice Hall, 1963).  
10Lee Edwards, The Conservative Revolution: The Movement that Remade America (New York: Free 
Press, 1999); and David R. Farber, The Rise and Fall of Modern American Conservatism: A Short History 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). 
11Sean Wilentz, The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974-2008 (New York: Harper, 2008); and Patrick Allitt, 




between political power, rhetoric and polarisation.12 Two of the key works in the field that 
influence this thesis are Sean Theriault’s The Gingrich Senators, and Kenneth Cosgrove’s 
Branded Conservatives. Each highlights how the partisan rhetoric of conservative 
Republicanism greatly influences political debate, dominating discussion previously 
controlled by liberal Democrats.13 Conservatism, on the other hand, can differ in the White 
House versus the Congress.    
 Reconfiguring four-party politics provides an alternative way to view Republican 
conservatism at the presidential and congressional levels, as well as how it relates to 
Democratic Party politics. Within the framework of four-party politics, it is evident that 
Republican conservatism is better geared to Congress and an anti-Washington message. It 
cannot be both a party of opposition and government. It has failed to recognise the success 
of Reagan’s pragmatism, but has succeeded in following his implementation of the socialist 
label. The conservative socialist critique comes from a place of privilege, supporting 
individual values and ideals over collective interests. But before moving on to four-party 
politics in more detail, a definition of conservatism is now needed. 
                                                          
12Some of the works on polarisation include: Nolan McCarthy, Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, 
Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006); Arthur Paulson, 
Electoral Realignment and the Outlook for American Democracy (Hanover: University Press of New England, 
2007); Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein. It’s Even Worse than It Looks: How the American 
Constitutional System Collided with the New Politics of Extremism. New York: Basic Books, 2012; Sean M. 
Theriault, Party Polarization in Congress (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Alan I. Abramowitz, 
The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and American Democracy (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2010); Donald C. Baumer and Howard J. Gold, Parties, Polarization, and Democracy in the 
United States (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2010); Barbara Sinclair, Party Wars: Polarization and the Politics 
of National Policy Making (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006); Jeffrey M. Stonecash, Mark D. 
Brewer and Mack D. Mariani, Diverging Parties: Social Change, Realignment, and Party Polarization (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 2003); as well as Scott A. Frisch and Sean Q. Kelley, eds., Politics to the Extreme: American 
Political Institutions in the Twenty-Frist Century (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
13Sean M. Theriault, The Gingrich Senators: The Roots of Partisan Warfare in Congress (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013); and Kenneth M. Cosgrove, Branded Conservatives: How the Brand Brought the 




 Addressing what is conservatism and what it stands for is not a straightforward issue. 
Even the debate amongst conservative academics is far from unanimous – with varying 
perspectives that include political pragmatism, an anti-New Deal libertarian position, and 
southern traditionalism.14 Furthermore, how does one define conservative Republicanism, 
how does it differ in comparison to moderate Republicanism, and what is Democratic 
liberalism in comparison to GOP conservatism? These points are pivotal in attempting to 
comprehend and address what conservatism is, what it stands for, and what it opposes. Once 
this is covered in more detail, I will go on to conceptualise how conservative Republicanism 
defines and utilises the socialist label – as well as articulate how the two relate to what I term 
the New Deal legacy.  
 Conservatism as an ideology cannot solely be defined by what it stands for. What it 
is against must also be understood, especially in its opposition to liberalism.15 As political 
scientists Charles Dunn and J David Woodward state: “Conservatism is about cultural 
traditions and values which defy simple definition. In America, the status quo which 
conservatism defends is a complex amalgamation of beliefs and values not easily 
summarized”.16 They do, however, go on to “define conservatism as a defense of the 
political, economic, religious, and social status quo from the forces of abrupt change, that is 
                                                          
14For more on these perspectives, consider: George H. Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement 
in America, Since 1945, 2nd ed. (Wilmington: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 1998), 300; Schneider, The 
Conservative Century, xiii; Critchlow, The Conservative Ascendancy, 5; Paul Gottfried, Conservatism in 
America: Making Sense of the American Right (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), ix-x; and Thomas 
Fleming, “Old Right and the New Right”, in The New Right Papers (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982), ed. 
Robert W. Whitaker, 181-182.        
15The differences between conservatives and liberals are also biological; for more, see: John R. 
Hibbing, Kevin B. Smith and John R. Alford, Predisposed: Liberals, Conservatives, and the Biology of Political 
Differences (New York: Routledge, 2014).  
16Charles W. Dunn and J, David Woodard, The Conservative Tradition in America, rev. ed. (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 23.  
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based on a belief that established customs, laws and traditions provide continuity and 
stability in the guidance of society”.17 Although any attempt to explain in great detail what 
conservatism stands for in contemporary America is very complex, the best way to simplify 
this is to compare it to liberalism, for in the view of Dunn and Woodward: “Conservatism is 
best defined by examining its various types and their differences with liberalism”.18 
 The meaning of conservatism is complex because as the ideology has evolved, so too 
has its meaning. And a direct link to this evolution has been the redefining of liberalism. As 
historian Gary Gerstle remarked, “[t]he liberalism of our time, with its emphasis on racial 
equality, minority rights, and expansive notions of individual freedom, differs substantially 
from the liberalism of the interwar years, which was focused on taming capitalism; further, 
both liberalisms differ from Progressivism. All three represents a substantial departure from 
the classical liberal program of limiting the government’s right to interfere with the 
economic and political liberties of its citizens”.19 The strength of liberalism, according to 
Gerstle, was its “protean character”, which was based on “three fundamental principles: 
emancipation, rationality, and progress”, which allowed liberalism to take on a political 
ideology that kept it at the centre of politics from 1932 to the mid-1960s, when it was 
undone by White animosity to civil rights.20 And since then, liberalism has been trying to 
recover the centre ground of politics ceded to conservatism.21 
                                                          
17Ibid., 30. 
18Ibid., 41.  
19Gary Gerstle, “The Protean Character of American Liberalism”, The American Historical Review 99, 
no. 4 (October 1994): 1045, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2168769 (accessed 4 February 2015).   
20Ibid., 1046, 1073. Although Doug McAdam and Karina Kloos argue that the civil rights moved both 
parties from the centre, Democrats to the left and Republicans to the right; Doug McAdam and Karina Kloos, 
Deeply Divided: Racial Politics and Social Movements in Postwar America (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2014), 79-120.    
21Arthur Schlesinger was one who considered New Deal liberalism to have formed the centre ground 
of politics heading into the post-war period; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom 
(1949; repr., New York: De Cappo Press, 1998). For more on how liberalism lost the centre of politics, refer to: 
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 In support of this argument, journalist Sidney Blumenthal argues: “The conservatives 
are replacing the old party politics with an ideological politics in which the ideas order up 
the images. In their view, a party is only useful when it serves the ends of ideology”.22 And 
as sociologist Jerome Himmelstein highlights, “the ideological strength of conservatism . . . 
[is] the capacity to picture a natural, spontaneous order (whether in American society or the 
world) and to blame the disruption of that order on liberal elites and their policies and 
ideas”. And until liberals regroup and offer an alternative message, the conservative 
narrative will remain the dominant message.23 But as historian Patrick Allitt’s work on 
American conservatism brings to light, the enduring strength of conservatism is less reliant 
on a vibrant ideology than a robust “attitude” that outlines what is supports, as well as what 
it has opposed through American history.24 Such a notion refutes the argument of political 
scientist Louis Hartz that the mainstream American political tradition was historically 
liberal, and had no legitimate alternative (such as conservatism and socialism).25 In his 
words, “The ironic flaw in American liberalism lies in the fact that we have never had a real 
conservative tradition”. Such a perspective identified conservatism as emanating from 
feudalism a stage of societal development never experienced by America.26 Although Allitt 
                                                          
Jeffrey Bloodworth, Losing the Center: The Decline of American Liberalism, 1968-1992 (Lexington: University 
Press of Kentucky, 2013); and Iwan Morgan, Beyond the Liberal Consensus: A Political History of the United 
States since 1965 (London: Hurst & Co., 1994). Race was a delicate issue for the New Deal coalition, but 
others included citizenship and benefits; for more, see: William H. Chafe, “Race in America: The Ultimate Test 
of Liberalism”, in The Achievement of American Liberalism: The New Deal and Its Legacies (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2003), ed. William H. Chafe, 161-179; and Suzanne Mettler, “Social Citizens of 
Separate Sovereignties: Governance in the New Deal Welfare State”, in The New Deal and the Triumph of 
Liberalism (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2002), eds. Sidney M. Milkis and Jerome M. Mileur, 
231-271.       
22Sydney Blumenthal, The Rise of the Counter-Establishment: From Conservative Ideology to Political 
Power (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), 313. 
23Jerome Himmelstein, To the Right: The Transformation of American Conservatism (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1990), 62, 210-211. 
24Allitt, The Conservatives, 2, 278. 
25Lewis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since 
the Revolution (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1955). 
26Ibid., 57.  
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considers Hartz’s argument outdated,27 it still remains influential.28 Allitt’s own view of 
conservatism as an “attitude” also neglect’s its embodiment of a set ideals in relation to a 
single aim: power.       
 Political scientist Corey Robin, in The Reactionary Mind, examines how 
conservatism, both in America and Europe, is not solely reactionary, but is instead a mind-
set intent on maintaining or regaining power at the elite level.29 He highlights how 
opposition to liberalism, whilst important, is secondary to conservatism’s primary concern of 
“defend[ing] particular orders – hierarchical, often private regimes of rule – on the 
assumption, in part, that hierarchy is order”.30 Moreover, conservatism’s reaction to a threat 
has always been radical because it fears losing ascendancy to those empowered by liberals.31 
In his assessment, the enduring trait of conservatism has been how it evolves and responds to 
challenges and defeat. In this sense it is reactionary, but Robin maintains there is an 
underlying goal of “reconfiguration of the old and absorption of the new”, which enables 
conservatives “to transform a tottering old regime into a dynamic, ideologically coherent 
movement of the masses”.32 This tactic, in his view, allows conservatism to branch out and 
                                                          
27Allitt, The Conservatives, 280.  
28Examples include: Mark Hulliung, eds., The American Liberal Tradition Reconsidered: The Contested 
Legacy of Louis Hartz (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010); Michael Foley, American Credo: The Place 
of Ideas in US Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 3-4, 7, 203-204, 218-222, 229, 297-298, 302, 
372-373, 390, 393-401, 407, 413, 431-432, 437; Bloodworth, Losing the Center, Theodore J. Lowi, The End of 
the Republican Era (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995), 10, 23, 28, 30, 84-85, 123-124, 126-127; 
and James T. Kloppenberg, “In Retrospect: Louis Hartz's The Liberal Tradition in America", Reviews in 
American History 29, no. 3 (September 2001): 460-478, http://www.jstor.org/stable/30030991 (accessed 19 
February 2015). 
29Corey Robin, The Reactionary Mind: Conservatism from Edmund Burke to Sarah Palin (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011). This differs from Schneider’s argument that conservatism evolved from a 
reactionary response against the New Deal into a political revolution that has achieved and thus far 
maintained power, as well as from Nash’s argument that conservatism shed this element in order to offer a 
practical alternative to liberalism.  
30Ibid., 24  
31Ibid., 25.  
32Ibid., 43.  
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engage with the masses “without disrupting the power of elites, or more precisely, to harness 
the energy of the mass[es] in order to reinforce or restore the power of elites”.33  
 Robin’s premise, however, also groups liberals, communists and socialists as part of 
the left, which is true in relation to conservatism, but also reveals how conservative 
Republicans can avow that liberalism is part of a leftist coalition against conservatism. This 
is of importance both rhetorically and ideologically for conservatives, but although 
liberalism is to the left of conservatism, it can also be placed to the right of socialism and 
communism and thus acts as a buffer ideology between left and right. 
 As political scientist Theodore Lowi argues in The End of the Republican Era, even 
though liberalism is to the left of conservatism, liberalism is in the center, not on the left, 
with conservatism on the right.34 The left comprises of socialism and social democracy, 
whilst old and new liberalism is in the centre, whereas old and new conservatism is on the 
right.35 Lowi considers that every American president from Franklin Roosevelt to Jimmy 
Carter was liberal, and the difference between the two was the gradual changing of old 
(classical) liberalism into new (modern) liberalism by the end of the 1960s. Also resulting 
from such a change was the birth of new (modern) conservatism. Lowi considers that new 
liberalism and new conservatism split the values of old liberalism, whilst new liberalism was 
influenced by the social equality stance of the New Left, new conservatism embraced all of 
old conservatism’s moral traditionalism. Of major importance to Lowi was how the ongoing 
Republican critique against the New Deal state from the 1950s to the 1980s helped them to 
succeed “miraculously well in their not-so-subtle redefinition of liberalism as Left and as 
                                                          
33Ibid., 55.  
34Lowi, The End of the Republican Era.  
35Ibid., 19; table 1.3.  
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Socialism. As President Ronald Reagan himself put it, the Democrats are ‘so far Left, 
they’ve left America’”, and as a result liberal Democrats have disassociated themselves from 
the liberal label “which contributed further to the discrediting of liberalism”.36 The lack of a 
vibrant socialist American movement helped Republicans brand liberalism, especially new 
liberalism, as socialism.   
 On the other hand, Lowi and Robin both highlight the statist mentality of 
conservatism to ensure socio-morals,37 yet they present contradicting perspectives on 
moderates. Lowi considers Dwight Eisenhower to be an old liberal, whilst Richard Nixon 
was a new liberal.38 Robin, on the other hand, regards Nixon as a conservative.39 The two 
contradicting perspectives minimalize the importance of moderates. Moderates do exist, but 
are more pragmatic and less committed to liberalism or conservatism, and are willing to 
stand in the middle and embrace the centre ground whilst dealing with the political realities 
at hand, acting sometimes out of necessity and other times by choice. The same is also true 
for liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans. The importance of the ideological 
diversity within the political parties from 1933 to 1994 is that whilst they were ideologically 
incoherent, they could still be politically significant.40 This was especially true for the 
                                                          
36Ibid., 42.  
37The importance conservatives place on culture can also be viewed as an ideology in itself. For 
more, see: Warren I. Susman, Culture as History: The Transformation of American Society in the Twentieth 
Century (1973; repr., Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2003), 51-74.  
38Lowi, The End of the Republican Era, 42, 89.  
39Robin, The Reactionary Mind, 34.  
40There are, however, some varying arguments amongst political scientists on the relationship 
between parties and ideologies. John Gerring regards the parties as two opposing ideological entities, on the 
other hand, Matt Grossmann and David Hopkins consider the GOP as the lone ideological party, whilst Hans 
Noel argues that political parties and ideologies work together to form coalitions. For more, refer to: John 
Gerring, Party Ideologies in America, 1828-1996 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Matt 
Grossman and David A. Hopkins, “Ideological Republicans and Group Interest Democrats: The Asymmetry of 
American Party Politics”, Perspectives on Politics 13, no. 1 (March 2015): 119-139, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1537592714003168 (accessed 18 April 2015); and Hans Noel, Political Ideologies 
and Political Parties in America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
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Democratic Party from 1930 to 1980, a fifty-year period of a diverse electoral coalition.41 
However, the post-1994 four-party politics dynamic has put GOP moderation into near 
extinction at the national level.42   
 What distinguishes Republican conservatism from GOP centrism is the level of 
ideological commitment and practical rationalism. Whilst both position themselves against 
Democratic liberalism, the level of commitment is much greater for conservatives than for 
moderates. But where liberalism and conservatism can be viewed as part of the American 
fabric, it is much more difficult to place centrism in a similar regard.43 On the other hand, 
Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon were no friends of Democratic liberalism,44 but their 
centrism earned them many enemies within the Republican right.45 Yet they were 
                                                          
41Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle, eds., The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930-1980 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1989). Economic liberalism was the driving force behind the rise of the New Deal 
coalition, and the change to social liberalism in the 1960s became its downfall. For more, refer to: ibid., and 
Everett Carll Ladd, “The Shifting Party Coalitions – 1932-1976”, in Emerging Coalitions in American Politics 
(San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1978), ed. Seymour Martin Lipset, 81-102.  
42For more on the declining influence of Republican moderates, see: Geoffrey Kabaservice, Rule and 
Ruin: The Downfall of Moderation and the Destruction of the Republican Party (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2012). 
43Moderation/centrism was not one the “compounds” that have dominated American political 
history in the same manner as capitalism, pluralism, liberalism, conservatism, populism or nationalism; for 
more, consult: Foley, American Credo, esp. part III. However, Gil Troy argues that there has been a strong and 
vibrant tradition of moderate presidents; Gil Troy, Why Moderates Make the Best Presidents: George 
Washington to Barack Obama, 2nd ed. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2012). 
44Moreover, both were not reluctant to use the socialist label to criticise liberal Democrats and 
policies that they disagreed with; for examples, see the next chapter and the section on how presidents 
respond to the socialist label. I also include examples of Nixon’s rhetoric in 1946 and 1950 later on in this 
chapter. Although Eisenhower tended to be more critical of New Deal liberalism in private than he was in 
public; for an example see: Robert Griffith, “Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Corporate Commonwealth”, The 
American Historical Review 87, no.1 (February 1982): 91-92, 98-99, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1863309 
(accessed 16 January 2015).   
45Critchlow, The Conservative Ascendancy, 39-40, 42-44, 77-103; David W. Reinhard, The Republican 
Right since 1945 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983), 121-128, 135-137, 138-142, 150-159, 219, 
223-227; Schneider, The Conservative Century, 92-94, 98, 101, 122-127; and Lewis L. Gould, The Republicans: 
A History of the Grand Old Party (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 237-241, 267-271.   
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determined to offer a challenge to the liberalism of the day, but such a challenge benefited 
them personally more so than the party at large.46  
 Even though there is a contrast between Republican centrism and Republican 
conservatism, the divergence between Democratic liberalism and conservatism is much 
greater. I now offer definitions for both conservatism and liberalism.47 Based on the previous 
comments by Dunn and Woodward, Blumenthal, Himmelstein, Allitt, Robin and Lowi, I 
define conservatism as a set of ideals and values that form a base of an evolving political 
ideology – a major component of conservatism is its opposition to the “liberal” position. 
Based on works by Gerstle, Lowi and Robin, I define liberalism as a set of ideals and values 
that forms the base of an evolving political ideology that, in the absence of a strong 
socialist/communist presence in America, can also be labelled as left-wing. This perspective 
holds especially true for Post-Cold War conservatism, which this study demonstrates is on 
par with socialism in the eyes of the right.48 I will go into more detail on how socialism is a 
key part of conservative rhetoric later in this introduction, but here I will add how linking 
liberalism with both socialism and big government is important to the conservative critique, 
giving it flexibility. Language and redefining the liberal label49 has greatly helped 
                                                          
46Alonzo L. Hamby, Liberalism and Its Challengers: From F.D.R. to Bush, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), 115-138, 298-338; Robert Mason, The Republican Party and American Politics from 
Hoover to Reagan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 148-181, 216-246; and Gould, The 
Republicans, 239-240, 267, 270, 272.  
47Also see: Christopher Ellis and James A Stimson, Ideology in America (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 2-10.   
48However, such a grouping can also produce opposing viewpoints. Historian Doug Rossinow argues 
that this is far from the case and is a mistake, whilst Historian Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones argues that such a 
grouping has its merits. For more, see: Doug Rossinow, “Partners for Progress? Liberals and Radical in the 
Long Twentieth Century”, in Making Sense of American Liberalism (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2012), 
eds. Jonathan Bell and Timothy Stanley, 17-37; and Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The American Left: Its Impact on 
Politics and Society since 1900 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013). 
49Conservative Republicans, in the past, tried to claim the proper usage of the liberal label when it 
referred to classical liberalism. Franklin Roosevelt used the liberal label as a way to attract Republican voters 
to the liberal label and not the Democratic Party. Roosevelt elected to use the term liberal instead of 
socialism to attract voters instead of repelling them. Herbert Hoover used the socialist label against Roosevelt 
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conservatives and the GOP since 1980, and has also, in the process, reshaped Democratic 
politics.50  
 An essential part of modern/contemporary liberalism is the ongoing importance of 
the New Deal. As political scientist Michael Foley states: “The pivotal point in the 
development of American liberalism remains the New Deal. . . . The rise of the positive state 
and the redefinition of liberal values were prompted by the catastrophic collapse of the 
American economy during the Great Depression”.51 Moreover, he affirms that “the nature of 
that liberalism is closely bound up with the character of the New Deal and of the society it 
brought into being”.52 A core element of New Deal liberalism for Foley was the birth of the 
modern welfare state and its natural political legacy. The Great Society added to the 
liberalism of the New Deal tradition with pragmatic social welfare initiatives like Medicare, 
as well as others such as Medicaid and Aid to Families with Dependent Children. 
Throughout the thesis, I will refer to this as the New Deal legacy; a legacy started by the first 
New Deal in 1933 which has grown ever since with subsequent additions like the Great 
                                                          
to attack Roosevelt’s policies in an effort to imply that Roosevelt’s policies were not liberal, in the true 
meaning of the word, but were instead a foreign concept that attacked freedom. However, the Great Society 
and the Vietnam War began the decline of popularity of the liberal label, and this was the time when 
conservative Republicans, such as Barry Goldwater and Ronald Reagan, started to embrace the conservative 
label. For more, refer to: Ronald Rotunda, The Politics of Language: Liberalism as Word and Symbol (Iowa 
City: University of Iowa Press, 1986), 3-4, 10-17, 52-65, 72-73, 88-98. And for more on Reagan and political 
language, consider: David Green, Shaping Political Consciousness: The Language of Politics in America from 
McKinley to Reagan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 256-259, 267-269. 
50For more on this point, see: Kenneth S. Baer, Reinventing Democrats: The Politics of liberalism from 
Reagan to Clinton (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2000); and William C. Berman, America’s Right Turn: From 
Nixon to Clinton, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1998).  
51Foley, American Credo, 276.  
52Ibid., 278.  
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Society;53 a legacy that has also shaped the evolution of Republican conservatism since 
1933.54       
However, as conservatism has evolved so has its meaning, but this evolution has 
united conservatism under the GOP banner, making it a political force with enormous 
influence over the party. All of the changes have made Republican conservatism more 
powerful politically, but the increase in support also makes it challenging to accommodate a 
growing base when its supporters disagree. But in order to merge and join conservative 
Republicanism, a branch has to be willing to accept the viewpoints of the elements that 
preceded it. Of course that does not imply that each wing has to completely agree with the 
views of another, but a common cause must take precedent in order to maintain unity.  
Enormous influence and party unity, however, are more complicated when the same 
party can be divided internally into competing factions. In his classic 1963 study The 
Deadlock of Democracy, James MacGregor Burns argued that on the national level, there are 
four-parties, instead of two, vying for power in the New Deal order: congressional 
Democrats, congressional Republicans, presidential Democrats and presidential 
Republicans. Their ideological breakdown, from most liberal to most conservative was as 
follows – presidential Democrats, presidential Republicans, congressional Democrats and 
congressional Republicans.55  
The shift in the four-parties, from the conservative Republican perspective, is that 
their party has become more conservative whilst the Democrats have become more liberal. 
                                                          
53Occasionally, however, I will refer to this as the New Deal/Great Society legacy when highlighting 
how the Great Society stands out from the New Deal, whether by differences in legislation, or how 
conservative Republicans like Ronald Reagan choose to focus his critique of the legacy towards the Great 
Society instead of the New Deal.   
54For Foley’s take on this, see pages 298-299 and 333-338 in American Credo.  
55Burns, The Deadlock of Democracy, 195-203, 257-264.  
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Some, like political scientist Matthew Levendusky, argue that this party breakdown indicates 
that both parties, Republican and Democratic, are now polar opposites. Republicans are the 
conservative party and Democrats are the liberal party.56 Another explanation, by way of 
political scientists Byron Shafer and William Claggett, is that the parties were further 
separated over economic, welfare, cultural and national differences. Each party benefits from 
the separate positions. Democrats have dominant liberal positions on economic and welfare 
issues, whilst Republicans have dominant conservative positions on cultural and national 
matters. Each of the party strengths is what makes the Democrats the liberal party and the 
Republicans the conservative party.57 I agree that Democrats are the liberal party, whilst 
Republicans are the conservative party. Yet this is only when they are compared to each 
other.58 Another argument, however, can offer an alternate perspective, one that illustrates 







                                                          
56Matthew Levendusky, The Partisan Sort: How Liberals Became Democrats and Conservatives 
Became Republicans (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009). 
57Byron E. Shafer and William Claggett, The Two Majorities: The Issue Context of Modern American 
Politics (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995).   
58Ellis and Stimson, Ideology in America.  
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The evolution of “four-party politics” 




At first glance, it may seem that the alterations I have made to Burns’ original 
breakdown of the four-parties concur with Levendusky, and Shafer and Claggett. The 
changes I made have put the two Democratic parties, congressional and presidential, to the 
left and the two Republican parties, congressional and presidential, to the right. What I am 
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not a liberal Democratic Party versus a conservative Republican Party, but instead two sets 
of battles, one is a battle within each party, congressional versus presidential, and the other is 
a battle between the opposing parties, Democratic and Republican.59 The outcome is that the 
congressional Republicans, presidential Democrats and presidential Republicans have 
become more conservative than when Burns’ work was published. The congressional 
Democrats are also more liberal than they were in 1963.60 Overall, the change in the four-
parties has made the Democratic Party less liberal than before, whilst the Republican Party 
has become much more conservative.61 Such a change did not happen overnight, but was 
instead gradual with the 1994 midterm elections acting as the decisive event. Yet what the 
shift also resulted in an increase in polarisation between Democrats and Republicans.62  
Polarisation and Four-Party Politics 
Although polarisation is an issue, the importance political scientists place on it can 
result in misinterpreting how it affects the two main political parties. This is so in part 
                                                          
59However, Earl Black and Merle Black (amongst others), consider the parties to have more 
“ideological purity” and thus the parties can be considered to be the liberal Democrats versus the 
conservative Republicans.  For more, consult: Earl Black and Merle Black, Divided America: The Ferocious 
Power Struggle in American Politics (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2008). I consider conservative 
Republicans to have more “ideological purity” because they have a great deal of influence within their party, 
whilst liberal Democrats and moderate Democrats have more intra-party battles, which indicates less of an 
“ideological purity” within the Democratic Party in comparison to the Republican Party.    
60For an example of how House Democrats evolved and became more liberal, consider: Nelson W. 
Polsby, How Congress Evolves: Social Bases of Institutional Change (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).  
61Two examples of this change in the Congress can be found in the South and the Northeast. The 
conservative leanings in the South have shifted from Democrats to Republicans, whilst liberals in the 
Northeast have changed their allegiance from the Republican Party to the Democratic Party. For more on the 
South, refer to: Earl Black and Merle Black, The Rise of Southern Republicans (Cambridge: The Belknap Press 
of Harvard University Press, 2003). For more on the Northeast, see: Howard Reiter and Jeffrey Stonecash, 
Counter Realignment: Political Change in the Northeastern United States (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011).      
62For an analysis on how polarisation affects ideology and “party position change”, see: David Karol, 
Party Position Change in American Politics: Coalition Management (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2009). For possibilities on how polarisation effects rhetoric on policy issues, refer to: Rebekah E. Liscio and 
Jeffrey M. Stonecash, “Parties, Public Policy Differences, and Impact”, in New Directions in American Political 
Parties (New York: Routledge, 2010), ed., Jeffrey M. Stonecash, 255-262.  
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because of how the parties are ideologically represented. The GOP is conservative-
dominated and the Democratic Party is comprised of a mix of liberals and moderates. The 
loss of southern Democrats to the GOP occurred over time as the priorities of the parties 
changed, making them more distinct from one another, especially on race and social issues.63  
More polarisation, however, does not necessarily result in equal polarisation amongst 
the two parties, for the Republican Party is much more polarized than the Democratic 
Party.64 The main reason for this is the rise of southern conservatives within the GOP rank-
and-file.65 Theriault argues that the influx of southern conservatives are “extremists” when 
compared to the southern Democrats they replaced in the broader American polity.66 
Although polarisation is more prevalent in the GOP, it has moved the congressional parties 
to the left and right of their respective presidential parties. The post-1994 shift has also 
                                                          
63Stonecash, Brewer and Mariani, Diverging Parties: Social Change, Realignment, and Party 
Polarization; Abramowitz, The Disappearing Center, 85-86; David Lublin, The Republican South: 
Democratization and Partisan Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Morris P. Fiorina, with 
Samuel J. Abrams, Disconnect: The Breakdown of Representation in American Politics (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 2009), 99-121; Paulson, Electoral Realignment and the Outlook for American Democracy, 56-
59, 63-88; as well as McAdam and Kloos, Deeply Divided. 
64For more, see: Sean M. Theriault, “Party Polarization in the US Congress”, Party Politics 12, no. 4 
(July 2006): 483-503, http://ppq.sagepub.com/content/12/4/483.full.pdf+html (accessed 16 March 2015); 
Thomas S. Langston, “Making Stale Debates Fresh Again: The Causes and Consequences of the Defense of 
Ideology as a Regime Imperative”, 20-24; a paper from the “Governing the U.S. in Polarized Times” 
conference, Rothermere American Institute, University of Oxford, 17 April 2013, 
http://www.rai.ox.ac.uk/sites/rai/files/Langston%20paper%20040313.pdf (accessed 10 March 2014); Thomas 
E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, It’s Even Worse than It Looks: How the American Constitutional System 
Collided with the New Politics of Extremism (New York: Basic Books, 2012), 51-58; Jacob S. Hacker and Paul 
Pierson, Off Center: The Republican Revolution and the Erosion of American Democracy, with a new afterword 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 5-7, 118; as well as Nolan McCarthy, Keith Poole, Howard Rosenthal 
and Chris Hare, “Polarization is Real (and Asymmetric)”, The Monkey Cage blog, 15 May 2012, 
http://themonkeycage.org/2012/05/15/polarization-is-real-and-asymmetric/ (accessed 31 March 2015).  
65Theriault, “Party Polarization in the US Congress”, 495-498; Hacker and Paul Pierson, Off Center, 
116-118; and Sinclair, Party Wars, 14-20. 
66Theriault, “Party Polarization in the US Congress”, 498. 
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decreased the presidential parties’ success rates with the opposing congressional party whilst 
increasing their success rate with their own.67  
The emergence of more ideologically-aligned parties benefits conservative 
Republicans. This is not to suggest that realignment of the parties has also polarised the 
American public.68 My concern is to show that it is advantageous to the GOP far more than 
to Democrats (and liberals).69 In most circumstances, the public has only the two main 
parties to choose from when voting, and left with only two alternatives, voting Republican 
becomes identifying.70 This compels the voter to choose based on their perceived 
conservative identity, supporting a candidate who reflects this perception, regardless of the 
candidate’s policy or ideology. If anything, voters would change their policy stance if their 
preferred candidate opposed it.71 This view further supports the notion that conservative 
                                                          
67Works that support this point, include: Sinclair, Party Wars, 355-361; Thomas E. Cronin and Michael 
A. Genovese, The Paradoxes of the American Presidency, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 
156-164; and George C. Edwards III, “Obama’s Burden: Governing in Polarized Times”, in Obama’s 
Washington: Political Leadership in a Partisan Era (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, School of 
Advanced Study, University of London, 2014), ed. Clodagh Harrington, 56-60.   
68For more on this point, refer to: Morris P. Fiorina, with Samuel J. Adams and Jeremy C. Pope, 
Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America, 3rd ed. (Longman: Boston, 2011); Fiorina and Adams, 
Disconnect, 3-23. However, others like Alan Abramowitz, Marc Hetherington, and Jonathan Weiler argue the 
opposite; Abramowitz, The Disappearing Center; Marc J. Hetherington and Jonathan D. Weiler, 
Authoritarianism and Polarization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).   
69Nolan McCarthy, “The Policy Effects of Political Polarization”, in The Transformation of American 
Politics: Activist Government and the Rise of Conservatism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), eds. 
Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol, 224.  
70For more on this point, see: Gabriel S. Lenz, Follow the Leader? How Voters Respond to Politicians’ 
Policies and Performance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012); as well as Shanto Iyengar, Gaurav Sood 
and Yphtach Lelkes, “Affect, Not Ideology: A Social Identity Perspective on Polarization”, Public Opinion 
Quarterly 76, no. 3 (Fall 2012): 405-431, http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/content/76/3/405.full.pdf+html 
(accessed 26 March 2015).  
71Lenz highlights how this reversal in policy position occurs in America, as well as in other Western 
Democracies; Lenz, Follow the Leader.  
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Republicans benefit from symbolic support, yet the support still empowers conservatism to 
continue with its tactical polarisation.72    
Journalist Thomas Edsall contends that polarisation is a conservative Republican 
strategy to use anger as a divisive wedge where values politics are used to split and divide 
America.73 This increasingly polarised environment is driven by the growing ideological 
divide between conservatism and liberalism.74 However, this divide does not necessarily 
benefit conservative Republicans, because although the majority of Americans consider 
themselves to be conservative, many of them also fall into the “symbolic conservative” and 
“operational liberal” categories, which means they claim to be conservative but they also 
support government programmes. According to political scientists Christopher Ellis and 
James Stimson “A substantial majority of self-identified “conservatives” . . . hold 
preferences . . . that are inconsistent with their ideological identification”.75 This internal 
conflict presents conservative Republicans with an opportunity to reform popular 
programmes like social security and Medicare, but it also limits them in what they can hope 
to achieve. Nonetheless, this will not stop conservative Republicans from attacking the New 
                                                          
72The increase of economic inequality since the late 1970s can be linked to the increase of 
polarisation, with Democrats in favour of addressing growing inequality, whilst Republicans have taken the 
opposite tack. For more, refer to: McCarthy, Poole and Rosenthal, Polarized America. 
73Thomas Byrne Edsall, Building Red America: The New Conservative Coalition and the Drive for 
Permanent Power (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 50-77.  
74Ellis and Stimson, Ideology in America. 
75Ibid., 97. Furthermore, this was no different from a previous study conducted in 1964; ibid., 90-
114. For the 1964 account, see: Lloyd A. Free and Hadley Cantril, The Political Beliefs of Americans: A Study of 
Public Opinion (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1967). Ellis and Stimson also label “symbolic 
conservatives” as “conflicted conservatives”; James A. Stimson Tides of Consent: How Public Opinion Shapes 
American Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 90-95; Ellis and Stimson, Ideology in 
America, 111, 149-155, 169-174, 177-183. 
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Deal and its ongoing political legacy.76 Additionally, as a result of the GOP becoming more 
conservative, conservative elite opinion has become more influential. 
The Conservative Elite 
The conservative elite form the vanguard of the conservative Republican assault on 
liberalism.77 The message begins at the top and works its way down through the rank and 
file.78 The conservative elite is a combination of sources: the Republican Party leadership; 
conservative media outlets like Fox News, National Review, Human Events, Washington 
Times, the Wall Street Journal editorial and op-ed columns, and Red State blog; 
conservative think tanks (the Heritage Foundation, Cato Institute, Claremont Institute, and 
the American Enterprise Institute are but a few of them) and non-profit organizations (such 
as FreedomWorks).79 The combination of these conservative elite influences dictates how 
the rest of the conservative voting base, along with swing voters, can be persuaded to vote 
for the conservative message – a feat that Levendusky highlights as “elite driven” sorting.80 
                                                          
76And as a result of the 2008/2009 recession, US politics can be viewed as a war of austerity between 
Democrats and Republicans, with social security and Medicare being two of the major battle fronts. For more, 
refer to: Thomas Byrne Edsall, The Age of Austerity: How Scarcity Will Remake American Politics (New York: 
Anchor Books, 2012).   
77For a general overview of American elitism, consult: Robert Lerner, Althea Nagai and Stanley 
Rothman, American Elites (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996); and C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1956), 269-297. The elite is wealthy and influential, and has much more 
influence on public policy than the general public. For more, see: Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, “Testing 
Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens”, Perspective on Politics 12, no. 3 
(September 2014): 572-577, http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1537592714001595 (accessed 18 April 2015).    
78Levendusky, The Partisan Sort, 35-37. However, Shafer and Claggett suggest that the party rank and 
file has more influence on the elite than either Levendusky or I believe is the case. For more on this view, 
refer to: Shafer and Claggett, The Two Majorities, 131-136.  
79There are also others that I did not mention above, such as big business, the National Rifle 
Association and evangelical Christians. For more on who is the elite, consider: Lerner, Nagai and Rothman, 
American Elites, 8-17; for more on who is the conservative elite, consult: Hacker and Pierson, Off Center, 11-
12, 32-34, 120, 135-162, 210.       
80Levendusky, The Partisan Sort, 3. According to Warren Miller and M. Kent Jennings, Democrats 
have an elite base that has a mixture of liberal and moderate views, whilst the Republican elite base is 
becoming more conservative. For more, refer to: Warren Miller and M. Kent Jennings, Parties in Transition: A 
longitudinal Study of Party Elites and Party Supporters (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1986), 240-247. 
For an example of what the elite bases support, as well as the different factions, consider: John S. Jackson, 
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According to political scientist Gerald Pomper, half of a party’s focus is based on its elite – 
whilst the other half is on the masses – which leads to the outward expression of ideological 
party goals.81 Or, as political scientist Thomas Langston put it: “elites educate the masses to 
support the party line”.82  
What is the aim of the conservative elite? According to political scientists Jacob 
Hacker and Paul Pierson, it wants “to tie together . . . [its] network of conservative activists 
and institutions and direct it toward nationally determined and carefully delimited ends”.83 It 
wants to brand anything it opposes as big government liberalism, socialism, communism, 
totalitarianism, and/or fascism, all five terms considered interchangeable.  
Conservative Republicans, as part of the conservative elite, want to shape public 
opinion.84 It is difficult to control public opinion, but easy to control the conversation, 
steering it in a direction helpful to their cause, whilst at the same time damaging the 
opposition. Walter Lippmann considered public opinion to be a tool used to gauge what a 
particular polling sample thought in response to the questions asked, but believed those 
                                                          
Nathan S. Bigelow and John C. Green, “The State of Party Elites: National Convention Delegates, 1992-2000”, 
in The State of the Parties: The Changing Role of Contemporary American Parties, 4th ed. (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2003), eds. John C. Green and Rick Farmer, 59-78. There are, however, two competing ideologies 
within the conservative elite, which are an anti-government market principle and a pro-government morality 
philosophy. For more, refer to: Kenneth B. Hoover and Raymond Plant, Conservative Capitalism in Britain and 
the United States: A Critical Appraisal (London: Routledge, 1989), 76-83; David Edgar, “The Free or the Good”, 
in The Ideology of the New Right (Cambridge: Polity, 1986), ed. Ruth Levitas, 55-79; and Desmond King, The 
New Right: Politics, Markets and Citizenship (Basingstoke: Macmillan Education, 1987), 7-27. 
81Gerald M. Pomper, Passions and Interests: Political Party Concepts of American Democracy 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992), 6-19.  
82Langston made this remark at the conference on “Governing the U.S. in Polarized Times”, 
Rothermere American Institute, University of Oxford, 17 April 2013. 
83Hacker and Pierson, Off Center, 120. They, however, opted for a more limited focus in their analysis 
on “New [conservative] Power Brokers” to individuals, for example Tom DeLay and Grover Norquist, instead 
of a wider study on the conservative elite; ibid., 11-12, 32-34, 120. For an analysis on elites in general, 
consider: Christopher Lasch, The Revolt of the Elites: And the Betrayal of Democracy (New York: W.W. Norton, 
1995).   
84For more on the political shaping of public opinion, refer to: Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Shapiro, 
Politicians Don’t Pander: Political Manipulation and the Loss of Democratic Responsiveness (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2000), 47-54.  
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responses “should have no bearing upon whether it is sound public policy”.85 Yet public 
opinion is a vital tool for conservative Republicans to claim that their positions on certain 
policy initiatives are in line with the public’s. Conservative Republicans use opinion polling 
as a means of persuasion, and occasionally propaganda.86 The conservative Republican 
intent is to persuade the public that their argument is the valid one, rendering the liberal 
Democrat argument invalid. The frequency of hearing an argument may be linked to the 
likelihood of agreeing with it.87  
 As previously stated, the conservative media is one component of the conservative 
elite.88 It wields an enormous amount of influence on public opinion,89 and the rhetorical 
message it conveys is influential and can be conveyed through television, the internet, 
newspapers/magazines and talk radio.90 One of the more established and well-regarded 
conservative media outlets is the National Review.91 William Buckley founded the magazine 
                                                          
85Walter Lippmann, The Public Philosophy (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1955), 41-42.  
86For more on propaganda, persuasion and public opinion, see: Garth Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell, 
Propaganda and Persuasion, 3rd ed. (London: Sage Publications, 1999), 1, 27-35, 44-46. For more on just 
public opinion and propaganda, consult: Leonard Doob, Public Opinion and Propaganda (New York: Henry 
Colt, 1948).   
87For more, see: Stimson Tides of Consent, 16-21. Both parties, however, attempt to manipulate the 
public to support one alternative over another. For more, refer to: Paige and Shapiro, Politicians Don’t 
Pander, 366-382.  
88For more, consult: Lerner, Nagai and Rothman, American Elites, 15. On the other hand, Levendusky 
does not consider the media to be part of the elite. For more, see: Levendusky, The Partisan Sort, 18-21.    
89For more, refer to: Lasch, The Revolt of the Elites, 163-175; Stimson, Tides of Consent, 17-19; 
Benjamin Paige and Robert Shapiro, The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans’ Policy Preferences 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 319, 321-322, 331-332, 353-354; and William G. Mayer, The 
Changing American Mind: How and Why American Public Opinion Changed between 1960 and 1988 (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992), 277-298.  
90Fox News, the internet and talk radio are influential media outlets that are helping to increase the 
influence of the conservative elite message. 
91For more, see: Jeffrey Hart, The Making of the American Conservative Mind: National Review and 
Its Times (Wilmington: ISI Books, 2005); Farber, The Rise and Fall of Modern American Conservatism, 40-41, 
62, 64-74; Linda Bridges and John R. Coyne, Jr., Strictly Right: William F. Buckley, Jr. and the American 
Conservative Movement  (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2007), 39-239; Rebecca E. Klatch, A Generation 
Divided: The New Left, the New Right, and the 1960s (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 23, 41, 
67, 69, 92, 237; and Paul Lyons, New Left, New Right, and the Legacy of the Sixties (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1996), 60-61, 135-136. 
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in 1955 to offer a voice to conservatives against the perceived domination in mainstream 
America by the “liberal media”.92 The National Review is an important conservative media 
outlet that spreads its message via its own magazine and online (internet) publications, as 
well as opining through other conservative media outlets, such as Fox News and AM talk 
radio, and even on other media outlets such as CNN, NBC and ABC. Another outlet for the 
National Review is to have its editors and other contributors publish books expressing a 
conservative elite opinion.93         
 A further example of conservative elite influence, although more solely focused on 
business interests, is the US Chamber of Commerce. More recently, the Chamber has voiced 
its opposition against national health care reform and the passage of the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA) in 2010.94 Moreover, it has a history of opposing more taxes, more oversight and the 
expansion of big government, claiming they are pathways to socialism.95 This is part of the 
trend of big business from the mid-1930s throughout the 1950s.96 
                                                          
92To understand why, in his own words, Buckley started the National Review, consult: Gregory 
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95Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, Committee on Economic Policy, Socialism 
in America (Washington, DC: Chamber of Commerce, 1950), 3, 17, 22, 53-54, 60. 
96For more, see: Chip Berlet and Matthew N. Lyons, Right-Wing Populism in America: Too Close for 
Comfort (New York: Guilford Press, 2000), 161-164; and Robert M. Collins, The Business Response to Keynes, 
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Against the New Deal (New York: W.W. Norton, 2010). 
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Another example, during the Cold War era was business leader Lemuel Boulware of 
General Electric (GE) who proclaimed in 1949:  
Our free markets and our free persons are at stake.  
We don’t like the proposals for further greatly enlarged government 
expenditures now being urged on the public by a combination of government and 
union officials.   
The size of taxes – now proposed – is bad enough. 
But the manner of their collection is disgracefully worse – is indefinitely 
more ominous for our whole future as well as for the future of any free market and 
any free person – for our taxes are now being based on political rather than economic 
considerations.97 
Boulware went on to state that proceeding on the present course was “Our real danger . . . 
[and] that, while we are scared to death of communism, too many of us seemingly haven’t 
come to fear socialism at all. . . . Let’s keep in mind that communism and socialism have 
only recently – and erroneously – come to be thought of by the public as two different 
things. Communism is just a slight variant of socialism, as were fascism and Nazism”.98  
Boulware’s comments comprise the basic tenets of what became known as 
Boulwarism – a mixture of “economic understanding, moral fortitude and political 
sophistication”.99 All of which became comprise part of Ronald Reagan’s political education 
to conservative Republicanism during his time as a spokesman for GE from 1954-1962.100 
Historian Robert Griffith, for example, argues “the reform programs of the New Deal 
prompted nervous conservatives to again raise the specter of Communism. Anti-
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Communism, of course, was a traditional tactic of conservative opponents of social reform . . 
. During the thirties it simply became sound conservative doctrine to attack the New Deal as 
the forerunner of an American bolshevism. ‘If Roosevelt is not a Communist today,’ charged 
Robert A. Taft of Ohio, ‘he is bound to become one’”.101  
 Although conservative Republicans accuse “liberal” Democrats of advocating 
socialism, do they believe that such a strategy is necessary in order to win elections? Whilst 
I have not done an in-depth search on this particular question, there have been instances 
where this was indeed the case. Although Robert Taft adamantly believed the policies of 
liberal Democrats would lead to socialism, he also assumed that the GOP could be 
successful in the 1950 midterm elections by making socialism a vital theme. In a letter to 
John Foster Dulles on 23 December 1949, he plainly stated his belief for such a stance.  
I do not find any grassroots support for the repeal of the Taft-Hartley Law, for the 
Brannan Plan, or for Socialized Medicine. I believe both the farmer and the working 
man are open to conviction on these issues, and that a campaign against the labor-
socialistic form of government which is now being urged upon us will be successful. 
Our problem is to reach the large population of voters who don’t really have 
any opinion on the subject and are, therefore, open to persuasion. In some ways, we 
may be better off in 1950 because I believe Truman will have to endorse the whole 
gamut of socialistic measures, so that the issue will be more clearly presented and 
more clearly understood than ever before.102 
He was also part of the committee that helped to plot the GOP’s 1950 midterm domestic 
platform as “liberty against socialism”.103 However, it was also common for moderate 
Republicans, as well as moderate and conservative Democrats to attack liberal Democrats in 
                                                          
101Robert Griffith, “American Politics and the Origins of “McCarthyism”, in The Specter: Original 
Essays on the Cold War and the Origins of McCarthyism (New York: Viewpoints, 1974), eds. Robert Griffith 
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1950.104 One notable (southern) liberal Democrat who was defeated in 1950 – by fellow 
Democrat George Smathers in the party primary election – was Senator Claude Pepper 
(FL).105 Richard Nixon also successfully used this strategy in California in 1946 against Rep. 
Jerry Voorhis, and again in 1950 against Sen. Helen Douglas.106  
The Republican National Committee (RNC) had also accused Democrats of adhering 
to socialism in 1952, big government collectivism in 1992, Democratic “socialized 
medicine” in 2008, and branded the entire party as “liberal Democrats” in 1988.107 Other 
examples were in 1946 when the RNC chairman B. Carroll Reece declared the midterm 
elections as a “fight . . . between communism and republicanism”.108 And in 2009, the RNC 
almost opted to call the Democratic Party the “Democratic Socialist Party”, but a 
compromise was made to only accuse Democrats of “the ‘march towards socialism’”.109 
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This conforms to a rhetorical pattern evident throughout America’s angst-ridden 
history, exemplified by the formation of the House Committee on un-American Activities 
(HUAC) before World War II,110 the Red Scare of 1919-1920,111 as well as before112 and 
after113 the Civil War. Well beyond the end of the Cold War, this rhetoric has remained 
intact.    
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The Power of Words: Conservative Rhetoric 
Conservative rhetoric centres on key words that are part of a strategy to keep 
liberalism at bay and on the defensive.114 Four key reoccurring themes in conservative 
rhetoric are freedom, individualism, socialism and un-American. All four help to establish a 
line of argument that fits into the broader ideological dogma. Political scientist William 
Riker, in The Strategy of Rhetoric, states: “we have very little knowledge about the 
rhetorical content of campaigns”, “That we fail to understand campaigns is not surprising. 
Campaigns are rhetorical exercises: attempts to persuade voters to view issues in the way the 
candidates wishes them to”.115 Although the presidency has been analysed from the scope of 
a permanent campaign, what about the evolution of conservative Republicanism?116 It has 
embarked on a permanent campaign against the New Deal and its ongoing political legacy.  
According to Riker, one who uses rhetoric as a rational choice should: firstly, frame 
the opponents’ program in the most negative aspect possible; secondly, argue that the 
programme(s) would lead to disaster (even if one is very unlikely); and thirdly, as a 
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supporter, label all reforms of the status quo in a negative aspect, and as a reformer, offer an 
alternative programme to the status quo.117 Riker’s three-stage rhetorical argument – as a 
reformer – is how conservative Republicans critique the New Deal legacy.    
However, political scientist Mark Smith’s analysis, in The Right Talk,  
departs from a purely rational-choice perspective by holding . . . that preferences are 
not simply functions of interest but also embody ideas. Because rhetoric plays a 
critical role in the processes of determining interests and developing ideas, and 
because the resulting preferences cannot be communicated to others until they are 
formalized through written, visual, or oral means, rhetoric’s place in politics goes 
beyond the purely instrumental aspects deployed by political elites.118  
He also “finds common ground with rational choice, however, in holding that once their 
preferences have been formed, political participants seek to defend them in the most 
persuasive manner”.119  
Smith’s view is similar to my own in that elites are the main driving force behind 
conservative rhetoric, but he only considers political elites, whereas I include those outside 
of office who also influence political debate. Although Smith does find other actors to be 
influential, such as think tanks and the National Review, he draws more of a separation 
between those inside and outside politics.120  
Whilst I agree that conservative Republicans have modified their economic rhetoric, 
Smith overlooks the importance of how the property tax revolt greatly helped the popularity 
of the anti-tax message.121 But this message was not new, Herbert Hoover, Robert Taft and 
Barry Goldwater all used similar rhetoric, and with a growing population in higher tax 
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brackets this message started to gain more traction nationally. Another overlooked factor is 
how the Republican Party since the 1994 midterm election had become a conservative 
controlled party, and thus their economic message has also taken over the party at the 
congressional level and is very influential at the presidential level.  
One important discrepancy that was evident in analysing Smith’s work was the 
importance conservatives placed on the socialist label when attacking big government and 
taxes – which is contrary to Smith’s claim of “the long-since abandoned practice of equating 
the New Deal with socialism”.122 The practice has only evolved and intensified, and is at the 
core of the conservative Republican attack against the New Deal legacy. 
Socialism 
Conservative rhetoric emphasises that the GOP delivers more freedom and less 
government, and conservative Republicans are able to make this bold claim because they 
control the means of debate. Having a dominant conservative message allows them to frame 
arguments that dictate what is more or less government, what is more or less freedom and 
what is and what is not socialist – a message that Langston views as “attack[ing] the state 
without reality”.123 Yet in order to maintain control of the debate, conservative Republicans 
need to have a definition of socialism that can both attract support and be flexible enough to 
allow them a diversity of examples. Their definition of socialism has concrete examples and 
vague parameters, and is not limited to a basic definition of socialism, one which considers 
socialism to be controlling the means of production.124 In the conservative Republican 
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lexicon, it is much more complex, fitting a wide range of examples into their vague 
definition of socialism, one which considers socialism, communism, fascism, Nazism and 
American liberalism to be one and the same. As a result, they can all be used 
interchangeably.125        
By associating liberalism with four alien ideologies, and socialism in particular, 
conservative Republicans aim to discredit the political agenda of liberal Democrats. Their 
intent is threefold: firstly, challenge the legitimacy of the program; secondly, offer an 
alternative option; and thirdly, abolish the existing program. They look to discredit the entire 
legacy of the New Deal, especially social security, Medicare and national health care via the 
Affordable Care Act. 
 Throughout this thesis, I will demonstrate how conservative Republicans use the 
socialist label to discredit any attempt to add onto the New Deal legacy. By attacking 
established and popular programs, such as Medicare and social security, they question the 
long-term credibility of the program and suggest the free-market offers the best solutions to 
save the programs. They must approach popular programs this way because claiming 
outright that these programs are socialist would diminish the effectiveness of their rhetoric. 
If they cannot undo the New Deal and its legacy all at once, they intend to chip away at the 
legacy until it crumbles. 
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Aside from defining socialism, conservative rhetoric also seeks to craft a specific 
meaning for the word freedom.126 According to Foley, “The most abiding and durable self-
characterization of the United States is that of freedom. The concept of freedom lies at the 
heart of the American identity. It is at one and the same time a foundational ethic, a cultural 
reference point, a defining ideal, a controlling precept, a depiction of social reality, a 
medium of political explanation”.127 Regarding politics and freedom, He states:  
The matrix of American political argument . . . is characterized by a diversity of 
competing claims to represent the real essence of American freedom. . . . The 
shaping of issues and policy in the United States is strongly influenced by the 
interplay between the central status of freedom in American culture on the one hand 
and those values and conditions that have a distinctive meaning and an alternative 
significance in the realm of political ideas on the other hand.128  
According to historian Eric Foner, “No IDEA is more fundamental to Americans’ 
sense of themselves and as a nation than freedom.129 He also analyses “conservative 
freedom”, a meaning that varies from one branch of conservatism to the next – much like 
defining conservatism – but regrouped after World War II and during the conservative 
revival found common cause against big government liberalism by way of the New Deal and 
its ongoing political legacy, as well as other issues such as abortion and taxes.130    
Similarly, historian David Fischer declares: “In every generation many different 
visions of liberty and freedom have flourished in America”.131 He goes on to add how 
opposing visions have led to “many differences over the meaning of liberty and freedom 
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[and] have been drivers of change in American history. Every major conflict inspired new 
visions of those old ideas. Most enlarged the meaning of liberty and freedom by combining 
them in highly inventive ways. The result was a long process of change and growth. Every 
generation without exception has expanded the meaning of liberty and freedom”.132 He 
considers that Reagan reconceptualised liberty and freedom in 1980 similar to what FDR 
had accomplished in 1932, as well as Lincoln in 1860. “In 1932,” he suggests, “this great 
revival had come from the left and centered on the leadership of Franklin Roosevelt. In 1860 
it rose from the center and was led by Abraham Lincoln. In 1980, the revival came from the 
right and found its leader and symbol in Ronald Reagan”.133 
According to linguistic scholar George Lakoff: “Ideas matter. Perhaps no idea has 
mattered more in American history than the idea of freedom”, but this had led to “two very 
different views of freedom in America today, arising from two very different moral and 
political worldviews dividing the country”.134 His two opposing views are called progressive 
freedom and conservative freedom.135 He considers progressive freedom to expand freedom, 
arguing what is good for society is also good for the individual.136 This also includes 
government regulation, social security, Medicare, personal choice, the right to vote and 
collective bargaining rights. Lakoff argues that conservative freedom, on the other hand, is 
based on moral values, the free-market and individual responsibility.137 He is of the notion 
that any progressive freedom such as social security, abortion rights, taxation and 
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government regulation violates one of the three and are thus the antithesis of conservative 
freedom.138 
Another linguist, Geoffrey Nunberg examines how conservatives control not only 
political rhetoric, they also control “ordinary language”.139 Reagan’s presidential victory in 
1980 signalled the shift where conservative rhetoric overtook liberal rhetoric as the dominant 
political language.140 He considers conservative rhetoric to be “better suited to perorations 
than to specific policy proposals”, which is due to the notion that “People readily applaud 
calls for the reduction of government in the abstract . . . The misgivings arise when it comes 
to eliminating specific programs and services”.141 
For conservative elite examples, W. James Antle, editor of the Daily Caller and 
senior editor of The American Spectator, in Devouring Freedom argues that threats to 
freedom include the Affordable Care Act. He is also critical of conservative Republicans 
such as Rep. Paul Ryan (R-WI) for supporting George W. Bush’s Prescription Drug Bill 
(Medicare Part D).142 Another is Newt Gingrich who accuses “far-left radicals” in “the 
House, Senate, and Presidency” of undermining freedom, individualism and American 
exceptionalism via socialism.143 Former South Carolina Senator and now Heritage 
Foundation president Jim DeMint argues that liberal/progressive socialists have hijacked 
freedom, because real freedom is the enemy of socialism.144 DeMint additionally disdains 
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pragmatic conservative Republicanism –for example Medicare Part D – that does not stay 
true to the cause.145  
 His perspective on freedom, which adds validity to Lakoff’s argument, is: “There can 
be no freedom unless individuals have the capacity to succeed in a free society”.146 He 
continues to state: “Freedom requires that individuals be treated equally based on their 
standing before God and society, but freedom will not work unless society has the right to 
discriminate between constructive and destructive behaviour – against what we as 
individuals consider good or bad. Without the freedom to discriminate between good or bad, 
our culture will decline and our society will deteriorate”.147 Others, like RedState blog editor 
Eric Erickson and Lewis Uhler agree with the criticisms made against pragmatism by 
DeMint and Atlee, however, they also posit: “the real menace to our freedom . . . [is] Barack 
Obama and the Democrats”.148    
Individualism  
 Freedom is also defined in its relation to the individual. In the early 1830s, Alexis de 
Tocqueville declared: “Americans believe their freedom to be the best instrument and surest 
safeguard of their welfare; they are attached to the one by the other”.149 Yet they “are 
consistently excited by two conflicting passions: they want to be led, and they wish to 
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remain free”, which leads them to “think they have done enough for the protection of 
individual freedom when they have surrendered it to the power of the nation at large”.150 
 According to Foley, “While freedom is only really comprehensible in terms of 
actions and thought of self-governing individuals, individuality is seen as meaningless 
without the attribute of freedom by which a person can be emancipated into the fullness of 
his or her potential”.151 He also states: “the Bill of Rights . . . stands today as the chief 
monument to American individualism. . . . [which] includes the personal rights of free 
speech, free assembly, the free exercise of religion, and the free access to a fair trial. This 
inventory of rights represents the clearest statement of the American belief that freedom 
preserved by the state must always be qualified by guarantees of freedom from the state”.152  
 However, political scientist Barry Alan Shain disagrees: “it was not until aggressive 
nationalist public policies were adopted, after America’s entry into World War II and later 
the implementation of prominent Supreme Court decisions of the 1950s through the 1970s, 
that the individualist ethical vision and its adherents finally succeeded in supplanting the 
popular but often intolerant communalist ethical tradition”.153    
 In moving toward a more political scope, historian Richard Hofstadter in The 
American Political Tradition argued that the individualism promoted by Herbert Hoover, his 
“laissez-fare liberalism”, became an outdated belief “almost overnight” with the onset of the 
Great Depression.154 Hofstadter also acknowledged that conservative Republicans never 
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gave up on Hoover’s strong belief in “efficiency, enterprise, individualism, substantial 
laissez-fare, personal success, [and] material welfare”.155 They did, however, struggle with 
how to ensure that the tenets of Hoover’s beliefs could be recaptured under the banner of 
conservative Republicanism, which first had to battle for control of the GOP, and then 
devise a political rhetoric to gain the support of the American public – something not 
accomplished until Ronald Reagan did so in 1980. 
 In support of Hosfstader’s view, sociologist David Riesman analysed how leading up 
to 1980, “the American character” was “changing” from a more outward looking society 
during colonial times to gradually becoming more concerned about oneself – the 
individual.156 This sense of self, transforming from a view where government action 
benefited both the individual and wider society, to one where the individual was better off 
with a more limited and less active government, greatly assisted in resolving the crisis of 
Hoover’s lost individualism to the benefit of conservatives, the GOP and especially Reagan 
in 1980. But as an overall ideology, historian Morton Keller contends that since the New 
Deal era: “Conservatives, in the eyes of conservatives, are apostles of freedom and 
individualism, law and order, and Middle America”, which includes rhetoric that labels 
“government-run health care [as] socialized medicine”.157 
Un-American 
 According to political scientist Everett Carll Ladd, “the American ideology” is based 
on an individualistic ideal that is a mix of economic and political values, the concept of 
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freedom, as well as socio-moral values.158 Historian Yehoshua Arieli also considered the 
American nationalistic impulse to be a key component – along with individualism – to 
measure American ideology; as well as analysing key differences which illustrate how what 
it means to be American can be both divisive and constantly evolving.159  
 What results is opposing viewpoints of what it means to be American. Foley 
examined nationalism from the perspectives of both liberalism and conservatism.160 For him, 
an example of liberal nationalism was the North defeating the South during the Civil War, 
where the North “conclusively won the argument over the characteristics of the American 
union”.161 Slavery was no longer a fabric of the American nation. Whereas with conservative 
nationalism, he argues that it “can be used to support, and at times to conceal, a more 
restrictive conception of American nationhood. This perspective draws upon a sense of the 
alien in defining America both in terms of what it is not and in relation to protect the 
republic from corrupting influence of those that are deemed to threaten its integrity”.162 
When conservative Republicans attack Democrats and liberals for having un-American, 
“alien” ideals, they do because at the core, conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats 
have opposing viewpoints on many issues.163   
The conservative Republican assertion that both government regulation and the 
American welfare state are socialist is based on the rigid notion that any increase in 
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government power hampers the individual freedom of all Americans. They also argue that 
what liberal Democrats have already done via government regulation and the welfare state, 
and what they will propose in the future, not only limits individual freedom, but is also 
distinctly un-American. This is because what liberal Democrats propose is based on ideals 
that originated from other countries. Conservative Republicans assert that America is 
exceptional because of its own unique ideals that set it apart from every other country.164   
 They compare America to other countries because they want to convince the 
American public that granting more power to the federal government undermines individual 
freedom. Using foreign examples allows them to argue that individual freedom could be 
diluted if these changes were to take place in America.   
It is not uncommon, however, for both sides to mirror each other’s arguments. Just as 
conservative Republicans use foreign examples to provide rationale for their argument, so do 
liberal Democrats. Two of the more widely used examples by both sides are Europe 
(especially the United Kingdom) and Canada. Both countries have important ties to 
America. Amongst the various commonalities, the United Kingdom (UK) has historical ties 
via the original thirteen American colonies and the American Revolution; whilst Canada has 
a geographical significance by way of sharing a border with America. But both Canada and 
the UK also have socialised medicine.  
America also has socialised medicine, and two of the most widely used examples are 
Medicare (for the elderly) and Medicaid (for the poor) – albeit they are not universal like the 
health care networks in the UK and Canada. Nevertheless, conservative Republicans have a 
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more difficult time attacking a popular government program, such as Medicare, even if it 
implements socialized medicine. On the other hand, conservative Republicans have a much 
easier time vilifying Canada’s and the UK’s universal systems using specific rhetoric, which 
largely focuses on rationed medical care, government intervention in the doctor patient 
relationship and long waiting periods for surgery. The claims go back to the conservative 
Republican message of individual freedom, the free-market and opposition toward a 
powerful federal government, whereas liberal Democrats argue that Canada and the UK both 
have universal access that gives their citizens high quality medical care at much lower costs 
when compared to America’s private health care system.  
The contrasting philosophies of liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans 
centre on their opposing ideological views of government.165 Liberal Democrats regard 
government as an element of good in society and conservative Republicans believe it to be 
the exact opposite. I am not suggesting that liberal Democrats believe that all government is 
good and conservative Republicans consider all government to be evil, but their ideologies 
are constructed from these opposing principles.166 Conservative Republicans want to first 
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link liberal Democrats to big government totalitarians, fascists and communists as a way to 
undermine their ideology before attacking their policies.  
 The intent of conservative Republicans is to portray their party as the party of 
American values, whilst labelling Democrats as the party of un-American values. One way 
conservatives intend to achieve this is through populism.167 This portrayal has changed since 
the end of the Cold War, due in large part to how conservative Republicans have adapted 
their definition of socialism.168 This modified definition now refers to anything related to big 
government, including fascism and totalitarianism, as a form of socialism. Attacking 
socialism in America is still popular and it has been this way for some time (since at least the 
Red Scare of 1917-1919). This is largely due to conservatives controlling the Republican 
Party, along with the party stance on limited government and individual freedom. By 
modifying their definition of socialism, conservative Republicans have flexibility to use the 
socialist label in their rhetoric.169   
Their rhetoric also uses the socialist label to fight policies and programmes that they 
believe are too liberal for America. These usually centre on the notion that the federal 
government gains power at the expense of individual freedom (and the free-market). These 
topics serve as symbols for their rhetoric.170 One example from 2010 was the Tea Party’s use 
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of a billboard display to suggest that the socialism of Barack Obama is the same as the 
socialism of Hitler and Lenin.171 The billboard’s intent was to imply that Obama wanted to 
bring socialism to America, in the same way that Hitler brought it to Germany and Lenin 
produced it in Russia. 
Conservative Republicans use the socialist label to reinforce distrust in the state. 
Those who agree with their rhetoric fear that giving more control to the state will take away 
from their individual freedom. The role of the socialist label is to evoke a hostility against 
that which is associated with the label, and in contrast, a feeling of patriotism for the status 
quo. Conservative Republicans rely on this antagonism in order to present their alternative, 
which is meant to evoke a positive response. They want the socialist symbol to be regarded 
as a credible threat to America, especially to the individual. One way to make this rhetoric 
“credible” is by employing data.172    
Conservative Republicans use numerical data to make bold assertions that brand 
liberal Democrats as socialist and un-American because of the current political climate. 
However, the conservative Republican message has helped to set the parameters that the 
public follows. They have been redefining what makes the liberal Democratic agenda 
socialist for over three quarters of a century. Liberal Democrats desire the same political 
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power but have a harder time convincing the public, especially when the argument is 
structured on a platform that favours conservative Republicans. 
However, conservative Republicans are not as able to influence public opinion when 
it comes to the core strength of the New Deal legacy. As mentioned previously, the 
American public places great value on certain founding programmes, and on the foundation 
of the legacy itself. Conservative Republicans who desire to undo the legacy must first chip 
away at the outside before reaching the core. One of the ways they accomplish this is by 
narrowing their focus to particular policies, and not focusing on the ethos of liberal 
Democrats. The cause is a secondary concern to the policy at hand. I believe this to be so 
because if everything conservative Republicans opposed could be defeated by simply 
implying that it was part of the liberal Democratic (i.e. socialist) cause, giving them the 
advantage at all times, they would simply attack liberalism itself. Social security and 
Medicare, however, are considered part of the liberal Democratic order that controlled 
American politics for over three decades. The long-term credibility both programmes have 
established over decades is a powerful shield against conservative Republican accusations of 
socialism.   
If conservative Republicans can change this perception amongst the public then the 
cause may well overtake the policy as the main focal point of their rhetoric. Until then, they 
must attack each separate issue by either defeating or undoing the policy before it becomes 
popular with the public, after which it becomes more difficult to combat (i.e. social security 
and Medicare). This, on the other hand, does not dissuade them from implying that the 





The body of my thesis will follow the overall theme that conservative Republicans 
use the socialist label to combat what they believe is un-American. Within the body, there 
will be five chapters in chronological order. The next (first) chapter gives a historical 
outlook from the 1930s to the 1980s. This chapter will present the domestic strategy of 
conservative Republicans against liberal Democrats, both before and during the Cold War 
era. The second chapter will focus on health care politics during the first term of the Clinton 
presidency, the rise of Newt Gingrich and the Conservative Opportunity Society. The third 
chapter will examine how House conservative Republicans used the rhetoric of welfare 
reform to attack the New Deal itself. The fourth chapter analyses the middle four years of 
the George W. Bush presidency (2003-2006); how he attempted to build a new Republican 
majority, as well as reform social security and Medicare. The fifth chapter will focus on 
Obama’s first term and ‘Red Fascism”, health care reform, the Tea Party and Jim DeMint’s 
influence on conservative Republicanism. The conclusion will summarise how the GOP has 
become successful in critiquing big government, but has been unsuccessful in moving 
forward with a pragmatic approach that offers a governing philosophy.    
I utilise the evolving four-party politics model to illustrate the debates, opportunities 
and quandaries that exist at a particular time. The lone constant is four-party politics, 
because as the political parties evolved and government control changed, the opportunity for 
reform had changed along the particular dynamic within four-party politics. Each dynamic 
was unique and different from the rest – which resulted in different policy expectations and 
outcomes that differed from one to the next.     
54 
 
The next chapter on conservative Republicans’ evolution and adaptation of the 
socialist label and critique against liberalism forms the basis for the later chapters. Important 
events from 1933 to the 1980s helped to shape how conservative Republicans would 
confront the New Deal legacy. Conservative rhetoric played a vital role in first getting a 
conservative back into the White House, then offering an alternative narrative on the proper 
role of government – one that had its appeal in theory but was more difficult to achieve in 
practice.  
The second chapter on Clinton’s first term, four-party politics and the New Deal 
legacy closes the door on the end of the old four-party politics model and begins the post-
1994 alignment. The rise of Newt Gingrich and GOP congressional conservatism was 
occurring at a similar time when the president also pursed major policy initiatives that put 
him at odds with his congressional party. After the 1994 midterm elections, congressional 
Republicans were in a powerful position to roll back the New Deal legacy of Medicare, but 
were unable to overcome Democratic opposition. The third chapter addresses how 
conservative Republicans were better able to offer a pragmatic response towards reforming 
welfare, and were able to achieve a historic reform victory against the New Deal legacy. 
They took advantage of Clinton’s desire to highlight his moderate credentials leading up to 
the 1996 presidential election.  
Chapter four on the Bush presidency illustrates how the GOP congressional party can 
be at odds with its presidential party. This does not imply that both parties disagreed on 
many issues, but Bush was more pragmatic than the Republican controlled Congress. His 
attempts to reform social security and Medicare looked to establish a legacy of historic 
conservative reforms to the New Deal legacy, yet congressional GOP conservatives were 
much more reluctant to support such measures. They were uncomfortable expanding 
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government domestic spending, and with social security, were unwilling to support the 
president at the expense of their political careers. Bush’s attempt to embrace immigration 
reform, similar to Reagan, and expand minority support for the GOP garnered distain from 
conservatives, many of whom viewed him as having betrayed Reagan’s legacy.  
Chapter five on Obama’s first term, health care reform and the Tea Party highlights 
how the GOP congressional party failed to stop national health care reform. But after the 
2010 midterm elections, congressional power was split between Democrats and Republicans, 
which tested the resolve of conservatives, especially the Tea Party. Anti-government rhetoric 
is less successful once in a position of power. Jim DeMint’s influence over the Tea Party and 
the fact that he took over as president for the very influential conservative think tank, the 
Heritage Foundation signifies that he will influence conservative policy making for the 
foreseeable future – a viewpoint that supports polarisation and gridlock over bipartisanship 
and compromise.  
The conclusion will critique how conservative rhetoric is both the GOP’s best 
weapon, and a major obstacle in offering a pragmatic governing philosophy. The GOP is 
moving further rightward, and now reflects a conservatism that has more in common with 
traditional southern Democrats than the original anti-New Deal conservative Republicans. 
However, any concern of becoming too extreme for the public is unlikely to come about any 
time soon. The GOP controlled Congress after the 2014 midterm elections has the 
opportunity to either strive for (hyper) partisan gridlock or offer a version of pragmatic 
conservatism that will demonstrate the capacity to govern.  
My goal is to add to the debate in American politics, regarding how conservative 
Republicans employ rhetoric in an attempt to dictate policy. Conservative Republican have 
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enormous flexibility in how they use the socialist label, which is useful when attacking new 
government policies that have not yet built up credibility, as well as ones that are unpopular 
with the public. Established programs with public support have withstood the socialist label. 
However, conservative Republicans are determined to change this present reality.
57 
 
Honing Their Message: Conservative Republicans and the Socialist Label 
The average American is . . . working one-third of the time for government: a third of what 
he produces is not available for his own use but is confiscated and used by others who have 
not earned it. Let us note that by this measure the United States is already one-third 
“socialized”.                                                                          
–Barry Goldwater, 1960 
 
Amongst conservative Republicans, there is a fear that socialism is overtaking 
capitalism in America. Their concern is that individual choice and opportunity will be 
replaced with government bureaucracy, controlling what an individual can or cannot do. 
This anxiety did not emerge purely as a response to the New Deal. However, the New Deal 
presented itself as the ideological lynchpin for conservatives to attack and ridicule. Many 
conservative Republicans argue that the New Deal began unravelling the American way of 
life because it unleashed socialism in the United States. However, in order to mount an 
effective critique against the New Deal legacy, conservative Republicans had to adapt their 
rhetoric to offer a compelling alternative narrative – one that is still vital to GOP politics, as 
well as very influential in American society. 
 Two key questions that will be addressed in this chapter are:  
1. How was finding the proper socialist critique vital to any conservative Republican 
argument against the New Deal legacy?   
2. How did the socialist label aid conservative Republicans in transforming the GOP?  
 Answering these questions will help to explain how the socialist label fits into 
conservative Republican rhetoric against big government. This approach is effective because 
many Americans view socialism as foreign born. In 1933, aside from socialism there were 
other “isms” that were also viewed as foreign and thus un-American. These other “isms” 
were fascism and communism. All three were considered totalitarian because under each 
system the government wielded too much control over individual freedom. Each “ism” also 
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had a face to go with its name. Socialism was linked to Adolf Hitler and German National 
Socialism, fascism was linked to Benito Mussolini and Italian Fascism, and communism was 
linked to Josef Stalin and Russian Communism. These three forms of government were 
vastly different to the American system. In America, citizens are guaranteed certain 
individual liberties. There are limits to the president’s authority over the American people. 
Therefore, by using any or all three of the totalitarian examples, conservative Republicans 
would imply that the federal government was attempting to change America into one of the 
three foreign “isms”, which made Americans uneasy. Support for any idea that had been 
labelled in this manner was limited. After World War II, Germany and Italy were defeated 
leaving only Russia, also known as the Soviet Union or the USSR, the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics. Due to the word “socialist” in this acronym, and because the USSR was 
a communist bloc, mixing the “isms” allowed conservative Republicans to label anything 
with a foreign “ism” as a natural enemy in the onset of the Cold War with the Soviet Union.   
 Conservative Republican criticism of the New Deal and its legacy differed from that 
of Senator Joseph McCarthy’s hostility in the post-World War II era. McCarthy’s attacks 
have been labelled “McCarthyism” due his tactics of using communism to ignite a “Red 
Scare” in America. It is true that he used conservative Republican rhetoric to label 
communism as un-American, but so did many Republicans and Democrats. “McCarthyism” 
differed from conservative Republican rhetoric based on different agendas. McCarthy used 
communism to attack individuals, whom he believed to have had un-American and pro-
communist sympathies, by accusing them of conspiring to bring America under the shadow 
of communism.1 He did so without any proof of what he was insinuating, whereas 
                                                          
 1Some people have agreed with his overall anti-communist rhetoric, whilst others have not. 
However, it is hard to justify the extreme limits he took to state his cause. I have included some of the many 
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conservative Republicans attacked the New Deal and later additions because they believed 
America was changing, from a society that fostered individual freedom to one where the 
government took more of a role in legislating an individual’s freedom. 
Conservative Republicans constructed their argument based on the way the New 
Deal changed America through a democratic process. This is not to say that they did not use 
their attacks on the New Deal to further their political aspiration.2 They did, but they had 
some basis of a political philosophy to act as their guide, which was to maintain the uniquely 
American role between the people and government, a role they felt was altered by the New 
Deal.   
  The notion of America’s exceptionalism is a cherished belief of its people in general 
and conservative Republicans in particular. Conservative exceptionalism supports the 
perception that America is unique to all other nations, and has been so since its founding.3 
Therefore, any (actual or implied) attempt to implement a “foreign born” creation such as 
socialism allows conservative Republicans to label it as un-American. This also allows them 
to tarnish something they do not approve of, most notably heavy involvement by the federal 
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government. The common conservative Republican belief is that it is up to the individual to 
do what is best for their own well-being.4 
This chapter will focus on how social security came to play a future role in the US 
health care debate, along with how conservative Republicans deployed the fear of socialism 
as their main political weapon against any national health care plan. There are other aspects 
of the New Deal that conservative Republicans oppose, but this approach will illustrate the 
evolution of their rhetoric, and how they consistently used the threat of socialism as a 
political weapon against a national health care plan.   
Conservative Republicans are dead set against liberal Democratic health policies and 
are not much more accepting of moderate versions. The New Deal initiated by President 
Franklin Roosevelt forced conservative Republicans to calculate how best to counter this 
political legacy, a legacy that kept expanding, much to their dismay. At first, conservative 
Republicans tried to attach the label of socialism to every liberal Democratic idea they 
opposed, but this rationale failed because it alienated voters who valued some aspects of the 
New Deal. As a result, conservative Republicans made a political calculation to focus their 
energy on one key area where they could be effective – health care. They labelled all new 
health policies as socialist in an attempt to brand them as un-American. This improvement of 
conservative Republican strategy against the New Deal took place from 1933 to 1988.   
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 This strategic improvement coincided with the social and economic fragmentation 
that erupted in America. During the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, the social and economic 
circumstances made it difficult for conservative Republicans to combat liberal Democrats 
(with the exception of national health care) due to the fact that liberal Democratic policies 
were largely focused on improving the lives of the middle class. But starting with the Great 
Society in 1964, the liberal Democratic effort to legislate equality for minorities began to 
fracture their coalition. The public fallout of the Vietnam War in the late 60s to the mid 70s, 
and the economic turmoil in the mid to late 70s, along with divisive social issues in the 
1970s (abortion, equal rights, etc.) all helped to make many Americans consider the 
alternative solutions that conservative Republicans offered. During this time span (1933-
1988), four conservative Republicans played a key role in this re-branding of the New Deal 
and its legacy.        
The Four Horsemen 
President Herbert Hoover, Senators Robert Taft and Barry Goldwater, and President 
Ronald Reagan were four major figures in the conservative Republican fold from 1933 to 
1988. These four men came from different backgrounds and from various parts of the 
country, but each developed a strong distrust towards liberal Democrats intent on expanding 
the New Deal. Hoover, Taft, Goldwater and Reagan stand out in representing an important 
shift in conservative Republican rhetoric through their use of socialism as a political weapon 
against liberal Democrats. This proved an important base for their attacks on liberal 
Democrats because conservative Republicans believed the New Deal attacked America’s 
dedication to individual freedom, which they considered an essential American ideal. 
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Hoover was an early example of a conservative Republican who used the threat of 
socialism as a political weapon against liberals.5 Initially, he was president at the onset of the 
Great Depression. He was unable to reverse the suffering that the Great Depression caused. 
Consequently, his defeat in 1932 to Franklin Roosevelt was due largely to the depression. It 
was a defeat that left him angry at Roosevelt’s proposals to bring America out of the Great 
Depression. In his mind, Roosevelt was not up to the challenge, and only he could guide the 
country through the perils of the Depression.     
Hoover did try to use government to help overcome the depression but he was 
unwilling to go as far as Roosevelt.6 According to Hoover, “The recovery which began in 
July [1932] steadily increased over that summer, but not sufficiently to overcome that 
particular political opponent. I gave more attention to the campaign of 1932 than might be 
desirable, because I then accurately forecast that attempts would be made to revolutionize 
the American way of life.”7 The crux of his critique was that “the effort to crossbreed some 
features of Fascism and Socialism with our free system speedily developed in the Roosevelt 
administration.”8 He also contended that “in adapting the New Deal, most of the American 
people did not realize that they had departed from the road of free men.”9     
                                                          
5For more on how Hoover’s response to the New Deal launched modern GOP conservatism, see: 
Patrick Allitt, The Conservatives: Ideas and Personalities Throughout American History (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2009), 144-147, 156-157; as well as Gordon Lloyd and David Davenport, The New Deal and 
Modern American Conservatism: A Defining Rivalry (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2013), 1-17. 
Conservative intellectual Frank Meyer believed the post-war revival of conservatism was “a delayed reaction” 
to FDR and New Deal socialism; Frank S. Meyer, “Conservatism”, in Left, Right and Center: Essays on 
Liberalism and Conservatism in the United States (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1965), ed. Robert A. Goldwin, 
3-4.       
6For more, see: Harris Gaylord Warren, Herbert Hoover and the Great Depression (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1959); Harold Wolfe, Herbert Hoover: Public Servant and Leader of the Loyal Opposition 
(New York: Exposition Press, 1956), 225-271; and Joan Hoff Wilson, Herbert Hoover: Forgotten Progressive 
(1972; repr., Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1992), 122-167.  
 7Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The Great Depression 1929-1941 (New York: 
MacMillan, 1952), vii. 
 8Ibid.  
 9Ibid., 351.   
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Hoover’s approach centred on how socialism affects America’s overall economy, 
instead of focusing on how it affected the individual. He could not have targeted the 
individual because he assumed the American “people had never been conscious of 
ideological systems. They had simply lived and breathed our own American manner of 
life.”10 Hoover, on the other hand, did view individualism as an ideology. Historian 
Yehoshua Arieli considered him to be part of an elite who “considered individualism not 
only an ideology . . . but also a system of values which expressed the aspirations and the 
sense of identity of the American nation as a whole”.11 Part of Hoover’s ideological critique 
of the New Deal focused on how its socialist tendencies hampered the effectiveness of the 
private enterprise and the free-market to bring the economy to a full recovery. In this regard, 
he avowed: “during Roosevelt’s first eight years the guiding phases of the New Deal [were 
a] ‘Planned Economy’ . . . an attempt to cross-breed Socialism, Fascism, and Free 
Enterprise.”12 In addition, he charged that “Every collectivist revolution rides in on a Trojan 
horse of ‘Emergency.’ It was a tactic of Lenin, Hitler, and Mussolini.”13 He tried to imply 
that Roosevelt’s use of emergency measures against the Great Depression was a ploy to 
change the American economy from one based on American individualism to a government-
controlled economy.14  
 Hoover believed that freedom was based on what was best for America as a country, 
not the individual. In his credo, “The will-o’-the-wisp of all breeds of socialism is that they 
contemplate a motivation of human animals by altruism alone. It necessitates a bureaucracy 
                                                          
 10Ibid.   
11Yehoshua Arieli, Individualism and Nationalism in American Ideology (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1964), 341.  
 12Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, 354.   
 13Ibid., 357.   
14Hoover also considered this an attack against individual liberty. For more, see: Herbert Hoover, The 
Challenge to Liberty (1934; repr., New York: Da Capo Press, 1973).   
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of the entire population.”15 His position on American individualism centred on smart people 
doing what was right to keep America prosperous.16 In his view, “Popular desires are no 
criteria to the real need; they can be determined only by deliberative consideration, by 
education, by constructive leadership.”17 He considered the New Deal to be a liberal ploy 
that used socialism to win votes as opposed to ending the Great Depression. It was 
ultimately a successful ploy for he truly believed that America “voted for the New Deal”.18 
Therefore, he also believed Roosevelt’s public pandering undermined America’s best 
interests. The New Deal was a utopian mirage that failed to tackle the Great Depression and 
instead prolonged the misery. 
 One reason Hoover was unable to effectively exploit the New Deal was because he 
criticised Roosevelt on a personal basis. He wanted to undo Roosevelt’s popularity along 
with his policies, seeming more intent on a personal vendetta to ruin Roosevelt’s popular 
support. According to previous director of the Hoover presidential library, Timothy Walsh, 
and its senior archivist Dwight Miller, Hoover was upset with “Roosevelt’s casual use of the 
truth”. Furthermore, Roosevelt’s campaign 
effectively attacked Hoover as the man responsible for the depression and the man 
who refused to respond to this economic collapse. Neither charge was true, but the 
public wanted someone to blame for their misery and Hoover was that man. . . .  
 The loss of the presidency was a bitter blow to Hoover . . . he soon learned 
how the American people could be manipulated by a master politician such as 
Roosevelt. Hoover never forgave him.19 
                                                          
 15Herbert Hoover, American Individualism (1922; repr., New York: Garland Publishing, 1979), 17. 
16Hoover’s individualism had evolved during the later stages of World War I and the years directly 
afterwards. His view moving forward from this time constructed the basis of his views in American 
Individualism. For more on Hoover’s evolving stance on individualism, see: Gary Dean Best, The Politics of 
American Individualism: Herbert Hoover in Transition, 1918-1921 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975).  
 17Hoover, American Individualism, 25.  
18Taken from: Gary Dean Best, The Postpresidential Years, 1933-1964, vol. I, 1933-1945 (Stanford: 
Hoover Institution Press, 1983), 8.  
19Timothy Walsh and Dwight M. Miller, eds., Herbert Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt: A 
Documented History (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998), 51-52.  
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Hoover went on to dedicate the rest of his public life to opposing Roosevelt as well as the 
New Deal and its ongoing political legacy.20 
 After the Second World War, Hoover tried to help conservative Republicans reassert 
their message. With the 1946 midterm elections imminent, he declared, 
Today the great issue before the American people is free men against the tide of 
Statism which is sweeping three-quarters of the world – whether it be called 
Communism, Fascism, Socialism or the disguised American mixture of Fascism and 
Socialism called “Managed Economy” now being transformed into a further 
ambiguity, the “Welfare State.” This growth of statism has been nourished by the 
confusion of a great war. And it can grow still more by continued excessive taxation 
and by creeping inflation.21                                                                            
He was still using this collective approach to combat socialism in America, but it continued 
to lack voter appeal. He did, however, give conservative Republicans the structure to imply 
that liberal Democrats would turn the New Deal “Managed Economy” into a “Welfare 
State” by means of taxation and inflation after World War II.22 These political talking points 
would turn out to be very important to both conservative Republicans and their party. They 
possessed future ammunition that would help them, over time, voice a more effective 
political narrative against the New Deal and its ongoing political legacy. 
Senator Republican Robert Taft (R-OH) continued Hoover’s strategy of condemning 
New Deal inspired policies for working against private enterprise and in favour of more 
government control. Taft favoured free market solutions because this was what he believed 
had made America great. As such, he regarded the New Deal as un-American in its 
                                                          
20Ibid., 149-169; Best, The Postpresidential Years, vol. I; Gary Dean Best, The Postpresidential Years, 
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embodiment of socialist collectivism. In his credo, “Socialism is the denial of everything for 
which America has stood in the past, individual opportunity, individual freedom, thrift, and 
above all unquestioned faith in the rule of the majority. Surely we are not about to abandon 
our heritage of centuries of democratic government.”23 However, global events made it 
difficult for Taft’s war against the New Deal to take centre stage until the 1946 midterm 
elections.  
To a large degree, the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 and the American 
entry into the conflict on 8 December 1941 brought a pause to most domestic condemnation 
of the New Deal. However, the end of the war signalled a return to domestic politics.24 With 
the country changing back to a peacetime economy, labour unrest in 1945 and 1946 and 
post-war tension with the Soviet Union all combined to make Americans anxious. On top of 
this, Roosevelt’s death in April 1945 made Harry Truman president. Taft realized the four 
events presented an opportunity for the GOP.25 They could effectively use the threat of 
socialism as a political device to their advantage. His rationale was to elect a Republican 
Congress that could challenge Truman. He told audiences on the 1946 campaign trail that 
Truman “coveted the ‘support of . . . the communists in the November election,’ and sought 
a Congress ‘dominated by a policy of appeasing the Russians abroad and of fostering 
Communism at home’”.26  
                                                          
 23Clarence E. Wunderlin, Jr., ed., The Papers of Robert A. Taft: Volume 1, 1889-1938 (Kent: Kent State 
University Press, 1997), 481.   
24Although Taft battled New Deal liberals on many domestic aspects, such as wartime government 
contracts throughout the war period; James T. Patterson, Mr. Republican: A Biography of Robert A. Taft 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), 255-267.  
25Farber, The Rise and Fall of Modern American Conservatism, 31-34; Patterson, Mr. Republican, 302-
314; and David W. Reinhard, The Republican Right since 1945 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983), 
9-14.  
26Patterson, Mr. Republican, 313.     
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Taft also shifted the focus of his attacks away from the New Deal and onto how its 
long-term impact would expand government involvement in the public’s everyday life. This 
shift made it possible for conservative Republicans to position themselves against the future 
ramifications of the New Deal.  
This alteration was largely due to political necessity. Republicans wanted to defeat 
the Democrats and they needed to offer something that could appeal to the public. This 
change gave conservative Republicans an opportunity to present how they and their fellow 
Republicans could bring back American individualism. According to Taft, in an 11 
September 1946 speech: “Only a Republican Congress can assure real and liberal progress 
through the restoration of freedom and individual opportunity”. He went on to avow: “More 
progress can come from freedom than from all the planned economy in the Communist or 
New Deal handbook.”27 Instead of trying to imply the New Deal was bad for America, he 
focused on why expanding the New Deal policies would be harmful to America. And as 
highlighted in the previous chapter, Taft did not go back on this strategy during his 1950 
midterm re-election campaign.     
This shift in position allowed Taft to take a more individualistic approach toward 
combating the legacy of the New Deal. He was able to imply how this legacy would affect 
each individual American instead of America’s collective identity. This was evident when he 
declared on 19 October 1945, “At home, liberty is the basis of success which we have 
achieved in building up the greatest and most powerful nation in the world. . . . Freedom of 
opportunity must be our goal rather than security”; for “[o]ur people are too much inclined 
to look to the government for the solution of every problem, and forget the great increase of 
                                                          
 27Clarence E. Wunderlin, Jr., ed., The Papers of Robert A. Taft: Volume 3, 1945-1948 (Kent: Kent State 
University Press, 2003), 177-178. 
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centralized power which the policy creates.”28 Taft did not worry about past failures; instead 
he focused on the future ramifications of the New Deal legacy, which was how liberal 
Democrats wanted to unleash socialism in America.   
As a result, Taft positioned the GOP as defending the freedom of opportunity that 
was the American way of life, versus the Democrats who would let the government control 
every aspect of life. His strategy enabled him to refrain from attacking popular elements of 
the New Deal like social security in order to fight against future expansions of the New Deal 
state, especially a national health care plan. In 1946, Taft also alleged “the Truman federal 
compulsory sickness insurance plan . . . would nationalize, federalize and socialize the entire 
field of medicine. . . . it would regulate the health activities of 95% of the people”.29 Echoing 
an earlier 1945 statement that asserted the “socialization of medicine” could lead to a 
complete “socializing of the state”.30 In a 7 October 1946 speech, he went on to cite the 
importance of taxes vis-à-vis socialized medicine. “But the fact is that this is not insurance. 
It is a plan for government administration of all medical care, supported by a tax on pay 
rolls. There is no difference between a pay roll tax and other tax. This can’t be insurance if a 
man has no option except to pay for it”.31 His conviction did not waver after Truman’s 1948 
re-election.32 Much like Hoover, the subject of taxes allowed Taft and conservative 
Republicans to make the case that paying less in taxes helped to combat socialism.33  
Taft’s death in 1953 allows for some debate on how he might have further evolved 
his approach to rhetoric surrounding the expansion of the New Deal legacy. For example, he 
                                                          
 28Ibid., 84. 
 29Ibid., 181.  
 30Ibid., 88, 90.    
 31Ibid., 202.  
32For more, see: Clarence E. Wunderlin, Jr., ed., The Papers of Robert A. Taft: Volume 4, 1949-1953 
(Kent: Kent State University Press, 2006), 37-42, 117-118, 148-149, 202-203. 
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may have taken a tougher position on welfare similar to that of Hoover, or he may not have, 
given that he did favour using the power of the government to help the poor, most notably in 
regards to public housing.34 In Taft’s view, the welfare state was socialist, whereas providing 
aid to the poor was the duty of a humane society.35 In January 1949 he wrote that 
government should provide limited social welfare assistance in areas like public housing and 
medical care to those who are in need, but that this was “not socialism”. Furthermore, 
“Government aid should be given only to those who cannot pay for it. The aid so given 
cannot be so heavy as to burden unduly the other four-fifths of the people who pay the taxes 
to support it, nor must it be so high that men who do not work are better off than those who 
do”.36 
Nonetheless, even though Taft’s tactics highlighted how conservative Republicans 
were determined to advocate for individual freedom against New Deal liberalism, he faced 
an uphill struggle to become the party presidential nominee. The intra-party struggles 
amongst liberals, moderates and conservatives proved to be an obstacle that he could not 
overcome – especially his ongoing battle with New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey from 
1944 to 1952.37 Taft’s loss in 1952 to Dwight Eisenhower – whom Dewey supported – was 
initially difficult for him and other conservative Republicans to accept.38 Hoover was one 
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who supported Taft because he did not have the “taint of ‘me-too-ism’”.39 More 
Republicans, however, believed that Eisenhower was the best option to defeat the 
Democrats. And in the end, both Taft and Hoover supported Eisenhower because he would 
help their party win the presidential election for the first time since 1928, ending twenty 
consecutive years of a Democratic White House.40  
Although Eisenhower moderate Republicanism displeased conservatives, he was 
fully committed to halting New Deal expansion to bring the country back from the slippery 
slope to socialism.41 But the “middle way” of the Eisenhower presidency, to many 
conservative Republicans, still led America down the road to socialism – one such 
conservative was Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ).42 
Following Taft’s lead, Goldwater built on the strategy of linking socialism to the 
diminishing freedom of the individual. His strategy was very simple and very personal from 
the beginning. He believed that “conservatism is not an economic theory, though it has 
economic implications.”43 According to Goldwater, “conservatives wanted to free the 
country from Roosevelt’s economic, social, and political engineers”.44 He also believed that 
“the Conservative looks upon politics as the art of achieving the maximum amount of 
freedom for individuals”, as well as supporting the notion that “for the American 
conservative there is no difficulty in identifying the day’s overriding political challenge: it is 
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to preserve and extend freedom”.45 He wanted to highlight how the New Deal agenda 
entailed steadily taking away individual freedom, resulting ultimately in socialism.   
Goldwater carried on where Hoover and Taft left off, asserting socialism as 
freedom’s nemesis.  
Here is an indication of how taxation currently infringes on our freedom. A family 
man earning $4,500 a year works, on the average, twenty-two days a month. Taxes, 
visible  and invisible, take approximately 32% of his earnings. This means that one-
third, or seven whole days, of his monthly labor goes for taxes. The average 
American is therefore working one-third of the time for government: a third of what 
he produces is not available for his own use but is confiscated and used by others 
who have not earned it. Let us note that by this measure the United States is already 
one-third “socialized”.46  
He wanted to make the case that paying less in taxes was good Americanism, whereas 
paying more in taxes supported un-American ideals. Socialism to Goldwater was an 
“encroachment of individual freedom by Big Government”.47 And upcoming battles would 
decide if the menace of big government was to be quelled or continue unopposed.     
Goldwater had a clear goal in mind regarding the role conservative Republicans were 
to play in halting the expansion of the New Deal philosophy. However, he was not sure if he 
could entirely trust his own party in this endeavour. This was evident when he said, “I am 
here concerned not so much by the abandonment of States’ Rights by the national 
Democratic Party –an event that occurred some years ago when that party was captured by 
the Socialist ideologues in and about the labor movement –as by the unmistakable tendency 
of the Republican Party to adopt the same course”.48 He was referring to how the 1932 
Socialist Party platform, with regards to labour, was similar to the 1936 Democratic Party 
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Platform,49 along with his belief that Eisenhower and some congressional Republicans did 
not try to nationalise right-to-work laws that conservatives and business were pushing at 
state level.50 
 In response to the perceived lack of commitment by some in his party, Goldwater 
presented conservative Republicans with a clear vision of how to proceed against the 
expansion of New Deal social policies. In his 1988 memoir, he recalled how “We 
conservatives were determined to reverse the policies of ‘moderate’ Republicans who were 
little better than ‘Me Too’ Democrats”.51 He also avowed: “Republican liberals had accepted 
many of the New Deal’s reforms of the 1930s and 1940s as permanent”. And this led him to 
conclude, “The Eastern GOP establishment was a pale imitation of the Democratic Party”.52   
 According to Goldwater, conservative Republicans needed to return to their core 
“economic, social and political practices based on the successes of the past.”53 His core 
beliefs revolved around glorifying the days before Roosevelt, during Hoover’s presidency. 
Historian David Reinhard regarded Goldwater’s “political beliefs” as “unabashedly pre-New 
Deal”.54 Even after he secured the 1964 GOP presidential nomination, the attack against the 
New Deal legacy continued with public comments expressing his support for privatising 
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social security, selling off the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), as well as opposing 
Medicare and Civil Rights legislation.55   
And although LBJ defeated Goldwater by a landslide in the 1964 presidential 
election, his opposition to 1964 Civil Rights legislation helped to secure the support of states 
from the deep South, as well as southern Democrats from the region such as Senator Strom 
Thurmond (SC) – who became a Republican in 1964 and was also the “Dixiecrat” 
presidential candidate in 1948.56 In congressional terms, however, the South remained a 
Democratic stronghold until the 1994 midterm elections, but captured southern white 
majorities for the GOP in presidential elections.57 Moreover, Goldwater’s presidential 
campaign fanned the flames of conservative Republicans’ determination to challenge the 
New Deal legacy, as well as providing a national spotlight as part of Reagan’s rise within the 
GOP.            
Reagan also took up the fight against the New Deal and its ongoing legacy, labelling 
it socialist and un-American. His contribution to the conservative Republican attack 
culminated with his two terms as president of the United States.  
Reagan’s strong regard for the freedom of the individual led his charge against the 
New Deal legacy – especially the Great Society. His stance was unique because it combined 
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the overall approach of Hoover, Taft and Goldwater, with his excellent public speaking 
skills (along with the fact that he had abandoned the Democratic Party in favour of the 
GOP). These three advantages gave him the leeway to attack the previous and future 
ambitions of liberal Democrats.  
Reagan’s conversion from liberal Democrat to conservative Republican did not 
happen spontaneously, but instead gradually throughout the post-World War II and early 
Cold War period.58 Stating in his presidential memoir: “I guess it was in 1960, the year 
Richard Nixon ran against John F. Kennedy for the presidency, that I completed my political 
journey from liberal Democrat to . . . [conservative] Republican”.59 His reason for changing 
parties in 1962 mirrored that of Strom Thurmond’s in 1964 who, whilst campaigning for 
Goldwater, avowed: “I did not leave the Democratic Party. It left me!”60 Reagan supported 
Roosevelt’s expansion of government as temporary but vital to combat the Great 
Depression. “Many of the relief programs FDR instituted during the Depression were 
necessary measures during an emergency, but I remain convinced that it was never his 
intention – nor those of many of liberal supporters – to make giveaway programs that 
trapped families forever on a treadmill of dependency a permanent feature of our 
government”, he said. In contrast, the proposed expansion of big government under 
Kennedy, then Johnson, was something he considered to be permanent “and impose a subtle 
kind of socialism”.61 He was adamant in his defence of Roosevelt and the New Deal, and 
condemnation of Johnson and the Great Society – writing in 1982: “The press is dying to 
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paint me as now trying to undo the New Deal. I remind them I voted for F.D.R. 4 times. I’m 
trying to undo the ‘Great Society’. It was L.B.J.’s war on poverty that led to our present 
mess”.62  
But it is important to acknowledge that as he came to embrace and become a vital 
spokesman for conservative Republicanism, he also became more sceptical of the entirety of 
the New Deal legacy – examples include social security and the Tennessee Valley Authority 
(TVA).    
Regarding social security, Reagan wrote in 1977 that “Most of you with the present 
tax could buy in the open insurance mkt. a retirement policy with life protection paying far 
more than present soc. security benefits”.63 He also made a similar comment in his “A Time 
for Choosing” speech in support of Goldwater in 1964, as well as during a television address 
in 1962.64 His stance was not an outright condemnation of social security, but suggested that 
the free-market would present more opportunity for individual freedom than a plan under the 
control of the federal government. His support for privatising social security demonstrates 
how conservative Republicans can successfully use the financial incentives of unrestrained 
capitalism to combat the present state of social security.65 
Regarding TVA, in the same 1962 television address, Reagan questioned the 
rationale of a planned economy, accusing liberal Democrats of failing to use government to 
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spur economic growth and development. He was intent on asserting that the more this is 
done, the more individual freedom is put at risk, for the large amount of government 
spending in the region has failed to yield the desired results. “And yet in the 169 counties of 
that [TVA] area, in spite of all this spending, the Labor Department declares that more than 
50% of those counties are permanent areas of poverty, distress and unemployment”, all of 
which is possible due to the increasing tax burden on the American people.66 He made 
similar remarks against TVA in 1959.67 
When it came to taxes and socialism, Reagan’s rhetoric was consistent with that of 
Hoover, Taft and Goldwater. “A basic point to remember is that none of these extensions of 
socialism can be effected without money. The fodder upon which our government has fed 
and grown beyond the consent of the governed is the fruit of the tax system whose only 
consistency is that a levy once imposed is seldom removed”.68 He also claimed that income 
tax was a “progressive tax directly from Karl Marx who designed it as the prime essential of 
a socialist state. In the surtax brackets, the steepest rate of increase occurs through the 
middle income range where are to be found the bulk of our small businessmen, professional 
people, and supervisory personnel – the people Marx said should be taxed out of 
existence”.69 He made both statements in 1961, when he was a closet conservative 
Republican – he also made similar remarks in 1958 and 1959.70 Consequently, Reagan’s 
loose affiliation with Democrats, along with his previous two comments on socialism and 
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taxes, suggests that he believed the Democratic Party was morphing into an adversary, rather 
than realising that the GOP was more in line with the beliefs he had held all along.   
Besides Reagan’s position on taxes and socialism, he also held a clear position 
regarding liberal Democrats, national health care and socialism. “Following the election that 
year (1960), I began to get more and more invitations from the Republicans to speak at their 
dinners and fundraisers and they more or less adopted me as one of their own even though I 
was still a Democrat. When a lot of the nation’s most prominent Democrats got behind 
socialized medicine (the Kerr-Mills bill), I started speaking out against it”.71 In March 1961, 
he also said,  
the liberal persuasion have used our sense of fair play – our willingness to 
compromise –  and have perfected a technique of ‘foot in the door’ legislation. Get 
any part of a proposed program accepted, then with the principle of governmental 
participation in that field established, work for expansion, always aiming at the 
ultimate – a government that will someday be a big brother to us all.                                                             
 Traditionally, one of the easiest first steps in imposing statism on a people has 
been government paid medicine.72 
 However, he had previously supported at least two “prominent Democrats” who 
supported a national health care plan, Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman. One might 
wonder why Reagan did not consider Roosevelt and Truman “prominent Democrats”. It may 
have been that he liked Roosevelt and Truman enough to simply agree to disagree with both 
of them, whereas with Johnson and the Great Society he did not want to draw attention to his 
“socialist” past. 
Reagan considered the Great Society’s accomplishments to be what Hoover earlier 
deemed as “welfare”. Regarding Medicare, in 1968 he questioned the government’s role for 
providing health care benefits to senior citizens.  
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Any Medicare program will have a heavy influence on private sector health services. 
Therefore, in developing the programs we need, we must remember our obligation to 
preserve the voluntary hospital system, the private health insurance programs, and 
the integrity of doctors who have given this nation the best medical care in the world 
under the private enterprise system. 
We have a responsibility to face up to the fact that those nations which have 
turned to nationalized programs or socialized medicine cannot match the quality of 
medical care that we have developed under a contrary system.73  
It is evident that Reagan was not in favour of Medicare’s socialist tendencies, which 
mandated that one individual had to pay for another’s medical care.  
Conservative Republicans consider this un-American because the individual has no 
freedom of choice in the matter; they are expected to pay taxes that will not be self-
beneficial. This same rationale could also be used by conservative Republicans against 
social security, where the individual is paying taxes for the benefit of others. However, 
social security and Medicare are still deeply ingrained in American society.        
Reagan’s stance against liberalism can make it seem as though the views of 
Democrats changed, and he simply no longer agreed with them. It seems this way because 
he used this strategy to attack liberal Democrats for wanting to implement socialist policies 
for all Americans. He used his past experiences as a Democrat to serve as proof of the un-
American beliefs liberals harbour against individual freedom. He wanted to warn America 
about its future if liberal Democrats were to completely socialise the country. To advocate 
his point, in the same March 1961 speech, he avowed: 
the Founding Fathers – that little band of men so advanced beyond their time that the 
world has never seen their like since – evolved a government based on the idea that 
you and I have the God -given right and ability within ourselves to determine our 
own destiny. Freedom is never more than one generation away from extinction – we 
didn’t pass it on to our children in the bloodstream. It must be fought for, protected, 
and handed on for them to do the same, or one day we will spend our sunset years 
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telling our children and our children’s children what it was like in the United States 
when men were free.74   
Reagan’s attempt to link himself with Roosevelt is the ultimate aspiration for 
conservative Republicans because they want to be able to use Reagan as a figurehead to 
attack the legacy of the New Deal. Quite simply, they want to brand liberal Democrats as 
socialists, thereby showing that conservative Republicans (and their party) will, according to 
Reagan, pursue Roosevelt’s true legacy.75 To emphasize this, in his 1990 memoir he stated:  
FDR in many ways set in motion the forces that later sought to create big 
government and bring a form of veiled socialism to America. But I think that many 
people forgot Roosevelt ran for president on a platform dedicated to reducing waste 
and fat in government. He called for cutting federal spending by twenty-five percent, 
eliminating useless boards and commissions and returning to states and communities 
powers that had been wrongfully seized by the federal government. If he had not 
been distracted by war, I think he would have resisted the relentless expansion of the 
federal government that followed him.76   
Reagan maintained this argument, but Hoover, Taft and Goldwater claimed that liberal 
Democrats embraced socialism before World War II. Unlike Reagan, they argued that 
Roosevelt was the start of it all, but he was determined to use Roosevelt’s legacy to his (and 
his party’s) advantage.77   
 Reagan’s implication that the GOP would continue with Roosevelt’s original intent 
was effective in his 1980 presidential victory. He made a point of attacking the size and the 
role of government, using the state of the US economy, especially with regards to inflation. 
During the 1980 presidential debate versus Jimmy Carter, Reagan criticized his opponent for 
pursuing big government economic policies that were damaging to the American people.  
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[Carter] has blamed the people for inflation. . . . He has then accused people of living 
too well and said that we must share in scarcity, we must sacrifice and get used to 
doing with less. We don’t have inflation because the people are living too well. We 
have inflation because the government is living too well. . . . 
Yes, you can lick inflation by increasing productivity and by decreasing the 
cost of government to the point where we have balanced budgets and are no longer 
grinding out printing press money, flooding the market with it because the 
government is spending more than it takes in. And my plan calls for that. The 
President’s economic plan calls for increasing the taxes to the point that we finally 
take so much money away from the people that we can balance the budget in that 
way. But we will have a very poor nation and a very sound economy if we follow 
that path.78  
Whilst he offered a critical rebuke of Carter’s stewardship of the economy, does his 1980 
presidential victory demonstrate that the conservative Republican message had gained 
widespread public approval?79 Regardless of whether Reagan’s 1980 presidential election 
was an indication of the public’s view on conservative Republican rhetoric, the government 
was no longer considered the saviour it had been during the Great Depression. Instead the 
public now perceived government to be the enemy, threatening individual freedom.80       
Reagan’s overall approach shows that whilst conservative Republicans may have 
adjusted their message, from defending the free-market to embracing the freedom of the 
individual within the free-market, Hoover’s original disregard for the New Deal has never 
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wavered. Instead the message has improved,81 and built upon a foundation of a rhetoric 
aimed at using socialism against opponents. 
Presidential Responses to Socialism 
 Every president from FDR to Reagan has commented on socialism. However, the 
presidential rhetoric can be broken down into two main themes; more government 
involvement is either desirable or undesirable. How presidents applied this rhetoric differed 
depending on their political views. By analysing their presidential records, their political 
views can be compared to the conservative Republican definition of socialist. Based on their 
presidential records, the presidents can be broken down into three different categories. The 
breakdown of the presidents is as follows: liberal Democrats - Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy, 
and Johnson; moderates - Eisenhower (Republican), Nixon (Republican), and Carter 
(Democrat); conservative Republicans - Ford and Reagan.   
 From the conservative Republican perspective, liberal Democrats, moderate 
Democrats and moderate Republicans all believed more government involvement was good; 
which meant that only conservative Republicans believed less government was better. The 
fact that moderate Democrats or moderate Republicans did not want as much government 
involvement as liberal Democrats was beside the point; they still wanted more government 
involvement than conservative Republicans felt was necessary.    
 The goal for liberal Democrats during this time was to eliminate the fear that their 
policies were socialist. In 1935, Roosevelt attempted to do so when he said,  
It is time to make an effort to reverse that process of the concentration of power 
which has made most American citizens, once traditionally independent owners of 
their own businesses, helplessly dependent for their daily bread upon the favour of a 
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very few, who by devices such as holding companies, have taken for themselves 
unwarranted economic power. I am against private socialism of concentrated power 
as thoroughly as I am against governmental socialism. The one is equally as 
dangerous as the other; and destruction of private socialism is utterly essential to 
avoid governmental socialism.82   
His statement allowed him to claim that he was indeed standing up for individual freedom. 
He was ensuring that this freedom was not crushed by either private enterprise nor by the 
government. Roosevelt started the political battle between liberal Democrats and 
conservative Republicans vis-à-vis which ideology truly represented individual freedom; 
whereas moderate Democrats and moderate Republicans were stuck battling both 
perspectives.    
 Social security and national health care were two objectives that liberal Democrats 
wanted to implement and conservative Republicans fought against. Roosevelt in 1934 stated 
his intent for  
the agencies of government to assist in the establishment of means to provide sound 
and adequate protection against the vicissitudes of modern life – in other words, 
social insurance. . . . A few timid people who fear progress, will try to give you new 
and strange names for what we are doing.  Sometimes they will call it “Fascism,” 
sometimes “Communism,” sometimes “Regimentation,” sometimes “Socialism.”  
But, in so doing, they are trying to make very complex and theoretical something that 
is really very simple and very practical.83   
Considering that “social insurance” was the initiative that would lead to social security, 
conservative Republicans were the “few timid people” against it because, from their 
perspective, it was un-American. A great deal of conservative Republicans considered social 
security un-American because it made individuals dependent on the federal government for 
their well-being. In 1935, many conservatives, in both parties, spoke out against Roosevelt’s 
social security legislation. One such conservative Democrat viewed social security as a 
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means for liberal Democrats “to centralize power . . . to socialize and federalize the Nation 
in all its affairs”, as well as “to concentrate in Washington all power and reduce the States to 
a system of vassalage, and to convert a free people, able to manage and conduct their own 
affairs, into humble supplicants for the crumbs and for the benefits which may fall from the 
national table”. 84 He was also hopeful that social security would be found unconstitutional 
because “the bill undertakes to impose a tax”, and furthermore:  
the bill rights enforceable at law are granted to private citizens, irrespective of the 
character of their employment, irrespective of the character of the industry in which 
employed, in every State in the Union; and that, in my judgement, clearly shows that 
an effort is here made to establish a system which does not lie within the powers 
granted to the Congress, but under which have been definitely reserved to the states 
under the reserved rights and powers of the States.85   
However, this was not the case; the Supreme Court ruled that Congress did have the power 
to enforce the right of individuals to have a government pension plan funded by federal 
payroll taxes.86    
 In 1935, Roosevelt not only wanted to establish social security, he wanted to achieve 
more for “social insurance”. He stated: “the . . . organizations and the . . . individuals who 
are now crying about the socialism involved in social security legislation, in bank deposit 
insurance, in farm credit, in the saving of homes, in the protection of investors and the 
regulation of public utilities. . . . must learn that many other social ills can be cured”.87 One 
of the “other social ills” the president wanted to cure was to make health care more widely 
available.          
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 Even though social security was signed into law by Roosevelt in 1935, national 
health care would still be a priority for all four of the liberal Democratic presidents.88 The 
presidential records of Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy and Johnson signify they had all 
envisioned social security as the first step toward some version of a national health care plan 
because righting one “social ill” created the platform to take on another. 
 The liberal Democratic presidencies of FDR and Truman failed in making a national 
health care plan a reality. Their defeats were largely due to the charge of socialized 
medicine, which implied that a national health care plan would change how Americans 
received their medical care. Conservative Republicans were aided in their campaign of 
opposition by the American Medical Association (AMA) and southern congressional 
Democrats – especially the powerful Finance committee chair, Sen. Walter George (D-
GA).89 For Roosevelt, a strong show of public support was needed to win over southern 
Democrats.90 However, in all likelihood, he would have had to further compromise to get 
any legislation passed, in a similar manner as with social security – by not challenging 
states’ rights.91 But Roosevelt was hesitant to add health care to his growing list of battles. 
The birth of the New Deal state meant that he had to engage in one fight at a time, especially 
                                                          
88Although for Roosevelt, national health care was not as important a priority as social security and 
other pressing needs as a result of the Great Depression. For more see: James Blumenthal and James A. 
Morone, The Heart of Power: Health and Politics in the Oval Office (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2009), 53-54; as well as Bryan D. Jones and Billy Hall, “Issue Expansion in the Early Clinton Administration: 
Health Care and Deficit Reduction”, in The New American Politics: Reflections on Political Change and the 
Clinton Administration (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), ed. Byron D. Jones, 199-200. 
89Blumenthal and Morone, The Heart of Power, 46-47, 51-52, 54-55, 70.  
90Ibid., 51-52.  
91For more, see: Charles Noble, Welfare as We Knew It: A Political History of the American Welfare 
State (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 59-66, 71-73. In a larger perspective, the congressional 
‘conservative coalition’ was able to restrain liberalism, even during the New Deal. For more, read: Barton J. 
Bernstein, “The New Deal: The Conservative Achievements of Liberal Reform”, in Towards a New Past: 
Dissenting Essays in American History (London: Chatto & Windus, 1970), ed., Bernstein, 263-288; James T. 
Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal: The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in 
Congress, 1933-1939 (Westport, CT: Green Wood Press, 1981); and John F. Manley, “The Conservative 
Coalition in Congress”, American Behavioral Scientist 17, no. 2 (November/December 1973): 223-247, 
http://abs.sagepub.com/content/17/2/223.full.pdf+html (accessed 21 May 2015). 
85 
 
after his failed attempt to oust southern Democrats in the 1938 midterm elections. For if they 
were sceptical of supporting him beforehand, their opposition became more resolute 
afterwards.92 
Roosevelt and Truman achieved greater success when they used New Deal (for 
Roosevelt) and Fair Deal (for Truman) liberalism via the “security” element. Some of these 
acts were: minimum wage, the forty hour work week, the GI Bill and social security. The 
public found it easy to identify with these initiatives. The outcomes were to increase the 
overall security of Americans. This was popular with the public and Congress was more 
inclined to support these measures. The difference with national health care was that it called 
for exchanging an established private health care system in favour of a government (public) 
health care system. How this change would affect the public was open to different 
interpretations.            
 Roosevelt made two failed attempts to combat the label of socialism surrounding his 
support for national health care in 1938 and 1939. In 1938 he said, “this plan contemplated 
no centralized and bureaucratic control or form of ‘socialized medicine,’ as frequently 
charged by some critics. Rather, it was simply a proposal to work out the problem of giving 
some assurance to wage earners of continuity of income through periods of disability due to 
sickness”.93 After this setback, in 1939 he tried to further his goal by insisting that “there can 
be no substitute for the personal relationship between doctor and patient. . . . Neither the 
American people nor their government intends to socialize medical practice anymore than 
they plan to socialize industry. There is no basis for the charge of the opponents of the 
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national health program that it was designed to socialize medicine”.94 FDR became 
preoccupied with war issues after this defeat, but Harry Truman would renew the health care 
debate.95 
 Truman was also unsuccessful in combating the charge of socialized medicine, but 
failed four times instead of Roosevelt’s two. He battled the socialist implication surrounding 
health care in 1945, 1948, 1951 and 1952. In 1945, he echoed Roosevelt’s 1939 attempt to 
argue that “people should remain free to choose their own physicians and hospitals.”96 But 
unlike Roosevelt, his approach in 1945, 1948 and 1951 focused on making make health care 
affordable for all Americans.97  
Truman’s last attempt in 1952 to combat the charge of socialized medicine 
emphasized that conservative Republicans’ disapproval of a national health care plan was 
part of their larger agenda to label the entire New Deal legacy with the threat of “creeping 
socialism”. “[Senator] Taft”, Truman remarked, “explained that the great issue in this 
campaign is ‘creeping socialism.’ Now that is the patented trademark of the special interests 
lobbies. Socialism is a scare word they have hurled at every advance in the last 20 years”. 
But such a campaign was really against the New Deal legacy. For when Taft argued for 
“Down with socialism”, “[w]hat he really means”, Truman decreed, “is ‘Down with 
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Progress – down with Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal,’ and ‘down with Harry Truman’s Fair 
Deal’”. 98 This last statement suggests that Truman realized he may have lost the battle with 
conservative Republicans over health care, but was determined to support the legacy of the 
New Deal – especially when he considered shifting the focus on health care reform to the 
elderly.99   
The liberal Democratic presidencies of John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson carried 
on the work of Roosevelt and Truman. Both Kennedy and Johnson were responsible for 
expanding the New Deal legacy. Kennedy modified the plan of attack for liberals by 
focusing on senior citizens. “[T]here remains”, he said “a significant gap that denies to all 
but those with the highest incomes a full measure of security – the cost of ill health in old 
age”. And to address the problem, he went on to propose: “a health insurance program”, “for 
all persons aged 65 and over who are eligible for social security and railroad benefits”. In 
defence of his proposal, Kennedy was adamant that it was “not a program of socialized 
medicine. It is a program of prepayment of health costs with absolute freedom of choice 
guaranteed. Every person will choose his own doctor and hospital”.100 
 Using the popularity of social security, Kennedy’s strategy looked to outmanoeuvre 
GOP claims of socialised medicine. In 1961, 1962 and 1963 he employed Truman’s stance 
on affordability and the freedom of choice for patients to pick their own doctors.101 
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Kennedy, however, implied that since seniors already had social security, health care 
benefits for seniors were a personal freedom and a right they deserved. “Three-fourths of 
older people have incomes of less than $2,000 a year. Only half of them have any kind of 
hospital insurance, and I believe that this represents an opportunity to permit them through 
the Social Security System – which was once opposed in the thirties, but which is now a 
blessing – to participate in providing for their own security when they are older”, he said.102 
Yet just like Truman, conservative Republicans defeated him every time in his quest for 
health care.   
 Kennedy never did alter his approach toward his health care plan. He was wilful in 
his defence against conservative Republicans and (southern) Democrats. He thought the 
conviction of the New Deal social security legacy would rise above the conservative 
Republican labels of “welfare, socialism, and communism.”103 When this failed, he declared 
“The fact of the matter is, since the loss in 1938, Franklin Roosevelt’s second term, when 
Democrats lost so many seats, there has been a balance of power in the House and the Senate 
which has made it very difficult to pass any legislation which involves important 
interests”.104  
Thus, it would seem that Kennedy was issuing a challenge to the American people: if 
they wanted more of the popular New Deal they had better elect more liberal Democrats to 
Congress. He further reiterated this claim by saying “I hope that we will return in November 
a Congress that will support a program like Medical Care for the Aged, a program which has 
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been fought by the American Medical Association and successfully defeated”.105 Since he 
died before his first term ended it is hard to say if his defiance towards conservative 
Republicans would have brought him success. However, Lyndon Johnson was able to 
continue the liberal Democrat’s fight against conservative Republican rhetoric. 
 Johnson was able to use the conservative Republican aggression toward the New 
Deal legacy to his political advantage. Leading up to the 1964 presidential election, on 26 
October 1964, he criticised Barry Goldwater’s comments on making social security 
voluntary. “The entire social security supported by every president of both parties has been 
threatened”. Johnson went on to say, “[a] voluntary plan would destroy social security as we 
know it”.106 The mere mention by conservative Republicans of making social security 
“voluntary” allowed him to claim that the New Deal was under attack. The remarks were 
similar to earlier comments he made on 8 October 1964: “the . . . issue is whether we are 
going to wipe out and throw away that program of 30 years under five presidents. . . . to go 
back, to repeal the present and to veto the future”.107 These statements allowed Johnson to 
maintain he was defending what Roosevelt had started, and that if this conservative 
Republican attack were successful, it could lead America back to the suffering that 
individuals endured during the Great Depression. In doing so, he reminded voters of 
Kennedy’s call to elect more liberal Democrats to move forward with the New Deal, and 
stated how conservative Republicans were not only fighting the New Deal legacy, they were 
now trying to dismantle it. Johnson’s new term in office followed with the passing and then 
the signing of the Medicare Bill on 30 July 1965. To mark this occasion, he said “perhaps no 
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single act in the entire administration of the beloved Franklin D. Roosevelt . . . did more to 
win him the illustrious place in history . . . as did the laying of that cornerstone [social 
security]. . . . And . . . this day will also be remembered for making the most important 
addition to that structure . . . in three decades.”108   
 Johnson’s new national health insurance plan for seniors, Medicare, was adored by 
liberal Democrats, but loathed by conservative Republicans because it expanded the legacy 
of the New Deal. Even though he did not take on the challenge of passing a national health 
care plan for all Americans, he did spend his remaining years as president defending himself 
(as well as the New Deal legacy) against the conservative Republican accusation that he had 
contributed to socialism in America.109 On one occasion, in 1966, he said, “Once again they 
talked about socialism; about the destruction of the free enterprise”. And his reply was 
“[t]oday, social security and Medicare stand as two of the most historic programs ever 
enacted in Congress”.110 Johnson successfully combated the socialist label by skilfully 
challenging conservative Republicans on the legacy of the New Deal and social security, 
whilst expanding its legacy with Medicare.111   
 Unfortunately, this victory for liberal Democrats only fortified the resolve of 
conservative Republicans to contain New Deal expansion, making it more difficult from 
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them on to implement a national health care bill for all Americans. Conservative 
Republicans were defeated not only in the Medicare battle by liberal Democrats; they were 
also defeated in the presidential election of 1964. The American people voted for the New 
Deal legacy over the conservative Republican alternative. Liberal Democrats seized the 
initiative in 1965, whilst conservative Republicans regrouped. Johnson’s victory solidified 
the resolve of conservative Republicans to fight back against the legacy of the New Deal.  
 After the Johnson presidency, conservative Republicans were in a much better 
position to seek retribution, because there were no further liberal Democratic presidents. The 
battles the liberal Democratic presidents fought with conservative Republicans made it more 
difficult for moderate presidents of either party to achieve a national health care plan. 
Moderate Republicans Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon fared no better than Jimmy 
Carter, a moderate Democrat. All three favoured some type of national health care plan.112 
Yet all three failed to combat the conservative Republican rhetoric against any addition to 
the legacy of the New Deal, whilst liberal Democrats focused on pushing forward with a 
national health care plan under federal control. Consequently, any moderate compromise 
was attacked on both fronts. Conservative Republicans viewed a moderate health care plan 
as too similar to socialized medicine. 
 Eisenhower was the first moderate president to propose a national health care plan. In 
1954, he first addressed socialism and his health care plan. 
Some extremists of the bureaucratic type challenge the plan because it does not 
attempt to remove all local and individual responsibility for the care of the sick and 
the unfortunate. Our refusal to centralize all responsibility and authority in the 
Federal Government is deliberate; it is an expression of active conviction that though 
the central Government may aid and coordinate, local authority and private initiative 
must be supreme in the normal procedure of daily living, else freedom – unless this is 
so we all realize freedom and self-government will be lost.                                                                  
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 Others – of the opposite extreme – oppose this legislation on the ground that 
it might become the entering wedge of socialized medicine. To that kind of service in 
America, my co-workers and I are emphatically opposed. But I hope that none of us 
confuse social progress with socialism.                                                                                 
 . . . The program for voluntary health insurance . . . is the logical alternative 
to socialized medicine.113      
His remarks exhibit his determination to propose a different health care plan than that of a 
liberal Democratic president. His statement also reveals the struggle within his own party, as 
conservative Republicans were not in favour of this plan. From the conservative Republican 
viewpoint, any kind of health care reform that increased the role of big government was 
socialist because it was still expanding the New Deal legacy. This was a no win situation for 
a moderate like Eisenhower.   
 In 1960, Eisenhower was asked this question: “what [is] your position and . . . your 
philosophy . . . toward what the Government should really do for senior citizens and what 
should they do on their own”? His response was “I have, from the time this subject was 
discussed with me very thoroughly and exhaustively way back in 1951 and `52, I have been 
against compulsory insurance as a very definitive step in socialized medicine. . . . I don’t 
believe in it, and I want none of it myself”. But he also acknowledged “I think we have got 
to develop a voluntary program”.114 Although Eisenhower tried once more in 1960 to 
address health care reform via a more scaled down approach, this version of Medicare failed 
to gather very little congressional support and yet was still chastised by Goldwater as 
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“socialized medicine”.115 Eisenhower was not the only moderate Republican president to 
fend off accusations of socialism from the conservative branch of his own party.   
 Nixon was the following moderate Republican president who attempted to pass a 
health care plan. He also wanted a national health care plan for all Americans, and was not 
in favour of a liberal Democratic national health care plan, and rejected socialism. He 
viewed socialism as providing “equality of poverty”.116 Nonetheless, in 1974 Nixon had to 
defend his health care plan against conservative Republican accusations of socialized 
medicine. He attempted to spin his plan to ward off conservative Republican criticism.  
There has been a great deal of debate in recent years about health insurance 
legislation. And there are, naturally, divergent points of view on the question of how 
to provide the highest possible quality of health care for all Americans. Some believe 
that we should socialize our system of health care. Now, this might make health care 
more available to all, but it would diminish the quality of care available. . . . There 
are others who believe we should do nothing. This would mean that fewer and fewer 
Americans would have access to the kind of care we are capable of providing.    
Neither course of action, is acceptable. What we must have is a creative 
relationship between government and our private health care system.117   
His proposal acknowledged that both the federal government and private health care had 
roles to play. This middle ground approach was deemed un-American and socialist by 
conservative Republicans because they did not want the federal government to have any role 
whatsoever in health care; they wanted the private market to have complete control of 
national health care. Nixon fared no better with liberal Democratic support due to his belief 
that their idea of national health care “would diminish the quality of care available”.118    
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 It is easy to suggest that Nixon may have attempted to compromise with conservative 
Republicans and/or liberal Democrats had he not resigned from office less than three months 
later.119 However, it seems unlikely a compromise would have been reached, given how 
much his health care plan differed from both conservative Republican and liberal 
Democratic beliefs. 
 Carter was the first non-liberal Democrat president since the coming of the New 
Deal. As a moderate, it would seem unlikely that he would differ from Eisenhower or Nixon 
regarding the role of federal government in health care. Carter, however, was a Democrat 
and could not take a position against the legacy of the New Deal. Whilst none of the three 
moderates discussed rolling back the New Deal, Carter had more in common with the 
moderate Republican presidents than he did with his liberal Democratic predecessors. His 
non-liberal stance on national health care put him in a unique position amongst conservative 
Republicans and liberal Democrats. 
 Carter addressed national health care in 1978, 1979 and 1980. But during 1978 and 
1979, he did not rise to defend himself directly against conservative Republicans. He took a 
somewhat different approach, focusing instead on the “Federal Government” and liberal 
Democrats. In 1978, he said, “Beginning with President Truman’s administration, there has 
been a growing interest and desire among the American people to have a far more reaching 
or comprehensive health plan for our Nation”. He went on to say: 
I think that a much more effective program can be evolved than the one now. A step 
in the right direction was Medicaid and Medicare. . . .  
I personally want to keep open the option of the insurance portion being 
administered by private insurance companies. I don’t want to see the Government 
take over this full responsibility. And I’m also committed to the proposition that 
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individual American citizens would continue to have the right to choose their own 
family physician. I don’t want the Federal Government telling a patient you have to 
go to that particular physician to get your care.120   
He was resolute that whilst he wanted a national health care plan, he would not support a 
liberal Democratic version that would give the federal government even more control of 
national health care at the expense of “private insurance”. Afterwards, in 1979 he reiterated 
his stance against a liberal Democratic version for national health care. “I don’t believe the 
Federal Government ought to do everything. I don’t believe in establishing a whole big array 
of massive Federal Government spending programs to take care of the needs of our 
country”.121 Consequently, Carter was in the difficult position of praising the legacy of the 
New Deal (one example was Medicare), whilst at the same time preventing it from moving 
forward with a liberal Democratic health care plan.122 However, 1980 presented him with an 
opportunity to join with liberal Democrats in defending the New Deal legacy.   
 In 1980, Carter faced a tough re-election against the conservative Republican Ronald 
Reagan. Their difference in views presented Carter with the opportunity to defend the New 
Deal legacy. He took full advantage of this opportunity, charging Reagan with attacking the 
legacy of the New Deal by making social security “voluntary,” undoing what FDR started. 
This would then have grave consequences and “would destroy social security”.123 He also 
accused Reagan of “travelling around the country speaking against Medicare, calling it 
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socialized medicine and the injection of socialism into the system of our country,” along 
with saying, “Ronald Reagan said Fascism was really the basis for the New Deal”.124   
 Carter’s hard-hitting approach against Reagan might have led some to believe that he 
was dedicated to the legacy of the New Deal, but this was not the case. Even though he said, 
“Republicans were against social security. They called it socialism or even communism,” he 
would still claim that “socialized medicine” was the wrong way to go because it could 
hamper the individual “freedom to choose one’s own physician.”125 These statements are 
conflicting. On one hand he is defending the New Deal legacy and on the other he is 
challenging it.  
Moderate Democrats, such as Carter, do not have the option of an outright rebuttal of 
the New Deal and its legacy. This is due to the political realities of the Democratic Party. An 
important cornerstone of the party since FDR has been the New Deal, and if any Democratic 
leader were to challenge this it would likely prove disastrous to the party. This is largely due 
to the rationale that if the New Deal (for example social security) itself comes into question 
then so do the later additions of its legacy (for example Medicare).     
 Consequently, Carter’s timid response to Reagan was due to the fact that, as a 
moderate Democrat, he disagreed with both the liberal Democratic and the conservative 
Republican positions. This made him seem unsure of his real message regarding the New 
Deal and its legacy. As a consequence, Reagan took a stronger stance on the legacy of the 
New Deal than Carter.126 Where Carter and moderate presidents were stuck between the 
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conservative Republican and liberal Democratic positions on the legacy of the New Deal, 
conservative Republican presidents had no problem defining their position.   
 When it came to the New Deal, the conservative Republican presidencies of Gerald 
Ford and Ronald Reagan formed a clear plan; their goal was to stop the expansion of its 
legacy.127 Ford and Reagan believed that the government had limited and defined 
responsibilities, and anything outside this sphere was left up to the guise of the free-market. 
Due to conservative Republican dislike for the New Deal, both Ford and Reagan may have 
preferred to reverse the legacy of the New Deal, but they first had to stop its growth before 
this could be achieved.   
 Ford took over the presidency after Nixon resigned from office. Nixon was a 
moderate Republican who believed the government played some role in national health care. 
Ford, however, had no belief in this whatsoever. He had inherited Nixon’s national health 
insurance plan, but decided the government should not continue with this “costly” policy.128 
He displayed courtesy toward Nixon’s plan, and did not label it socialist, but instead blamed 
the “current economic problems” for the reason the plan was dropped. Afterwards, he 
claimed he would consider such an idea, but only if it was affordable.129 However, as a 
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conservative Republican, he believed the government was already too involved in citizens’ 
lives.   
 Regarding “socialized medicine” Ford said, “I don’t think . . . we should have a 
national health insurance with the Federal Government being the dictator”, “I think any 
nationalized medical system, anything comparable to what they have in Great Britain and in 
a number of countries, won’t work, and I would vigorously oppose it”.130 When he was 
specifically addressing the liberal Democratic health care proposal in Congress he stated that 
“We have had the Kennedy proposal, which up until this year was the Kennedy-Griffith 
proposal which would have encompassed a total federalization of the health delivery system 
of the United States. It would put the Federal Government in the patient-doctor relationship. 
. . . I am opposed to the program, period”, as well as bluntly remarking: “the Kennedy bill, 
never”.131 Ford was against any future mention of a national health care plan associated with 
socialized medicine. This was his consistent position in 1976.   
 Ford was determined to stop the New Deal legacy from expanding. In his view, many 
government programmes were costly and ineffective – especially the Great Society – and 
provided an increased dependence on government instead of compassion.132 His stance on a 
national health care plan is well documented. He attacked the liberal Democratic plan for 
national health care, labelling the proposal a “dictatorship” and “a total federalization of the 
health delivery system”. A moderate like Eisenhower, Nixon or Carter would have suggested 
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an alternative. Since Ford was a conservative Republican, he did not offer his own 
compromise. In fact, he was clear when he said, “I did not recommend to the Congress in the 
State of the Union message, nor do I intend to in 1976, any national health insurance 
plan”.133  
I do not, however, intend to suggest that Ford was as conservative as Reagan.134 
Although both were conservative, there were differences between the two. Conservative 
author Craig Shirley states the differences as the following: “Reagan took the GOP from a 
[Ford] Tory style conservatism . . . to an American brand of conservatism”.135 Furthermore, 
Ford’s conservatism was closer to Robert Taft rather than that of the Christian Right.136 
However, regarding the expansion of the New Deal legacy, both supported the conservative 
Republican argument.137  
 Reagan was the second conservative Republican president between 1933 and 1988. 
He was unique in that he was president and a key conservative Republicans during this 
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period. Of all the presidents covered, he was the one who most strongly opposed the New 
Deal legacy – especially the Great Society. He was a staunch supporter of the private sector, 
and thus sought to limit the role of government whenever possible. Regarding health care, in 
1984 he stated, “Today, if you get sick in any place in the world, get sick here in this 
country. We have the greatest medical care of any country in the world. And those countries 
that have socialized medicine, the quality of care has declined, the waiting list is forever, and 
the cost is far greater than it is here”.138 His statement demonstrates the conservative 
Republican core belief that the US health care system was the best in the world for relying 
on the free-market instead of “socialized medicine”.  
 In 1985, Reagan sought to brand the conservative Republican message as America’s 
future.  
Ever since F.D.R. and the New Deal, the opposition party, and particular 
those of a liberal persuasion, have dominated the political debate. . . .                                                                             
 But in 1964 came . . . the great Barry Goldwater . . . a true-blue, undiluted 
conservative. He spoke from principle and offered vision. Freedom – he spoke of 
freedom: freedom from the Government’s increasing demands on the family purse, 
freedom from the Government’s increasing usurpation of individual rights and 
responsibilities, freedom from the leader is continued acquiescence to totalitarianism. 
. . . The truth of the matter is, conservative thought is no longer over here on 
the right; it’s mainstream now.139 
His statement reveals what conservative Republicans believe about liberal Democrats, that 
the legacy of the New Deal has compromised individual freedom. Using the conservative 
Republican rationale, Reagan implied that the best way forward for America was to stop any 
expansion of the New Deal legacy, and that the liberal Democratic agenda was un-
American. Reagan, unlike Ford, was aggressive in attacking the liberal Democratic agenda. 
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By doing so he laid the foundation for the use of conservative Republican rhetoric as a 
political weapon to put liberal Democrats on the defensive.  
 In 1988, Reagan renewed charges against the New Deal legacy.  
Senator Kennedy has tried for years to pass an exorbitantly expensive program of 
socialized medicine, and it hasn’t happened. So now he’s proposing – and the 
expected Democratic nominee (Governor Michael Dukakis) has endorsed the plan – 
that the Government pass a law requiring private companies to directly pay for a 
federally mandated health insurance program . . .                                                                              
 . . . The fact that the liberals try to disguise their big government ideology 
inside a legislative Trojan horse is proof they haven’t given up.140 
His narrative asserted that the legacy of the New Deal would not stop until America was 
completely socialized. He implied that, if the liberal Democrats won the next presidential 
election, their health care plan could potentially be the next step toward a socialist society. 
 The conservative Republican political use of socialism to refer to social security and 
health care caused all of the presidents to react in certain ways. Liberal Democratic 
presidents fought back against the charges, moderate Republican and moderate Democratic 
presidents tried to deny the accusations, whilst conservative Republican presidents continued 
to agree with them and use them to their advantage. 
 I did not seek to compare the presidents in a chronological format, but instead used 
three separate and definitive presidencies to showcase the conservative Republican usage of 
socialism. However, it is worth mentioning that when listing the presidents in chronological 
order (from least to most recent) there is a notable trend toward conservatism. My approach 
best revealed the low opinion conservative Republicans held of the New Deal, with regard to 
the examples of social security and health care, and noted the contrast of liberal Democratic 
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presidents and conservative Republican presidents, along with how the moderate Democratic 
and moderate Republican presidents compared to both the liberal Democratic and 
conservative Republican presidencies. Overall, presidents who did combat the socialist label 
were not usually successful in their efforts. Roosevelt and Johnson were able to sign 
legislation into law that was labelled socialist (social security and Medicare) but they were 
the exceptions, and even Roosevelt suffered defeat at the hands of the socialist label 
(national health plan). In the end, the conservative Republicans gained a victory in that they 
played a large part in preventing a national health care plan. However, they could not stop 
the expansion of the New Deal legacy.       
The Evolution of Conservative Republicanism 
The 1980 presidential election of Reagan marked a turning point for conservative 
Republicans. His election victory over Carter signified that a conservative Republican was 
now leading the GOP. This marked a significant change from the previous Republican 
presidencies of Eisenhower and Nixon (I am not counting Ford since he became president 
due to Nixon’s resignation). Eisenhower and Nixon were Republican presidents but they 
were moderates, not conservatives. Moving forward to 1964, Goldwater’s presidential bid 
marked the beginning of the conservative Republican movement to regain control of its 
party and the presidency.141  
Throughout the conservative Republican revival of the party from the 1960s to 1980, 
conservatism was comprised of various factions within its wing of the GOP. Some of the 
conservative elements had been in the Republican fold since before the 1960s and some 
were added after the 1960s. Before the 1960s, conservatives were mainly comprised of free-
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market economics, anti-communism and cultural conservatism. After the 1960s, neo-
conservatives were one faction to join the conservative Republican movement. They moved 
from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party, were largely anti-communist in their 
mantra and did not agree with the party shift amongst Democrats in the 1960s toward 
equality, civil rights and especially welfare. As a result, they began to feel estranged from 
the Democratic Party in the 1970s. By 1980, they played an important role in Reagan’s 
presidential election.  
Another post-1960 faction that joined the conservative movement was the New 
Right. The New Right railed against the 1960s’ and 1970s’ cultural liberalism taking place 
in America (examples include abortion, birth control and no school prayer). The Christian 
Right was another supporter of Reagan in 1980 and has since remained part of the 
Republican right.142        
Prior to 1964, Robert Taft attempted four times to win the GOP presidential 
nomination, failing on each occasion (1940, 1944, 1948, 1952). His 1952 loss to Eisenhower 
was a devastating blow to conservative Republicans. Many felt that the Republican 
establishment had taken the nomination away from Taft and had given it to the safer or 
moderate candidate, Eisenhower, whom many conservative Republicans considered a “dime 
store New Dealer”. They concluded that Eisenhower and, later, Nixon were not doing 
enough to challenge the expansion of government that started under FDR. 
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However, there are differing perspectives regarding who deserves credit for the 
conservative revival within the Republican Party. Some credit the 1964 Goldwater 
presidential campaign for unifying conservative Republicans within the party, whilst 
differing opinions offer two counter perspectives that either believed Reagan’s rise within 
the conservative Republican movement was the vital factor, or that it was a combination of 
equally strong figures within the conservative elite that both added to and moved along the 
cause.143  
Regardless of what was the most important factor in the conservative Republican 
uprising, two important points stand out: firstly, certain hot button issues have helped the 
cause of conservative Republicans; and secondly, these hot button issues are also redefining 
what it means to be a conservative Republican. Some of the domestic issues that 
conservative Republicans attack (aside from the New Deal and its legacy) are economic, 
such as taxes, and socio-moral, such as birth control and abortion (i.e. women’s rights).   
Taxes is one subject that coincides with the conservative Republican attack against 
the New Deal legacy. They argue that the more one pays in taxes the greater the loss of 
individual freedom. Their message on taxation gained support due to the increase of taxes on 
the middle class. The amount of taxes paid by the middle class almost doubled from the 
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1996), 92, 114; Edwards, The Conservative Revolution, 140-141; and Jonathan M. Schoenwald, A Time for 
Choosing: The Rise of Modern American Conservatism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 6-7. For 
more on the importance of Reagan’s 1980 election, refer to: Jonathan Kolkey, The New Right, 1960-1968 with 
Epilogue, 1969-1980 (Washington, DC: University of America Press, 1983), 14-15, 341-342, 347; Mary 
Brennan, Turning Right in the Sixties: The Conservative Capture of the GOP (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1995), 5, 128; Sean Wilentz, The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974-2008 (New York: Harper, 
2008), 1-4; Busch, Reagan’s Victory, 141-144; and Hayward, The Age of Reagan, 715-716. For more on some 
key figures of the conservative elite, who added to and progressed the conservative Republican message, 
consult: Critchlow, The Conservative Ascendancy, 66-183; and Farber, The Rise and Fall of Modern American 
Conservatism, 4, 257-258.    
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1950s to the 1970s.144 The passage of California’s Proposition 13 in 1978 sought to limit the 
amount of property taxes (and as a result, decrease this tax) that are to be paid to the state 
government in Sacramento.145 This act was the start of the tax revolt that reverberated across 
America from 1978 to the mid 1980s.146   
At this point, it is important to question the main emphasis behind Proposition 13. 
Was it that the public was demanding less government, whilst at the same time wanting 
more individual freedom from government (by way of paying less taxes), or was it 
something else? According to Everett Carl Ladd, et al., the public opinion polling data gave 
a clear message, one that said, “the message Americans are giving on the issues of taxing 
and spending is clear: Reduce taxes; maintain “big government”; end the waste and 
inefficiency of big government. This is an important message, to be sure. It is not an easy 
one to respond to, however. And it is by no means clear whether liberals or conservatives – 
in their many varieties – should be more heartened by it”.147   
                                                          
144For more, refer to: Everett Carll Ladd, with Marilyn Potter, Linda Basilick, Sally Daniels and Dana 
Suszkiw, “The Polls: Taxing and Spending”, Public Opinion Quarterly 43, no. 1 (Spring 1979): 126-135, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2748417 (accessed 25 March 2011); and Hayward, The Age of Reagan, 524-525. 
145For more, see: Ladd, et al., “The Polls”; Clarence Lo, Small Property Versus Big Government: Social 
Origins of the Property Tax Revolt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); David Sears and Jack Citrin, 
Tax Revolt: Something for Nothing in California (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982); Issac Martin, The 
Permanent Tax Revolt: How the Property Tax Transformed American Politics (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2008), 98-125; Heyward, The Age of Reagan, 527-528; Arthur O’Sullivan, Terri Sexton and Steven 
Sheffrin, Property Taxes and Tax Revolts: The Legacy of Proposition 13 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), 3-7, 32; and Jack Citrin and Frank Levy, “From 13 to 4 and Beyond: The Political Meaning of the 
Ongoing Tax Revolt in California”, in The Property Tax Revolt: The Case of Proposition 13 (Cambridge, MA: 
Ballinger Publishing, 1981), eds. George G. Kaufman and Kenneth T. Rosen, 1-26. 
146Another example that succeeded after Proposition 13 was Massachusetts’s Proposition 2 ½ that 
was passed in 1980. For more on Proposition 2 ½ , consult: O’Sullivan, Sexton and Sheffrin, Property Taxes 
and Tax Revolts, 3-4, 32, 95-97; Lo, Small Property Versus Big Government, 2-4; Hayward, The Age of Reagan, 
527-528; and Jack Citrin, “Introduction: The Legacy of Proposition 13”, in California and the American Tax 
Revolt: Proposition 13 Five Years Later (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), ed. Terry Schwadron, 
43-51.  
147Ladd, et al., “The Polls”, 135.  
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In California, the drive for the Proposition 13 ballot measure had very little support 
amongst the state Republican Party. Even the future Republican Governor of California, 
George Deukmejian “opposed Proposition 13” before it passed. However, “one [notable] 
exception was Ronald Reagan”, he supported the initiative and also tried for a similar plan 
when he was Governor of California.148 According to sociologist Issac Martin, “The tax 
revolt transformed American politics by popularizing a new public policy – tax limitation – 
that helped to place tax cuts permanently on the policy agenda”.149   
As a result, the mantra of tax cuts placed the rhetoric of conservative Republicans 
onto centre stage. As previously mentioned, Reagan (along with Hoover, Taft and 
Goldwater) railed against taxes because they hampered individual freedom. Consequently, 
the increase in taxes paid by the middle class from the 1950s to the 1970s made the public 
more perceptive to this message. The public, however, did not want less government, it 
wanted a more efficient government,150 but the conservative Republican argument vilifying 
increased taxation and calling for a reduction in taxes became increasingly popular. As a 
result, it further transformed the GOP to support conservative Republican rhetoric.151 
Aside from taxes, moral issues have further altered what it means to be a 
conservative Republican. Whereas conservative Republicans have consistently favoured less 
government regarding taxes, they now favour a pro-government attitude regarding moral 
                                                          
148Lo, Small Property Versus Big Government, 23. For more on Reagan’s Proposition 1 and his support 
for Proposition 13, see: Robert M. Collins, Transforming America: Politics and Culture in the Reagan Years 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 42-44.  
149Martin, The Permanent Tax Revolt, 23.  
150Ellis and Stimson, Ideology in America, 191-193; Stimson, Tides of Consent, 84-91; and Ladd, et al., 
“The Polls”. 
151For more on how the tax revolt and how it changed the Republican Party, refer to: Martin, The 
Permanent Tax Revolt, 126-145; Hayward, The Age of Reagan, 527-531; as well as Thomas Byrne Edsall and 
Mary D. Edsall, Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1992), 134-136.  
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values. However, this has not always been the case. Goldwater is one example, 
demonstrating how this stance has changed from one of individual choice to one of 
government-mandated morality.152 The shift in the conservative Republican position on 
morality, especially in the 1970s, was due to what they perceived as the liberal Democratic 
shift toward social liberal positions on issues such as abortion, divorce and gay rights.153 
Examples of other issues that helped to foster the social moral shift amongst conservative 
Republicans were the Supreme Court decisions regarding Engel v. Vitale (1962), Abington 
School District v. Schempp and Murray v. Curlett (both in 1963), all of which led to the 
banning of school prayer, whilst Roe v. Wade (1973) gave women the legal right to an 
abortion.154  
                                                          
152For more on how Goldwater’s view on morality differs from the current conservative Republican 
position, consult: Goldwater, Goldwater, 384-388; John W. Dean and Barry M. Goldwater, Jr., Pure Goldwater 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008),346-348; Robert Alan Goldberg, Barry Goldwater (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1995), 116, 284-285, 300-301, 315-316; and William A. Link, “Time is an Elusive Companion: 
Jesse Helms, Barry Goldwater, and the Dynamic of Modern Conservatism”, in Barry Goldwater and the 
Remaking of the American Political Landscape (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2013), ed. Elizabeth Tandy 
Shermer, 247-255. 
153This shift has affected both parties. But even other issues like gun control has also affected party 
change amongst the parties. For more on how abortion and gun control have become staples of party politics, 
refer to: David Karol, Party Position Change in American Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2009), 56-101.   
154For more on moral values and the conservative Republican movement, see: Critchlow, The 
Conservative Ascendancy, 106-107, 127-142,173-176; Sarah Diamond, Roads to Dominion: Right-Wing 
Movements and Political Power in the United States (New York: Guilford Press, 1995), 135-136; Michael 
Schaller and George Rising, The Republican Ascendancy: American Politics, 1968-2001 (Wheeling, IL: Harlan 
Davidson, 2002), 62-68, 71-73; Himmelstein, To the Right, 83-84; Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: The Origins 
of the New American Right (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 225-237; Robert O. Self, All in the 
Family: The Realignment of American Democracy Since the 1960s (New York: Hill and Wang, 2012), 309-398; 
and Schneider, 133-139. For more on the ongoing cultural war during the Reagan presidency, consult: Collins, 
Transforming America, 171-192; James Farney, Social Conservatives and Party Politics in Canada and the 
United States (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 52-57; Andrew Preston, Shield of the Spirit, Shield 
of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012), 578-583; and Allan J. 
Lichtman, White Protestant Nation: The Rise of the American Conservative Movement (New York: Atlantic 
Monthly Press, 2008), 355-370, 375-377, 386-394.   
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There are some notable figures that have propelled the conservative Republican shift 
on social-moral issues. One such figure is Phyllis Schlafly.155 Her contribution is important 
because she has been a loyal conservative Republican for over sixty years. She not only 
helped to mobilise grassroots support for Goldwater’s 1964 presidential campaign, she also 
helped to rally a grassroots movement against the proposed Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) 
in the 1970s and early 1980s. Additionally, she is a staunch supporter of traditional moral 
values (i.e. anti-abortion, anti-gay rights and anti-feminism).156 Her efforts toward the cause 
illustrate the usefulness of grassroots movements to conservative Republicans.157       
Similar to Schlafly, William F. Buckley has also helped to advance the conservative 
Republican movement. Historian David Farber considers both Schlafly and Buckley to be 
vital to the movement. Buckley was important due to the role that he played after the death 
of Taft in 1953 and until Goldwater came on to the national scene during the 1964 
presidential election.158 Farber also concludes that after Goldwater’s defeat in the 1964 
presidential election to Johnson, Schlafly “helped bring back conservatism from its political 
dead end . . . she made sure that the politics of gender and sexuality became central to the 
conservative movement”.159 According to Farber, as president, Reagan was then able to use 
                                                          
155Some other figures are Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell. Robertson and Falwell are important 
figures amongst conservative Christians and both helped to solidify the Religious Right in the 1970s and 1980s 
as a core support group for conservative Republicans.    
156For more on Schlafly’s impact to the conservative Republican cause, refer to: Allitt, The 
Conservatives, 215-216; Collins, Transforming America, 47; Wilentz, The Age of Reagan, 93-95; Farber, The 
Rise and Fall of Modern American Conservatism, 119-157; Schaller and Rising, The Republican Ascendancy, 72; 
Diamond, Roads to Dominion, 167, 169-170; Critchlow, Phyllis Schlafly and Grassroots Conservatism; McGirr, 
Suburban Warriors, 135-136, 233; Rebecca E. Klatch, Women of the New Right (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1987), 22-23, 50, 60-61, 98, 125, 128, 130, 134-137, 140, 143-145; and Self, All in the Family, 
304-305, 311, 313-316, 320, 334.   
157For more on the conservative Republican movement and the grassroots movement, see: McGirr, 
Suburban Warriors, 111-186.     
158Farber, The Rise and Fall of Modern American Conservatism, 257-258. 
 159Ibid., 258.  
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the contributions of the previous conservative elite figures (Taft, Buckley, Goldwater and 
Schlafly) to help him further the movement.         
Buckley’s most significant achievement for the conservative Republican movement 
has been his magazine, the National Review.160 He launched the National Review in 1955 to 
offer a conservative voice to counter the message of the “liberal media”.161 I consider 
Buckley an important figure within the conservative elite for his view towards liberal 
Democrats.162 His magazine is a source of influence that the conservative elite use to help 
conservative Republicans attack both the legacy of the New Deal and anyone they perceive 
to be a liberal Democrat and/or a socialist. According to Farber, Buckley wanted to combat 
the liberal Democratic New Deal legacy in a manner which established “that liberalism was 
cousin to socialism and atheistic communism”, and he did so because “he believed he could 
move Americans to acknowledge the moral and spiritual superiority of conservative 
principles”.163   
                                                          
160Buckley also helped to foster the grassroots movement Young Americans for Freedom (YAF) in the 
1960s. For more, consult: John A. Andrew, The Other Side of the Sixties: Young Americans for Freedom and the 
Rise of Conservative Politics (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1997), 54-64.; Critchlow, The 
Conservative Ascendancy, 59-60; Brennan, Turning Right in the Sixties, 115; and William F. Buckley, “Young 
Americans for Freedom”, 226-228, and “The Sharon Statement”, 229-230, both are in Conservatism In 
America since 1930: A Reader (New York: New York University Press, 2003), ed. Gregory L. Schneider.  
161For more on Buckley and the National Review, see: Jeffrey Hart, The Making of the American 
Conservative Mind: National Review and Its Times (Wilmington: ISI Books, 2005), 1-14; Carl Bogus, Buckley: 
William F. Buckley Jr. and the Rise of American Conservatism (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2011); Farber, The 
Rise and Fall of Modern American Conservatism, 39-76; Linda Bridges and John R. Coyne, Jr., Strictly Right: 
William F. Buckley, Jr. and the American Conservative Movement  (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2007), 39-
239; McGirr, Suburban Warriors, 63, 95, 128-130, 218-219; and David Burner and Thomas West, Column 
Right: Conservative Journalists in the Service of Nationalism (New York: New York University Press, 1988), 39-
64. 
162Another journalist that has made an impact, as a neo-conservative, is Irving Kristol. For more on 
Kristol and neo-conservatism, refer to: Burner and West, Column Right, 65-84; Critchlow, The Conservative 
Ascendancy, 105, 107-112, 114-116; Gottfried and Fleming, The Conservative Movement, 64-70; Allitt, The 
Conservatives, 203-204; Gary Dorrien, The Neoconservative Mind: Politics, Culture, and the War of Ideology 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993), 68-132; and Mark Gerson, The Neoconservative Vision: From 
the Cold War to the Culture Wars (Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1997), 4, 7-9, 21-25,352-353. 
163Farber, The Rise and Fall of Modern American Conservatism, 257.  
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Farber’s statement is vital in understanding the evolution of conservative Republican 
rhetoric. They now use religion in an attempt to claim similar values and ideals to the 
founding fathers (especially George Washington, James Madison and Thomas Jefferson) 
which include: limited government, states’ rights, strong moral values and a non-regulated 
free-market. On the other hand, they argue that liberal Democrats stand for the exact 
opposite, consisting of: a powerful national government at the expense of states’ rights, 
weak (no) moral values and an overregulated free-market.   
Although it is difficult to pinpoint the exact moment the conservative Republican 
movement became a tour de force, it did attain a great amount of influence within the GOP, 
by at least 1980, if not sooner. Of all conservative Republicans, Reagan benefited the most 
from the movement. His political career in the Republican Party started, officially, in the 
early 1960s and progressed along with the movement. He suffered personal setbacks much 
like the movement, but after his 1968 and 1976 defeats for the Republican presidential 
nomination, he regrouped and ultimately prevailed in 1980 (and again in 1984). Eventually, 
they achieved their goal of shifting the GOP away from its liberal/moderate party power 
structure into one that was conservative.164 And as a result of this shift, according to politics 
professor Kenneth Cosgrove, “We should not underestimate the extent to which the former 
party of Lincoln has, in fact, become the party of Reagan”.165 
 
                                                          
164For more on this point, refer to: Walter J. Stone, Ronald B. Rapoport and Alan I. Abramowitz, 
“Party Polarization: The Reagan Revolution and Beyond”, in The Parties Respond: Changes in American Parties 
and Campaigns, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), ed. L. Sandy Maisel, 69-99.   
165Which is part of Cosgrove’s chapter on “Reagan as a Marketer and as a Brand for Conservative 
Movement”; for more, see: Kenneth M. Cosgrove, Branded Conservatives: How the Brand Brought the Right 





Conservative Republicans, from Hoover to Reagan, had to decide whether or not to 
ape the New Deal legacy, or present an alternative narrative (such as A Choice Not an 
Echo166). This narrative would also be useful to fight the GOP divide between the moderate 
and conservative wings, moving beyond a “conservative coalition” to form a more long-
lasting union. As illustrated in the next chapter, this choice became fruitful, as the GOP won 
control of Congress and southern conservatives broke their allegiance to the Democratic 
Party.     
Conservative Republicans have altered their position over time, from a more generic 
use of socialism to a more specific one. Moving to a more specific definition of socialism 
gave them a clearer and more concise message. This change allowed their meaning to have 
the political flexibility necessary to frame an issue to their advantage.        
This chapter addresses how conservative Republican rhetoric improved from the 
1930s to 1980s. First came Hoover’s ineffective message, which Taft transformed, then 
Goldwater’s fervour, and finally Reagan’s vision (making him arguably the most popular 
conservative Republican of all). Overall, the conservative Republican message has not 
radically changed when attacking socialism; it has simply improved over time. However, 
conservative Republicanism evolved from Hoover to Reagan – from wanting the 
government out of the economic and social-moral activities of America, to aspiring for the 
government to play an active role in the maintaining America’s morality, whilst at the same 
time still refraining from any government regulation of the free-market.    
                                                          
166Schlafly’s book was in defence of Goldwater becoming the 1964 GOP candidate over a more 
moderate Republican; Phyllis Schlafly, A Choice Not an Echo (Alton, IL: Pere Marquette Press, 1964).  
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Chapters two through five analyse how conservative Republicans attempt to carry on 
the battle against the New Deal and its ongoing political legacy in the post-Cold War era. 
Whilst doing so, they will continue to evolve, ultimately winning control of the party away 
from moderate Republicans – giving them future opportunities to battle against the New 
Deal legacy. 
Although Reagan was influential in honing a conservative message that could offer 
an alternative to liberalism, he was, however, constrained with what he could accomplish 
without a conservative GOP Congress. Reagan popularised the ideal of less government, 
especially tax cuts, but his legacy did not offer the GOP any clarity on how to govern as a 
conservative. His legacy was one of pragmatism, a strong socialist critique against liberals, 
and most importantly, a lasting myth of his presidency. And as the remaining chapters 
illustrate, conservative Republicans would use their rhetoric successfully to gain power, but 






The New Deal Legacy at a Standstill? Clashing Narratives on Big Government 
Fifty years ago unionists and New Dealers proudly avowed their Socialist creed. During the 
Great Society we had “Social Democracy” – meaning “capitalism, but....” Then came the 
managed-decliners of the Carter era. And finally, after Reagan, we got the vague “New 
Democrat” – the “I’m not like those other folks the public has come to despise” types. But 
these were verbal equivocations only, new labels for old reactionary nostrums. 
-Dick Armey1 
Dick Armey’s statement exemplifies how many conservative Republicans viewed so-
called New Democrat Bill Clinton as yet another Democratic adherent to the “Socialist 
creed” of big government liberalism. These words were written shortly after the GOP had 
bested Clinton on health care reform, but just before he turned the tables on them over 
Medicare reform. Although four-party politics was altering the political dynamic of 
Democrats and Republicans, this chapter will illustrate that this particular dynamic was 
better established to defend the status quo of the New Deal legacy instead of dismantling it.  
Health care policy during Clinton’s first term (1993-1996) – the failed attempt at 
national health care reform and his defence of Medicare versus a Republican dominated 
Congress – highlights how the New Deal and its ongoing political legacy presented difficult 
challenges when attempting bold initiatives. Conservative Republican rhetoric against the 
“liberal welfare state” was successful in fighting off an expansion of the legacy, but was 
unsuccessful in its attempt to roll it back via Medicare reform. Conservatives struggled with 
moving from a congressional minority party to the majority party. Winning control of 
Congress put them in a position of power, but with power came responsibility as well as 
having to govern with a Democratic President.  
                                                          
1Dick Armey, The Freedom Revolution: The New Republican House Majority Leader Tells Why Big 
Government Failed, Why Freedom Works, and How We Will Rebuild America (Washington, DC: Regnery 
Publishing, 1995), 76. 
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Conservative Republicans like New Gingrich and Armey sought to replace a “liberal 
welfare state” with a conservative one, but this was easier said than done. As the struggle for 
national health care has shown, they garnered success against the liberal Democratic desire 
for national health care, but they also suffered major setbacks over Medicare and Medicaid. 
Leading up to the 1990s, they were in the midst of a two-front political war against liberal 
Democrats and “me-too” Republicans. Conservative Republicans, especially in the House of 
Representatives, were determined to build upon Ronald Reagan’s 1980 presidential election 
win by further expanding the influence of their faction within Congress. Bill Clinton’s push 
for national health care reform presented them with the perfect opportunity to achieve their 
goal.         
Three questions that will be addressed in this chapter are: 
1. How did the Conservative Opportunity Society’s rhetoric shape the conservative 
Republican critique against the New Deal Legacy? 
2. What is the impact of the GOP socialist criticism towards health care reform? 
3. To what extent did Gingrich contribute to the evolution of GOP rhetoric and its use 
of the socialist label? 
The above questions will illuminate conservative Republicans’ attempts to undo the 
New Deal and its ongoing legacy within the framework of the political realities they faced. 
In the House, Rep. Newt Gingrich (R-GA) and the Conservative Opportunity Society 
formulated a strategy that had the potential to achieve such a feat.   
Plotting Their Path to Power: The Conservative Opportunity Society 
At its inception in 1983, the Conservative Opportunity Society (COS) was a group of 
individuals dedicated to the goal of winning a conservative Republican majority in the 
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House of Representatives.2 The main architect of COS was Newt Gingrich. He wanted COS 
to take over as the main influence within the GOP House because he believed that the 
party’s moderate leadership was too comfortable in its permanent minority, and even worse, 
was too accommodating towards the opposition.3 To achieve this goal, the Republican Party 
had to take a more confrontational stance against the Democratic Party. Some early COS 
members, aside from Gingrich, were: Dan Coates (IN), Phil Crane (IL), Judd Gregg (NH), 
Duncan Hunter (CA), Dan Lungren (CA), Connie Mack (FL), Vin Weber (MN) and Robert 
Walker (PA).4 Early on, this organisation used C-SPAN as a tool to help bring their message 
to the American public, and attack Democrats without them being present to respond to the 
accusations.5 House Speaker Tip O’Neill (D-MA) believed that those engaged in this 
strategy “did their best to undermine the dignity of the House”.6   
                                                          
 2For more on the COS from a non-conservative perspective, consult: Robert Remini, The House: The 
History of the House of Representatives (New York: Smithsonian Books: Collins, 2006), 462-477; Julian Zelizer, 
Governing America: The Revival of American Political History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 270-
275; Judith Warner and Max Berley, Newt Gingrich: Speaker to America (New York: Signet, 1995), 92-112; 
Eleanor Clift and Tom Brazaitis, War Without Bloodshed: The Art of Politics (New York: Scribner, 1996), 227-
237; and Sean M. Theriault, The Gingrich Senators: The Roots of Partisan Warfare in Congress (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 19-31. For more on COS from the conservative perspective, refer to: Lee 
Edwards, The Conservative Revolution: The Movement That Remade America (New York: Free Press, 1999), 
270-282; and Mel Steely, The Gentleman From Georgia: The Biography of Newt Gingrich (Macon, GA: Mercer 
University Press, 2000), 140-145, 150, 160, 165-166, 174-178, 189.   
3For more on the permanent minority, refer to: William F. Connelly, Jr. and John J. Pitney, Jr., 
Congress' Permanent Minority? : Republicans in the U.S. House (Lanham, MD: Littlefield Adams Quality 
Paperbacks, 1994).  
 4Remini, The House, 462; Edwards, The Conservative Revolution, 271; Werner and Berley, Newt 
Gingrich, 92-93; and Steely, The Gentlemen From Georgia, 142-143. 
5For the view of the former House Speaker, Tip O’Neill (D-MA), on the actions of Gingrich, COS and 
their usage of C-SPAN, see: Tip O’Neill with William Novak, Man of the House (New York: Random House, 
1987), 352-355. 
6Ibid., 353.  
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Although COS was hostile towards Democrats, it was also aggressive towards its 
own party, with Gingrich, Armey (R-TX) and Tom DeLay (R-TX) challenging moderates 
for House leadership positions.7   
The main problem with COS’s rhetoric was that it was best employed by the 
minority party, making it more difficult to govern than when using a bipartisan approach. 
One notable example is from 1984 when Gingrich publicly condemned Ronald Reagan for 
compromising with Democrats.8 He accused the president of “feeding the liberal welfare 
state instead of changing it”.9 On the other hand, being part of the House minority allowed 
greater freedom to challenge those who governed. The problem once conservative 
Republicans seized power, which Gingrich faced during the 104th Congress, was that the 
public expected those in power to actually govern, not to figuratively blow-up government, 
or shut it down.10    
However, when Gingrich bemoaned Reagan’s record on challenging “the liberal 
welfare state” he demonstrated that COS was even more conservative than Reagan.11  
Reagan was willing to be a conservative who worked within the existing political structure 
whilst Gingrich was determined to change the present state to one which best suited COS’s 
ideals.12 
                                                          
7For more on this point, see: Douglas L. Koopman, Hostile Takeover: The House Republican Party, 
1980-1995 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996), 11-26.  
8Zelizer, Governing America, 272. 
9The quote was taken from: ibid.    
10This will be discussed in more detail later on in the chapter.  
11For more on this point, see: Nicol C. Rae, Conservative Reformers: The Republican Freshmen and 
the Lessons of the 104th Congress (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 33-34. 
12For more on this point, consider: Richard E. Cohen, “Frustrated House Republicans Seek More 
Aggressive Strategy for 1984 and Beyond”, National Journal 9, no. 16 (3 March 1984): 413, 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/nexis (accessed 16 November 2012); Evan Thomas, Laurence I. Barrett and 
Joseph N. Boyce, "Struggling for a Party's Soul", Time 124, no. 10 (3 September 1984): 38, Academic Search 
Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed 22 November 2012); and Zelizer, Governing America, 272. 
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According to Vin Weber, the main goal of COS was to offer “an attractive alternative 
to the liberal welfare state”.13 In his assessment, Gingrich aimed to change “the political 
dynamic that was put in motion at the time of the New Deal. He believes that to triumph 
politically you have to smash ‘tax-and-spend liberalism,’ which has dominated our domestic 
politics for sixty years. It is an alignment in the sense that it’s discrediting a way of problem 
solving. He puts it in terms of the ‘welfare state,’ ‘bureaucracy’ – it can be defined more 
objectively. He wants to change the way people think about government.”14 What these two 
statements illustrate is that Gingrich wanted to challenge the ongoing liberal Democratic 
New Deal legacy and replace it with a conservative Republican equivalent. He had also 
described the legacy he was fighting against as “the baroque phase of liberalism: the Soviet 
Union as puzzling and benign, no growth, rationing.”15 Therefore, what Weber, Gingrich 
and other COS members were combating was a way of life they considered un-American.      
Weber, in an interview, was asked to “differentiate a conservative approach to the 
welfare state from a liberal approach”. His response was the following: “The first principle 
is that government should reinforce traditional values such as family and work, instead of 
undermining them. . . . Second, government policy should be market-sensitive, not market-
destructive. . . . Third, the conservative welfare state should be fiscally [conservative]. . . . 
Finally, local control and decentralization should be central to our agenda”.16  He went on to 
articulate how he believed that COS’s message would allow for “a Republican majority in 
the House in the next 10 years. . . . Democrats have yet to get their act together on terms of 
                                                          
13Adam Meyerson, “Wedges and Magnets”, Policy Review 52 (Spring 1990): 38, Academic Search 
Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed 21 May 2012).  
14Elizabeth Drew, Showdown: The Struggle Between the Gingrich Congress and the Clinton White 
House (New York: Touchstone, 1997), 26-27.  
15The quote is from: Nicholas Lemann, “Conservative Opportunity Society”, The Atlantic, May 1985, 
36. 
 16Meyerson, “Wedges and Magnets”, 39.     
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moving back to the mainstream. Their party is increasingly controlled by left-wing activists. 
. . . I don’t see moderates and conservatives coming back to the Democratic Party”.17 As it 
turned out, his prediction was partially correct, the GOP won a majority in both Houses of 
Congress four years later.   
Conservative historian Lee Edwards is another who asserts that all Democrats have 
become liberals. He also implies that the leftist tendencies of Democrats indicate that they 
champion socialist ideals.   
[M]odern liberals have shown that they cannot govern wisely, wed as they are to the 
socialist ideal. So convinced they were in the 1930s that government, and only 
government, could save the nation that they proposed a radical break with American 
tradition – nothing less than a new contract between the government and the 
governed. Their model was not the American Revolution, rational and grounded in 
the law, but the French Revolution, utopian and guided by the impulse of the 
moment.18   
What he conceived to be an un-American ideal underlay the “fifty-year experiment in ever 
larger government and ever less individual responsibility”.19   
Edwards linked COS’s goals to that of the larger conservative Republican movement 
to combat the New Deal legacy. He asserts: “COS’s undisputed enemy was the liberal 
welfare state, a primary target of conservatives from Bob Taft through Barry Goldwater and 
Ronald Reagan to the present”. However, he highlights a difference between Gingrich and 
Reagan that set COS apart. “Gingrich stressed that although President Reagan 
unquestionably had “slowed down” the liberal welfare state, he had not fundamentally 
changed its character or its size. COS members therefore sought “wedge” issues, like 
                                                          
 17Ibid., 42.  




abortion . . . and magnet issues . . . like tax reform” to first repel voters away from the 
Democratic Party and then attract them to the GOP.20 
Edwards also perceives Gingrich to be one of the iconic figures, along with Robert 
Taft, Barry Goldwater and Ronald Reagan, who have “remade America” via the 
conservative movement.21 However, one major difference in Gingrich’s era was the 
increased importance given to social values. Although Gingrich did not openly campaign on 
social issues in the 1994 midterms – COS did make them a part of their wedge driving issues 
in the House – the Contract with America contained a vital social issue as part of the 
agenda.22 Welfare reform worked against the New Deal legacy, simultaneously using family 
values to attack a government programme accused of encouraging women to have children 
out of wedlock. On the other hand, the four were united in their opposition to tax-and spend 
liberalism.               
Weber’s four-point response in 1990 was very similar to the foundation of the 
welfare reform plan in the Contract with America, as well as the welfare reform plan that 
Clinton signed into law during the 104th Congress. However, the conservative Republican 
theme of “opportunity” faced an uphill battle when the GOP-controlled 104th Congress 
proposed slashing Medicare benefits.23 Challenging what COS-labelled the “liberal welfare 
state” was much more difficult when attacking a popular entitlement that was not viewed in 
the same light as welfare benefits, which could be accused of going to “the undeserving 
                                                          
20Ibid., 281-282.  
21I consider Herbert Hoover to play a larger role than what Edwards suggests. He highlights the 
similarities of the roles played by Taft and Gingrich – where two GOP Congresses, in 1994 and 1946, 
attempted, with limited success, to attack big government. For more, refer to: Edwards, The Conservative 
Revolution, 306-307.    
22According to political scientist James Farney, the Contract had three points that were included to 
appeal to social conservatives. For more, consult: James Farney, Social Conservatives and Party Politics in 
Canada and the United States (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 69-70.  
 23The point will be discussed in more detail later on in the chapter.  
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poor”.24 Clinton was more successful defending Medicare than he was defending welfare 
against the Republican-controlled Congress.25 The different outcomes of the two events 
highlight his difficult situation as a centrist Democrat looking to distance himself from the 
liberal wing of his party. He, however, found a fortuitous ally in Senate Majority Leader Bob 
Dole (R-KS) to help turn the tables against Gingrich and the conservative dominated House, 
and to end the budget stalemate. 
A Delicate Balance: Health Care, the New Deal Legacy and Four-Party Politics  
 Although Gingrich wanted to move the GOP in a more conservative direction than 
Reagan, Reagan’s impact on the evolution of four-party politics is important to consider. 
Without his election in 1980 and re-election in 1984, Gingrich’s success in 1994 may not 
have been possible.26 It would at least have been more difficult to achieve. Thus what the 
Reagan presidency achieved, the 1994 midterm elections solidified – the reconfiguration of 
four-party politics.27  
 Part of the change in four-party politics placed Clinton to the left of the Republican 
congressional party and to the right of the Democratic congressional party. This political 
dynamic played right into the ploys of conservative Republicans, and especially Gingrich.28 
                                                          
 24For more on the undeserving, consult: Michael Katz, The Undeserving Poor: From the War on 
Poverty to the War on Welfare (New York: Pantheon, 1989). 
25Welfare reform is the central theme of the next chapter.  
26For more on Reagan and party reorganisation, refer to: Walter J. Stone, Ronald B. Rapoport and 
Alan I. Abramowitz, “Party Polarization: The Reagan Revolution and Beyond”, in The Parties Respond: Changes 
in American Parties and Campaigns, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), ed. L. Sandy Maisel, 69-99; 
Robert Mason, “Ronald Reagan and the Republican Party: Responses to Realignment”, in Ronald Reagan and 
the 1980s: Perceptions, Policies, Legacies (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), eds. Cheryl Hudson and 
Gareth Davies, 151-172; and Paul Allen Beck, “Incomplete Realignment: The Reagan Legacy for Parties and 
Elections”, in The Reagan Legacy: Promise and Performance (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1988), 
ed. Charles O. Jones, 145-171.     
27Political scientist Douglas Koopman also briefly analyses how the GOP in 1994 had altered their half 
of the four-party system. For more, refer to Koopman, Hostile Takeover, 156-158. 
28For more on polarisation as party strategy, see: Thomas Byrne Edsall, Building Red America: The 
New Conservative Coalition and the Drive for Permanent Power (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 50-77. 
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According to political scientist Sean Theriault, although Reagan’s 1980 presidential election 
victory challenged congressional bipartisanship, “Gingrich’s penchant for confrontation 
started before 1980 and the establishment of COS”.29 Theriault’s analysis of Gingrich’s 
congressional career illustrates that his first term in the House, the 96th Congress of 1979-
1980, laid the path towards partisanship, and when he became Speaker, “The Republicans 
who entered Gingrich’s House looked and acted differently than the Republicans who 
entered the House after Gingrich”.30 With the election and subsequent shift of Phil Gramm 
(R-TX) from the House to the Senate in 1984 the seeds of partisanship took root.31 During 
the 103rd Congress (1993-1994), partisanship was evident on issues like Clinton’s first 
budget and the failed attempt at health care reform.32 
I argue that Clinton was a moderate Democratic president if judged on his response 
to the New Deal legacy.33 In essence, he was not against expanding the legacy of the New 
Deal (via health care reform) but preferred to do so through the private insurance industry. 
He was also willing to defend the legacy, with regards to Medicare. However, many 
Republicans, especially conservatives, branded him a liberal Democrat in his attempts to 
                                                          
29Theriault, The Gingrich Senators, 20-22. The quote is from page 22.   
30Ibid., 28-30. The quote is from page 30. For more on the House Republican Party changed during 
the time span of 1980 to 1994, refer to: Koopman, Hostile Takeover.   
31Ibid., 37-50.  
32For more on partisanship during the 103rd Congress, consider: James P. Pfiffner, “President Clinton 
and the 103rd Congress: Winning Battles and Losing Wars”, in Rivals for Power: Presidential-Congressional 
Relations (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1996), ed. James A. Thurber, 170-190; and Barbara Sinclair, “Hostile 
Partners: The President, Congress, and Lawmaking in the Partisan 1990s”, in Polarized Politics: Congress and 
the President in a Partisan Era (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2000), eds. Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, 146-
148, 150-153.  
33However, political scientist Sidney Milkis considers Clinton to be a progressive who wanted “to 
correct and renew the progressive tradition”, whereas, historian David Courtwright considers Clinton to be a 
“progressive in his ends”, via his leftist stance on morality. See: Sidney M. Milkis, The President and the 
Parties: the Transformation of the American Party System since the New Deal (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1993), 312-313; Sidney  M. Milkis, “The Presidency and Political Parties”, in The Presidency and the 
Political System, 9th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2010), ed. Michael Nelson, 317; and David T. Courtwright, 
No Right Turn: Conservative Politics in Liberal America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 239.     
122 
 
increase the scope of government, not only on health care but on other issues that 
conveniently fit in with their allegations, especially the tax increase included in his first 
budget plan to reduce the fiscal deficit. As a consequence, the budget only narrowly passed, 
without any support from the GOP opposition.34 Historian Steven Gillon remarked that 
Clinton’s “budget was a gift to Gingrich, who successfully stigmatized his modest proposal 
as a traditional “tax and spend” budget”.35 But in that regard Gingrich was not alone, for Bob 
Dole erroneously declared the budget to have included “not just the largest tax increase in 
American history. It’s the largest increase in world history”; a claim that historian Iwan 
Morgan dismissed as “a patently ridiculous allegation . . . In reality, OBRA [Clinton’s] tax 
increases were smaller than the Reagan-Dole tax hike of 1982, which netted $268 billion in 
1993 dollars over five years”.36 
Clinton’s agenda during his first two years in office united the GOP opposition and 
was detrimental to congressional Democrats. “Clinton’s first two years”, according to 
political scientist Nicol C. Rae, “were an absolute disaster for the Democratic Party”.37 The 
theme of taxation rallied the GOP Congress, especially COS and Gingrich,38 and took up 
where Reagan’s rhetoric left off. But Gingrich wanted to go beyond what Reagan 
accomplished by ending Democratic control of Congress, as well as their big government 
                                                          
34For more, see: Iwan Morgan, The Age of Deficits: Presidents and Unbalanced Budgets from Jimmy 
Carter to George W. Bush (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009), 165-178; Steven M. Gillon, The Pact: 
Bill Clinton, Newt Gingrich, and the Rivalry That Defined a Generation (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2008), 113-114; and Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency (New York: Touchstone, 1994), 59-
75, 80-86, 109-113, 165-173, 260-272.       
35Gillon, The Pact, 114.  
36Morgan, The Age of Deficits, 174.  
37Nicole C. Rae, “Clinton and the Democrats: The President and Party Leader”, in The Postmodern 
Presidency: Bill Clinton’s Legacy in U.S. Politics (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), ed. Steven E. 
Schier, 192.    
38Morgan, The Age of Deficits, 170-174; Michael Foley, “Clinton and Congress” in The Clinton 
Presidency: The First Term, 1992-1996 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), eds. Paul S. Herrnson and Dilys M. 
Hill, 29-31; Lewis L. Gould, The Republicans: A History of the Grand Old Party (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2014), 318-319; and Gillon, The Pact, 113-114  
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credo that stymied the Reagan revolution. Clinton, however, was not willing to cut taxes the 
way Reagan had or George W. Bush eventually would.39       
As illustrated in the previous chapter, during the latter stages of his presidency, 
Reagan started to reassert the conservative Republican claim that liberals – in this instance 
Sen. Ted Kennedy (D-MA) and Governor Michael Dukakis (D-MA) – wanted to tax-and-
spend America into socialised medicine. As provocation he used the terms liberal and 
Democrat as interchangeable references because they were synonymous, a liberal was a 
Democrat and a Democrat was a liberal. The main point of his avowal was that no matter 
what you label them they still had have a big government agenda. This association, however, 
also bore implications on foreign policy. 
According to political scientist John Kenneth White, “the Republican Party was the 
primary beneficiary of the struggle with communism, as it succeeded in tarring liberalism 
with the epithet that it was “soft” on communism”.40 The “rejection of communism 
reinforced American nationalism, and made the Republicans into a patriotic party”.41 
However, the end of the Cold War signalled a change in American party politics. The public 
disliked new, big-government agendas, whilst at the same time it supported protecting the 
middle class welfare state. Clinton and the Democratic Party were more tight-fisted with 
government spending; the Republican Party was similar, whilst also reasserting conservative 
social values.42  
                                                          
39Catherine E. Rudder, “The Politics of Taxing and Spending in Congress: Ideas, Strategy, and Policy”, 
in Congress Reconsidered, 8th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2005), eds. Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. 
Oppenheimer, 319-342; 323-325, 237-329; and W. Elliot Brownlee, Federal Taxation in America: A Short 
History (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004), 147-216. 
40John Kenneth White, Still Seeing Red: How the Cold War Shapes the New American Politics, 
updated and expanded ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), 5.  
41Ibid., 8.  
42 For more, consult: White, Still Seeing Red, 221-285. 
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On GOP use of the red label, White posits: “Despite Republican efforts to paint 
Democrats red by association, the Cold War no longer remains an organizing image in 
American politics. Its fading portrait poses a significant challenge for the GOP. . . . New 
enemies must be found”.43 His book, published in 1998, did not fully explore how both 
parties had changed but this work agrees that the red label can still be effective depending on 
the circumstances.  
In 2003, however, White rearranged Burns’ four-party politics model in “the return 
of four-party politics”.44 This noted how the exit of southern Democrats made both 
congressional parties more ideologically harmonious, whilst both presidential parties (his 
examples are Clinton and George W. Bush) fit in-between the two congressional parties. On 
the other hand, as I point out in the fourth chapter on George W. Bush, his presidency 
offered the GOP the opportunity to gain its own New Deal electoral coalition – albeit one 
that did not come into fruition. 
Rae’s work on the demise of the liberal GOP wing is of importance to my 
argument.45 In the current four-party politics dynamic, the remnants of liberal 
Republicanism have moved to the Democratic Party. Whilst the Democratic House is liberal 
dominated, this is not the case in the Senate nor for the presidential party.46 Of course there 
are liberal Democrats in the Senate, but moderate Democratic support, if not also Republican 
support, is needed to pass Senate legislation. There are not enough liberal Democrats in the 
Senate to pass legislation without moderate support. And like the previous Democratic 
                                                          
43Ibid., 273.  
44John Kenneth White, The Values Divide: American Politics and Culture in Transition (New York: 
Chatham House Publishers, 2003), 177-193.  
45Nicol C. Rae, The Decline and Fall of the Liberal Republicans (New York: Oxford Press, 1989).  
46However, others such as historian Ronald Radosh argue that Democrats have become a liberal 
party. For more, consult: Ronald Radosh, Divided They Fell: The Demise of the Democratic Party, 1964-1996 
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Senate Majority during the 113th Congress (fifty-one with two Independents who caucused 
with the party), Republican support is needed to have the sixty vote supermajority to invoke 
cloture and overcome a potential filibuster. Compared to the House, the Senate is smaller 
and allows individual members more opportunity to assert their views – which makes an 
individual senator more influential than an individual house member.47 
Bill Clinton was a southern Democrat who achieved major accomplishments, such as 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), welfare reform and deficit reducing 
budgets, whilst working with and against liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans 
respectively.48 Clinton represented a Democratic Party that was much more liberal on socio-
moral issues than the GOP. Though economically centrist, it was (and still is) liberal by 
comparison to the GOP. Clinton lamented that his first year budget agenda did not have 
traditional Democratic priorities but instead was more in line with the policies of 
“Eisenhower Republicans”, whilst his administration was pitted against “fighting the Reagan 
Republicans. We stand for lower deficits and free trade and the bond market. Isn’t that great 
                                                          
47For more, refer to: Sarah A. Binder, Minority Rights, Majority Rule: Partisanship and the 
Development of Congress (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997). A powerful tool at a senator’s 
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(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010).   
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[italics added]?”49 Political scientist Philip Klinkner’s take on Clinton and New Democrats is 
that they adhered to 
an accomodationist ideology. . . . that attempts to accommodate itself with the 
dominant political tides by presenting a more moderate version of the latter. In this 
way, the New Democrats are akin to the “Moderate Republicanism” of the 
Eisenhower era. . . . [However,] the New Democrats lack the popular base to alter the 
dominant conservative political ideology. They are reduced to splitting the difference 
with or moderating the more unpopular elements of the conservative agenda.50   
Political scientist Mark Smith explains the evolution of party politics as the 
following: “The flow of American politics in recent decades can thus be summarized by a 
basic fact: With some exceptions, Republicans and their ideological allies changed their 
arguments while Democrats changed their positions. Disarmingly simple in its essence, this 
contrast is complex in both its origins and its implications”.51 This is the case with 
economics, which is Smith’s central theme, but when combining socio-moral policies both 
parties have changed positions. Conservative Republicans believe that individual freedom 
also equals individual responsibility. 
Clinton, during his presidency, was the leader of a Democratic Party that did – and 
still does – support more socially liberal policies that do not moderate “the dominant 
conservative political ideology” as Klinkner suggests. However, unlike moderate 
Republicanism, moderate Democrats have a home in both their presidential and 
congressional parties – although this rings truer for the Senate than for the House. Moderate 
Republicans, on the other hand, have an uphill fight in their presidential party, balancing the 
desire to appeal to a conservative base without repelling the centre. They are also dwindling 
                                                          
49Bob Woodward, The Agenda: Inside the Clinton White House (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 
165.  
50Philip Klinkner, “Democratic Party Ideology in the 1990s: New Democrats or Modern Republicans?” 
In The Politics of Ideas: Intellectual Challenges Facing the American Political Parties (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 2001), eds. John Kenneth White and John C. Green, 128-129.    
51Mark A. Smith, The Right Talk: How Conservatives Transformed the Great Society into the Economic 
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in numbers to be a force in either the Senate or the House. And as liberal Republicans have 
left the GOP, moderate Republicans are also getting pushed out of the party, and are now on 
the verge of extinction at the national level.  
Previous works on the Clinton presidency, at least the first term, provide a path to 
understanding Clinton and the New Deal legacy, especially the failed attempt at health care 
reform and the defence of Medicare during the budget battles.52 But how did four-party 
politics affect him in the two instances? Or for that matter, how did they also affect Gingrich 
and other conservative Republicans?   
It is without a doubt that the pre-1994 four-party politics dynamic was transformed 
by the 1994 midterm elections. Whilst the Democratic controlled 103rd Congress maintained 
a high level of support for Clinton’s agenda, on three of his major initiatives, national health 
care reform, welfare reform and the ratification of NAFTA, he was at odds with his 
congressional party.53 And his NAFTA success was due to the help of Gingrich and 
congressional Republicans overcoming the opposition of a majority of congressional 
                                                          
52For more on Clinton and his centrist policies affected his presidency, see: Burns and Sorenson, 
Dead Center; Dan Balz and Ronald Brownstein, Storming the Gates: Protest Politics and the Republican Revival 
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Democrats.54 NAFTA was one example of the complex political relationship between two 
key political rivals.55    
Four-party politics was a mixed bag for both Clinton and Gingrich. By being to the 
left of the Republican congressional party ideologically, Clinton’s health care reform plan 
and any other Democratic health care plan was successfully labelled by the GOP as a big 
government takeover of American health care. On the other hand, Medicare and the 1995/96 
budget battle exposed Gingrich and the GOP for being overly zealous in their attempt to 
reduce the size of government. Conservative rhetoric framed a successful narrative in 
attacking health care reform, which helped the party to reap the rewards of their labours in 
the 1994 midterm elections. However, this also backfired when Bob Dole’s presidential 
aspirations hindered a similar strategy during the two government shutdowns, as well as 
when the freshmen and other members of the House leadership were all too happy with the 
government shutdowns. 
Bob Dole’s 1996 presidential aspirations made him and Clinton temporary allies 
against Gingrich and the House Republicans, which did not sit well with many House 
members.56 Dole believed the House Republicans were “a little too much in a hurry” with 
the notion of the Contract with America because “You don’t undo 40 years or 20 years or 30 
years in 100 days or four years”.57 And he even lamented that this all or nothing approach on 
                                                          
54The final voting tally was 234-200 in the House and 61-38 in the Senate. For more on the vote 
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the budget, including Medicare allowed Clinton to “nail us [the GOP] to the mast on the 
government shutdown”58. Leading up to the 1995 Christmas recess, Gingrich was losing 
control of the House, and even though Clinton, Dole and Gingrich were willing to come to a 
budget agreement, “Gingrich’s own team”, including Armey and DeLay, were “willing to 
have an Alamo finish”.59 According to journalist Bob Woodward, “Clinton saw the 
opportunity” to use the split to attack the House. “He [Clinton] called Dole”, noted 
Woodward “to explain that he was going to denounce the House Republicans in public. Dole 
did not resist. ‘My new best friend, Bob Dole’, Clinton declared to his aides afterwards”.60  
This tactic was devised to force Gingrich to choose sides between either the House or 
Dole.61 Armey was enraged that Clinton – via his usage of the press – was able to out 
manoeuvre the GOP in controlling the public perception of the budget battle: “Us getting 
taught by the master!” After the 17 January 1996 meeting between Clinton, Gingrich, Armey 
and Dole, Dole “realized, without a doubt, that Clinton had stalled the Republican 
revolution”.62 The result was not the Alamo, but in the view of journalist Linda Killian it 
was more apt to call it “their Waterloo”.63 
In following with Theriault’s analysis of how Gingrich House Republicans were 
making their way into the Senate, during the 104th Congress the Gingrich Senators clashed 
with Dole and other moderate GOP Senators, however, the Senate did shift closer towards 
the House, especially afterward Dole resigned from Congress and Trent Lott (R-MS) 
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60Ibid; also see: Drew, Showdown, 356, 365-368.  
61Woodward, The Choice, 342.  
62Ibid., 359-360.  
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became the next Senate Majority leader.64 But even before Dole resigned, he could not 
abandon Gingrich and the House outright during the earlier stages of budget negations. He 
had to contend with the presidential aspirations of Phil Gramm (R-TX), the original Gingrich 
Senator, who threatened to challenge him from the right.65  
Gingrich, on the other hand, had a problem with Armey. Whilst both were 
conservative Republicans, at the time, the former was concerned with governing whereas the 
latter was more concerned with ideological purity. Although conservative historian Donald 
Critchlow states that “Dick Armey, a former university economics professor, provided the 
tactics (and the restraint) that enabled the revolt to succeed”, whereas journalists David 
Maraniss and Michael Weisskorpf portray Armey as more of an ideologue and Newt as the 
more restrained individual.66 Or, in the words of journalists Dan Balz and Ronald 
Brownstein, “Armey was, if anything, more conservative than Gingrich. Pure ideology ran 
through his veins”.67  
Analysis on the budget battle clearly shows how Armey, the House leadership and 
many House freshmen focused more of their attention on reducing the size of government 
than on governing. Yet it is also relevant to note that Gingrich, the combativeness of COS 
and the Contract with America were effective in using conservative ideology to gain 
political power, and as a result launched a “Partisan Conservative” era in Congress.68 
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Politics professor Kenneth Cosgrove considers how Gingrich and the Contract was the 
“single best example of the conservative brand strategy”, where “rather than running as 
individuals, these conservatives ran as a block much as candidates in the Westminster model 
do”.69 Gingrich also overlooked how to use this power as an effective means to govern with 
the presidency still under Democratic control. The mantra of Gingrich and COS was to gain 
political power, the next step was to articulate how to use the power available to change 
policy.  
 Central to the conservative Republican brand is a rhetoric that attacks the New Deal 
and its ongoing political legacy. In some ways Clinton helped the conservative cause in his 
response to the legacy, especially when it came to health care reform.  
Rhetoric and Political Narrative   
As mentioned in the first chapter, Jimmy Carter attempted to defend the legacy of the 
New Deal (such as social security and Medicare), whilst also making it clear that he would 
not add on to the legacy via another government programme.70 In this regard, Clinton 
followed Carter’s example by trying to combat both the liberal and socialist labels 
simultaneously.  
In order for Clinton to be able to present his health care plan as moderate, he had to 
highlight the differences between his plan and a more liberal option, such as Medicare. 
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Socialism is when the Government runs a health care system. We don’t have 
socialized medicine in this country, and my plan is for private insurance and private 
doctors. . . . 
Now, nobody thinks Medicare is socialism . . . You pay for it every month in 
a payroll tax. Is that socialism? No. I don’t want to raise – I don’t even want to pay 
for it like Medicare. I just want people who don’t have insurance to have it.71            
This example shows how he carefully positioned health care reform, to the right of 
Medicare, which is a government controlled health care programme. According to his 
statement, he wanted to establish that since Medicare was not socialist then neither was his 
plan, since it was more privatised than Medicare. 
 Another way in which Clinton wanted to establish his health care plan as a moderate 
reform was to link his plan to that of a former Republican president, Richard Nixon. In one 
reference to Nixon he said, “we need to complete a battle that was begun by Franklin 
Roosevelt and Harry Truman that has never been completed. And to show you how far our 
friends in the other party have gone, in 1972 – ’71 – President Richard Nixon recommended 
that all Americans be covered by health care and that employers and employees split the bill. 
They now think that is a radical, liberal idea”.72 By stating that his plan was similar to 
Nixon’s, he was trying to establish that his proposal not only used to have Republican 
support, it was originally their plan.73 With this comparison, he was also insinuating that his 
plan was no more “radical” a reform than Nixon’s.   
                                                          
71Bill Clinton, "Remarks at a Health Care Rally in Greensburg, Pennsylvania", 15 July 1994, compiled 
by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=50486 (accessed 7 December 2010).  
72Bill Clinton, "Remarks at a Democratic Campaign Reception in Portland, Maine", 18 July 1994, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=50511 (accessed 31 January 2011).  
73Political scientist Stephen Skowronek described Clinton’s political style as one of “preemption”.  
According to Skowronek, “Clinton drove himself to mystifying complexity in trying to insulate his health care 
initiative from the conservative repudiation of “big government” and “tax-and-spend” liberalism”; Stephen 
Skowronek, Preisdential Leadership in Political Time: Reprise and Reappraisal, 2nd ed. (Lawrence: University of 
Kansas Press, 2011), 105, 110. 
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On the other hand, Clinton, in trying to refute both the socialist and liberal labels, 
obscured the meaning of the New Deal legacy. As a moderate Democrat, he wanted to 
expand the legacy of his party, but not under the liberal label. One example of this 
conflicting message was when he stated: 
Harry Truman had to say, “No, this is not socialized medicine, this is private 
insurance. No, this is not a Government takeover, we’re preserving the choice and 
the private medical system. No, we’re not going to waste more money covering 
everybody, we’ll actually save money.” And what did they say? “Harry Truman’s a 
radical liberal. He’s for socialized medicine. He’s for big government. He’s going to 
take this country down.” . . . 
  If you have ever dealt with Medicare, you know that it’s the furthest thing in 
 the world from socialized medicine. Senior citizens pick their doctors, and the 
 doctors make the decision. And yet, the arguments we’re hearing today against this 
 plan are the same arguments the same crowd made against Medicare 29 years ago, 
 just like they did against Harry Truman 50 years ago and F.D.R. 60 years ago.74         
This example illustrates Clinton’s insistence that using private health insurance, as a 
way of health care reform, was also the basis of reform followed by President Truman. Yet 
in reality, Truman’s position on health care was closer to that of Lyndon Johnson’s and 
Medicare than it was to Clinton’s plan.75 However, Truman’s health care preferences also 
differed from both of theirs. Social policy scholar David Blumenthal and political scientist 
James Morone in the Heart of Power assert, “Truman would snort at the idea that private 
markets met his ideals – he was a genuine New Deal egalitarian”.76   
Medicare allows its users to see private sector doctors and go to private hospitals, but 
the federal government pays for their medical bills.77 In comparison, Clinton’s plan 
mandated that private insurers would pay patients’ medical bills. The two approaches were 
                                                          
74Bill Clinton, "Remarks to Health Security Express Participants in Independence, Missouri", 30 July 
1994, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=48923 (accessed 31 January 2011).  
75The concept of Medicare came about after Truman’s setbacks on health care, which was viewed as 
a more incremental approach focused on the elderly. For more, refer to: Blumenthal and Morone, The Heart 
of Power, 94-95; Jonathan Oberlander, The Political Life of Medicare (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2003), 22-35; and Hacker, The Road to Nowhere, 78-79.   
76Blumenthal and Morone, The Heart of Power, 96.  
77For more on the history of Medicare, see: Oberlander, The Political Life of Medicare.  
134 
 
vastly different from one another. In all likelihood, they were competing policies instead of 
similar plans. As a moderate Democrat, he was in the difficult position of defending the New 
Deal legacy, whilst simultaneously challenging its liberal pedigree.78   
Clinton and Truman both failed, but each with different consequences.  
Truman lost, but in the process of losing, he defined the terms of the debate. He gave 
the reforming generations that followed him a cause, a plan, and a patron saint to 
rally around.   
In contrast, Bill Clinton walked away from the wreckage speculating about 
tactics and musing that he should have tried welfare reform instead. Opponents 
completely controlled the spin – and the history. And national health care reform – 
the Democrats’ signature cause – slipped out of political sight for a decade.79              
Another issue they had in common was an ideological foe, a conservative Republican, who 
was determined to fight them tooth and nail along the way – Sen. Robert Taft (R-OH) for 
Truman and Rep. Newt Gingrich for Clinton.80 The major ideological difference between 
Clinton and Truman, however, was that the latter wanted the state to provide health 
insurance and the former preferred private health insurance. 
Regardless of Clinton’s position on the New Deal and its legacy, according to 
conservative rhetoric, his health care reform plan was a form of socialism because it gave 
government more power by way of oversight. His plan would expand government power at 
the expense of individual freedom. The conservative Republican argument against having a 
national health care plan is contrary to the positions of both liberal Democrats and 
moderates, Democratic or Republican. Conservative Republicans previously opposed 
moderate proposals that were brought forward by presidents Eisenhower, Nixon and 
                                                          
78For more on this point, consult: Alex Waddan, “Found and Lost: A Third Way on Health Care”, in 
The Presidency of Bill Clinton: The Legacy of New Domestic and Foreign Policy (London: I. B. Tauris, 2012), ed. 
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Carter.81 To them, it did not matter if a president was a moderate Democrat, such as Carter, 
Clinton and Obama, or a moderate Republican, such as Eisenhower and Nixon. What 
mattered to conservatives was the potential increase of power for the federal government to 
regulate national health care – a notion they abhorred.   
Conservative Republican rhetoric, on the other hand, did not hesitate to imply that 
Clinton’s health care reform initiative was the culmination of over half a century of liberal 
Democratic expansion of the welfare state. COS members were some of the most vocal 
critics. In one instance, Gingrich declared:  
Principle and policy sense, if they ever existed, have vanished in the mad scramble to 
cobble together enough votes for liberal Democrats to claim another historic 
expansion of the welfare state. These are the same liberals, by the way, who bemoan 
the declining prestige of government. It is all remarkable especially because never in 
American history has one party attempted to make so much social policy with so 
little support. The Clintons like to compare their effort to Social Security and 
Medicare, but those were military parades compared with this political riot. . . . 
. . . Social Security and Medicare . . . both came after landslide presidential 
victories. Franklin Roosevelt was elected by a huge margin in 1932. Lyndon Johnson 
was elected by a huge margin. In 1992 we had a split election with a minority 
President getting 43 percent of the vote. There is no mandate for social engineering 
to turn America’s health care over to the government.82     
On another occasion, both Gingrich and Armey described the plan as “a breathtaking display 
of social engineering, the scope of which has not been seen since the Great Society . . . the 
Clinton plan is good old-fashioned income redistribution. . . . It’s a top-down, welfare-state 
approach that diminishes personal freedom”.83 Gingrich’s last two remarks highlight how he 
viewed the liberal welfare state as the enemy of individual freedom. This critique holds more 
sway against unpopular programmes like welfare, but if the critique is employed to also 
                                                          
81For a more in-depth analysis on how previous presidents, from Herbert Hoover to George W. Bush, 
have dealt with health care reform, see: Blumenthal and Morone, The Heart of Power. 
82Newt Gingrich, Thomas (Library of Congress), Congressional Record, 103rd Congress, 22 July 1994, 
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83Dick Armey and Newt Gingrich, “The Welfarization of Health Care”, National Review 46, no. 2 (7 
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rebuke popular programmes such as Medicare and social security, it will have to focus on 
credibility issues to undermine public confidence, or attempt to reform the entitlement.  
Conservative Republicans viewed Clinton’s health care reform agenda as the 
culmination of the liberal Democratic legacy. Exemplifying this outlook, Armey argued after 
the midterm elections that the Clinton health care plan “was to be the final fulfillment of the 
New Deal vision of lifelong “security” under the management of the state. Three of the five 
post-war Democratic presidents – Truman, Johnson, and Carter – tried and failed to add this 
capstone to the welfare state, the final piece that would consolidate middle-class dependence 
on Big Government forever. . . . The repudiation of this monstrous proposal was one of the 
best moments in our history”.84      
As Gingrich and Armey exemplify, conservative Republicans – especially those who 
initiated COS – asserted that Clinton had no mandate to add on to the reviled liberal legacy. 
Although they did not attack popular programmes such as social security and Medicare with 
the same intensity as health care reform, they regarded them as one and the same. In an 
exchange with Rep. Steny Hoyer (D-MD), Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-CA), who was one of 
COS’s founding members, expressed his views on the New Deal legacy. Hoyer asked 
Hunter the following question: “Does the gentleman believe that Medicare is a socialized 
system”? Hunter replied by stating “yes”, “it is a small piece of a [larger] socialized system”. 
And regarding both social security and Medicare, Hunter went on to state that America has 
“built a system around that [social security and Medicare] and we now have built thousands 
and millions of Americans who now have, for better or worse, become part of those 
programs, who put their money in, and who now feel that they have a contract with [a] 
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government that took money that they might have better used in other programs and that 
those people are now locked into those programs”.85   
Acknowledging the need to protect the “earned entitlements” of programmes like 
social security and Medicare, Armey professed: “All the extortions of Big Government, all 
the programs, all the social “reforms” forced upon us are beginning to look like so many 
failing shadows”.86 His preferred remedy was to privatise Medicare.87 He also conceded, 
“Social Security is in need of reform, but I do not believe Congress has earned the trust 
necessary to reform it just yet. We must first reform – meaning rethink, cut, or eliminate 
altogether – other programs to prove we are able to reform Social Security without doing 
injury to those who now rely upon it”.88 His preferred choice was to “transform the system 
and allow younger workers to begin directing some of their money to private accounts under 
their own control . . . The building blocks of any Social Security reform must be allowing 
choice for today’s workers and keeping our promises to the retired . . . It will be the final 
business of the Freedom Revolution”.89 His ideal plan was similar to George W. Bush’s 
attempt to partially privatise social security, and his comments highlight how conservative 
Republicans want to battle the liberal welfare state and replace it with one which is 
conservative (this is also the goal of COS).  
Gingrich made similar remarks on social security. In To Renew America, he said, “I 
have argued consistently that Social Security must be off the table in any discussion of a 
balanced budget. Social Security is the most widely accepted government contract in 
                                                          
85Duncan Hunter, Thomas (Library of Congress), Congressional Record, 103rd Congress, 10 August 
1994, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/LegislativeData.php?n=Record&c=103 (accessed 25 May 2011).   
86Armey, The Freedom Revolution, 303, 312.  
87Ibid., 211.  
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America. It is also the single most popular government program. Furthermore, the current 
generation of politicians has not earned the necessary trust to talk about retirement accounts. 
There is plenty of government left to remake even if we protect Social Security”.90 Echoing 
Armey’s previous comment on social security, he said, “In the short run, you have to take 
Social Security off the table and deal with everything else. And when you finish dealing with 
everything else, and you’ve done it right, you will have earned the trust of the American 
people to look at Social Security”.91 Gingrich also expressed his desire to privatise 
Medicare. According to historian Iwan Morgan,  
The GOP’s projected retrenchment of Medicare encapsulated its antistatist intent. It 
wanted seniors to take more responsibility for their health-care financial planning by 
capping benefits and encouraging them to opt for low-cost private health plans. . . . 
In a speech to the Blue Cross/Blue Shield Association on October 24 . . . [Gingrich] 
asserted, “We don’t get rid of it in round one because we don’t think that’s politically 
smart. . . . But we believe it’s going to wither on the vine because we think people 
are voluntarily going to leave it”.92 
The Contract with America did not attack social security. The same could also be 
said with regards to Medicare.93 Nonetheless, the Republican Congressional majority further 
strengthened Gingrich’s hand, which allowed him the opportunity to use the budget 
negotiations of 1995-1996, a way of privatising Medicare, as part of a larger plan to decrease 
the size of government (and also provide the wealthy with a tax cut). The House 
conservative Republican leadership wanted to seize the opportunity to attack the New Deal 
and its ongoing political legacy. Although some, such as Balz and Brownstein, suggest that 
the GOP “is [not] seriously contemplating eliminating Social Security or Medicare, the 
cornerstones of the American social welfare state”, however, others such as journalist 
                                                          
90Newt Gingrich, To Renew America (New York: Harper Collins, 1995), 96-97.  
91Morgan, The Age of Deficits, 179. 
92Ibid., 183.  
93Refer to: Ed Gillespie and Bob Schellhas, eds., The Contract with America: The Bold Plan by Rep. 
Newt Gingrich, Rep. Dick Armey and the House Republicans to Change the Nation (New York: Random House, 
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Elizabeth Drew, and academics like James MacGregor Burns and Georgia Sorenson, argue 
that the conservative Republican leadership of the 104th Congress sought to do just the 
opposite.94 According to Drew, the 1994 midterm elections gave Gingrich the opportunity to 
fulfil his desire to reform welfare – an opportunity to “repeal the New Deal” – as well as the 
prospect of realising an earlier goal of his to “transform Medicare”.95 Burns and Sorenson 
argue the 104th GOP congressional freshmen “came to Washington ready to declare war on 
the Democratic establishment, and to reverse a half century of New Deal and Fair Deal 
programs”.96     
Although, Balz and Brownstein are correct in their affirmation that conservative 
Republicans are not “seriously contemplating eliminating Social Security or Medicare, the 
cornerstones of the American social welfare state”. What needs more consideration, 
however, is the fact that conservative Republicans want to replace a liberal welfare state 
with a conservative welfare state that would offers fewer benefits and at least partially 
privatise the programmes. This was Gingrich’s failed strategy – especially with Medicare – 
during the budget battle of 1995-1996.97 Historian Sean Wilentz observed, “The Republicans 
touted their budget as . . . the grandest domestic decision since the advent of the New Deal. 
That shift included an attack on Medicare”, with the intent being to “attack a cornerstone of 
the American welfare state”.98 Their intent is to get government – as much as possible, if not 
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entirely over time – to defer to the free market, which allows government entitlement 
spending to decrease.99   
Although Gingrich and COS were only partially successful in attacking the New 
Deal and its ongoing political legacy, Gingrich made a vital contribution to the evolution of 
Republican conservatism.   
The importance of Gingrich in the evolution of conservative Republicanism 
Newt Gingrich played an essential role in getting conservative Republicans into the 
House – as well as the Senate – and strategizing a path to power in the 1994 midterm 
elections. Edwards considers his importance to the conservative Republican cause to be 
equal in importance to other stalwarts like Robert Taft, Barry Goldwater and Ronald 
Reagan.100 Cosgrove considers Gingrich’s framing of the conservative message to have been 
as vital as Reagan’s.101 And most importantly for Cosgrove, “What Ronald Reagan and his 
team had begun in Conservative politics, Newt Gingrich took to a level that continues to be 
used by Conservative candidates to the present day”.102 This strategy is summed up by 
Theriault as “party polarization and escalated partisan warfare” that passed on from the 
House to the Senate.103 Although others, such as Stephen Slivinski and Michael Tanner, both 
from the Cato Institute, argue that Gingrich was important in a more negative way, allowing 
the GOP to become a party of big government, just not as big as the Democrats – which only 
                                                          
99This was also Bush’s intent for Medicare and social security. However, Bush added onto Medicare 
via a free-market expansion. Bush’s attempt to reform social security was similar in its intent to insert the 
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102Ibid., 142.  
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became worse under the George W. Bush presidency.104 Both Gingrich and COS, however, 
had been accused of this before, during the Reagan administration,105 as well as during the 
104th Congress.106  
Yet as Theriault’s analysis illustrates, Gingrich helped to shift the House to 
conservatism, a change that also occurred in the Senate. Although the achievements of the 
104th Congress were mixed, it did force Clinton in a rightward direction in many ways, even 
during the budget battle and government shutdowns and especially welfare reform, in order 
to compromise.107 Gingrich was instrumental in building on how Reagan and other 
Republicans used the liberal label with almost carte blanche against the Democratic Party, 
but also in how Reagan intermixed the socialist label with both the liberal and Democratic 
labels. He helped to bring more conservatives (especially southern) under the congressional 
GOP banner, a move that helped to bolster conservative rhetoric within the growing ranks of 
the GOP to attack Clinton and the Democratic Party.108 And whilst this confrontational 
strategy was successful in helping to achieve power, it also became more difficult after the 
midterm elections for the GOP to attack government, because as the majority congressional 
party, it now faced the burden of having to put forward a governing agenda that attempted to 
shrink the size of government. With established and popular entitlement programmes this 
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was easier said than done, but gaining control of the Republican Party had allowed the 
conservative position to become the official party viewpoint.  
Conclusion 
 My intent with this chapter was to establish how conservative rhetoric was successful 
in providing a political narrative to attack national health care reform, but was unsuccessful 
in doing so when it came to reforming Medicare. Conservative rhetoric controlled the 
narrative for the prior, but not the latter.  
 This chapter fits into my overarching theme by illustrating how conservative rhetoric 
attacks the New Deal and its ongoing political legacy. Gingrich and COS followed in the 
footsteps of previous conservative Republicans, especially Hoover, Taft, Goldwater and 
Regan. Four-party politics also played an important role. The change in four-party politics 
presented Gingrich and other conservative Republicans with an opportunity to dismantle 
New Deal reforms that was unavailable in earlier times. The 1948 Taft-Hartley Act is one of 
the few exceptions, but this took on organised labour, not entitlements. As this chapter 
shows, conservative rhetoric can control narrative, but within the political realities of four-
party politics what can be achieved is limited. Gingrich and COS wanted to reform the 
welfare state, but a Democratic president stood in their way on this occasion. The next 
chapter shows how the GOP was able to use four-party politics to their advantage on welfare 
reform. 
 In the fourth chapter, I analyse how George W. Bush attempted to build off what 
Gingrich and COS attempted in this chapter, entitlement reform, which is one more step 
towards turning the liberal welfare state into a conservative welfare state. The 2010 midterm 
elections mirrored the 1994 midterm elections in how the GOP, as a minority party, was able 
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to attack a Democratic Party that controlled both the executive and legislative branches of 
government. However, that wave of conservative Republicans was even more rambunctious 
and less loyal to party leadership than the 104th Congress. The 112th Congress, on the other 
hand, continued to increase the level of partisanship in Congress, building on Gingrich and 
COS, by using confrontation, rhetoric and the socialist label to declare war on big 
government liberalism. However, the current GOP controlled 114th Congress (2015-2016) 
has an opportunity to present a pragmatic governing philosophy, especially on issues where 
President Obama is at odds with congressional Democrats. 
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The Rollback of the New Deal Legacy? Welfare Reform in the 104th Congress 
I am proud to have been a part of the revolution. I am proud of the changes we brought to 
government. We proved that they ways of the Founding Fathers work, and they work in a 
modern, high-tech world. In fact, we proved that the socialism that had been creeping into 
American society for decades was failing the American people, failing the American vision, 
and failing the challenges of a new millennium. 
-Tom DeLay1 
As Tom DeLay (R-TX), the House Majority whip of the 104th Congress, stated 
above, conservative Republicans believe that socialism has crept into America. They 
consider the modern American welfare state, which began with social security and the New 
Deal, to be the catalyst that unleashed socialism in America. The result of the 1994 midterm 
elections, and subsequent power shift in Congress, made it possible for conservative 
Republicans in the 104th Congress to go after a key part of the New Deal and its ongoing 
legacy. Welfare reform was this key issue, and presented conservatives with the opportunity 
to defend the traditional family values they claim have been undermined by liberal policies 
and big government.2  
The American welfare state is a combination of social insurance, such as social 
security and Medicare, and welfare, such as unemployment benefits, Medicaid and Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).3 Both social insurance and welfare are part of 
the New Deal legacy, which Conservative Republicans aim to undo, either by ending 
                                                          
1Tom DeLay, with Stephen Mansfield, No Retreat, No Surrender: One American’s Fight (New York: 
Sentinel, 2007), 7.    
2A notion that Thomas Edsall highlights as a major goal for the GOP; Thomas Byrne Edsall, Building 
Red America: The New Conservative Coalition and the Drive for Permanent Power (New York: Basic Books, 
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four, 309-425.  
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programmes, such as AFDC, or by privatising them, such as with social security.4 To a large 
extent, their preference of whether to abolish or privatise a programme is based on a 
programme’s popularity, and to a lesser degree, other circumstances that factor into their 
decision making.    
Social insurance is more popular with the public than welfare.5 This is largely due to 
the belief that social insurance is for the deserving and welfare for the undeserving.6 The 
former contribute to the costs of their programs by paying into them throughout their 
working life, whilst the latter receive a “handout” for not working. Dependency and work 
ethic are two points used to differentiate between the deserving and the undeserving, and 
have been at the forefront the welfare reform debate since the 1960s.7 According to political 
scientist Lawrence Mead, welfare reform is one area where the political parties have 
changed positions.8  
Mead argues that “Democrats are now in the classic “me-too” position of a minority 
party. The majority party has taken a stand on some potent issue that allow it to dominate; 
the minority believes in the opposite position and would like to assert it, but would be cast 
                                                          
4Refer to the next chapter for more on George W. Bush’s failed attempt to privatise social security 
and his successful attempt to expand Medicare via the free-market with prescription drug benefits.  
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 6For more on the undeserving, consult: Michael Katz, The Undeserving Poor: From the War on 
Poverty to the War on Welfare (New York: Pantheon, 1989).  
7For more, refer to: Lawrence M. Mead, The New Politics of Poverty: The Nonworking Poor in 
America (New York: BasicBooks, 1992), 185-209; Michael Katz, The Price of Citizenship: Redefining the 
American Welfare State (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2001), 64-66, 71-76; and Gary Bryner, Politics and 
Public Morality: The Great American Welfare Reform Debate (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), 66-90. 
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liberal elites - who ignore public opinion and instead focus on ideological interests. For more, see: Lawrence 
M. Mead, “The Politics of Conservative Welfare Reform”, in The New World of Welfare (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2001), eds. Rebecca M. Blank and Ron Haskins, 201-220.     
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into the wilderness for its pains. Alternatively, it can take a stance close to the majority in 
order to have a shot at power, but it would lose its distinctive identity.”9 Mead’s statement is 
credible when it comes to welfare, but not to the more popular aspects of the New Deal 
legacy, such as social security and Medicare.10   
However, the Democratic Party was not against the concept of welfare reform, it 
simply struggled with how to address the issue in a way acceptable to its liberal, moderate 
and conservative members.11 Some within the party had searched for a solution that would 
change how the public viewed the party on the welfare issue with “the right turn in 
American politics . . . in the 1980s”.12   
A major priority for Clinton was welfare reform, which would demonstrate his New 
Democrat capacity to fix the shortcomings of the system.13 This reform would help to iron 
out the liberal Democrat solution of the Great Society, one that had had good intentions, but 
had since produced negative results.14 The importance of welfare reform can be seen in his 
                                                          
9Mead, The New Politics of Poverty, 244-245.  
10Although conservative Republicans are also trying to achieve what Meade describes as “the 
majority party status” with social security and Medicare.   
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and Michael Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America, 10th ed. (New York: 
Basic Books, 1996), 326-332.          
14Some of the good intentions were to help provide mothers with financial support that would 
enable them be better able to provide food, clothing, shelter, etc. for their children. Some of the perceived 
negative results have been the breakdown of the traditional family which has made it more financially 
beneficial for women to have children out of wedlock and to also stay separated from the children’s father 
due to the requirements of the programme. This argument has been made by conservative Republicans and 
others in the conservative elite. President Clinton and other moderate Democrats, such as Sen. Daniel 
Moynihan (D-NY) have also stated a similar argument. Liberal Democrats lacked a united front in defending 
welfare, some even had a reluctance to publicly support it. Examples can be found all throughout this 
chapter. For more, consult: William F. Buckley, Jr. and Charles Kesler, eds., Keeping the Tablets: Modern 
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1994 State of the Union Address. He mentioned “welfare” twenty-one times and the 
following statement best summarizes his major emphasis on the reform:  
And just as we must transform our employment system, so must we also 
revolutionize our welfare system. It doesn’t work. It defies our values as a nation. If 
we value work, we can’t justify a system that makes welfare more attractive than 
work if people are worried about losing their health care. If we value responsibility, 
we can’t ignore the $34 billion in child support absent parents ought to be paying to 
millions of parents who are taking care of their children. If we value strong families, 
we can’t perpetuate a system that actually penalizes those who stay together. Can you 
believe that a child who has a child gets more money from the Government for 
leaving home than for staying home with a parent or a grandparent? That’s not just 
bad policy, it’s wrong. And we ought to change it.15 
Further remarks on 21 June 1994 indicate that he wanted to move forward with the welfare 
issue. In a letter to Congress, he wrote, “It is time to end welfare as we know it and replace it 
with a system that is based on work and responsibility – a system that will help people help 
themselves. . . . The Work and Responsibility Act of 1994 will replace welfare with work”.16   
The major emphasis to take away from Clinton’s two comments is that he wanted “to 
end welfare as we know it”. This is exactly what happened on 22 August 1996, when he 
signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PPWORA), 
the welfare reform bill that came from Congress.17 Before signing the bill he said,  
What we are trying to do today is to overcome the flaws of the welfare system for the 
people who are trapped on it. We all know that the typical family on welfare today is 
very different from the one that welfare was designed to deal with 60 years ago. . . . 
The bill I’m about to sign, as I have said many times, is far from perfect, but 
it has come a very long way. Congress sent me two previous bills that I have strongly 
believe failed to protect our children and did too little to move people from welfare 
                                                          
American Conservative Thought (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), 8, 217-219; and Katz, The Price of 
Citizenship, 317-319. 
15Bill Clinton, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union”, 25 January 
1994, compiled by Gerhard Peters and John T. Wolly, The American Presidency Project, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=50409 (accessed 21 January 2012).  
16Bill Clinton, “Message to the Congress Transmitting Proposed Welfare Reform Legislation”, 21 June 
1994, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=50367 (accessed 7 
February 2012). 
17If one would like to see this law, it can be found at: http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=104_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ193.104.pdf (accessed 8 February 2012).  
148 
 
to work. I vetoed both of them. This bill had broad bipartisan support and is much, 
much better on both counts. . . .  
After I sign my name to this bill, welfare will no longer be a political          
issue. . . . 
  Today we are ending welfare as we know it.18 
After signing the bill Clinton stated: “The current welfare system is fundamentally broken, 
and this may be our last best chance to set it straight. . . . this bill is a real step forward for 
our country, for our values, and for people on welfare. It should represent not simply the 
ending of a system that too often hurts those it is supposed to help, but the beginning of a 
new era in which welfare will become what it is meant to be: a second chance, not a way of 
life”.19  
 Clinton’s comments offer an opportunity to explore what he meant when he said, 
“after I sign my name to this bill, welfare will no longer be a political issue”. Was he 
suggesting everything he and Congress discussed beforehand was merely political 
manoeuvring in order to gain the upper hand in the welfare reform debate? I believe that 
during the 104th Congress this was exactly the case.20 However, I do not believe the attack 
on welfare, and to a larger extent the American welfare state, ended with welfare reform. 
The political battle over the New Deal legacy has been ongoing since its inception and it 
came to the forefront again during Clinton’s first term.        
 The 104th Congress was able to target both Clinton and the New Deal legacy because 
the Republican Party was the majority party in both the House of Representatives and the 
                                                          
18Bill Clinton, “Remarks on Signing the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act of 1996 and an Exchange With Reporters”, 22 August 1996, The American Presidency Project, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53218 (accessed 8 February 2012).   
19Bill Clinton, “Statements on Signing the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996”, 22 August 1996, The American Presidency Project, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53219 (accessed 8 February 2012). 




Senate. The new Republican majority was comprised of returning and first time members of 
Congress. The first time members can be referred to as freshmen.21 These new members, 84 
in total – 73(32% of the GOP House numbers) in the House and 11 in the Senate (21% of the 
GOP Senate members) – marked a change in congressional politics for the Republican 
Party.22 Most of the freshmen, especially in the House, were conservative Republicans. This 
new batch of Republicans brought with them a conservative ideology that shunned the New 
Deal legacy and sought limited government.23 Many of them came into office expecting to 
work with the House leadership in implementing the Contract with America.24  
The conservative Republican attack on the New Deal and its legacy had advanced 
since Herbert Hoover’s rhetorical assaults against Franklin Roosevelt. They could now 
exploit popular anti-tax sentiment, mistrust of government and hostility to welfare. These 
three issues, amongst others, played an important role during the 104th Congress. Whilst 
taxes and trust in government will be discussed in this chapter, the welfare state will be the 
centrepiece of this chapter analysis. Also, regarding Congress and the freshmen, I will 
mainly focus on the House of Representatives and not the Senate.25 The format of this 
chapter will include a secondary analysis on the issue of welfare in America, the role of the 
                                                          
21Not all of the new Republican members were true freshmen. Some had had prior legislative 
experience at the state or local level. Seven new members in the Senate were Gingrich Senators who had 
previously served in the House of Representatives. For more, see: Nicol C. Rae, Conservative Reformers: the 
Republican Freshman and the Lessons of the 104th Congress (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 66-67, 132-133; 
and Sean M. Theriault, The Gingrich Senators: The Roots of Partisan Warfare in Congress (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2013).   
22Taken from Rae, Conservative Reformers, 63, 132.  
23I will use two examples of this later on in the chapter. 
24However, the degree to which each individual conservative Republican freshman would adhere to 
their leadership, especially in the House, was best described as centralized anarchy. For more on this point, 
refer to: Linda Killian, The Freshmen: What Happened to the Republican Revolution? (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1998), 414-419. I will expand on this point later on in the chapter.  
25For more on the Senate and the freshmen, consult: John Owens, “Taking Power? Institutional 
Change in the House and Senate”, in The Republican Takeover of Congress (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 
1998), eds. Dean McSweeney and John E. Owens, 33-70; and Rae, Conservative Reformers, 131-167.   
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House of Representatives in attacking the New Deal legacy and how welfare reform affected 
the legacy. This chapter format will best address the questions I aim to answer. 
These questions are:  
1. Why is linking socialism to liberalism vital to conservative GOP rhetoric? 
2. Why is welfare reform significant to the GOP conservative socialist critique 
against the New Deal legacy?   
These questions will help to establish why it is important for conservative Republicans to 
link socialism with liberalism when critiquing the New Deal legacy. Welfare reform gave 
them the opportunity to move beyond rhetoric and achieve a legislative victory against both 
the Great Society and the New Deal.26 This reform presented conservative Republicans the 
opportunity to pass legislation that supported both socio-moral values and the mantra of 
limited government.  
Welfare Reform 
The conservative nature of the welfare reform bill that was passed in Congress and 
signed into law by Clinton was due in part to his insistence on addressing it as a New 
Democrat, thus proving to the public that he was not a liberal.27 Public policy analyst R. 
Kent Weaver argues that Clinton’s welfare reform rhetoric, whilst campaigning for president 
in 1992 and also during the 103rd Congress, “helped to push Republicans to shift their own 
                                                          
 26However, according to Gwendolyn Mink, “The [Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act] 
PRA may have been Republican legislation, but the pledge to end welfare was a Democratic president’s 
inspiration”; for more, refer to: Gwendolyn Mink, Welfare’s End (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 5.   
27For more, see: John Harris, The Survivor: Bill Clinton in the White House (New York; Random House, 
2005), 230-239; Steve Gillon, The Pact: Bill Clinton, Newt Gingrich, and the Rivalry That Defined a Generation 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 101, 123-124, 157-158, 177-178; and James MacGregor Burns and 




welfare reform stance to the right in order to avoid losing the welfare issue to Clinton”.28 
Unlike Weaver, I am arguing that conservative Republicans would have attempted to push 
welfare reform to the right regardless of whether or not Clinton had done so. Unlike earlier 
reforms in the 1980s, Republicans controlled both Houses of Congress and the conservative 
Republican House leadership were adamant about using their majority to the fullest – a 
reality of four-party politics that was not possible beforehand.29 They viewed Clinton’s 
rhetoric, not as a challenge, but as an opportunity to boldly attack this part of the New Deal 
legacy.30 
I am not suggesting that a great number of Democrats and Republicans were against 
reforming the American welfare system.31 However, the emphasis that Clinton put on 
welfare reform did cast a large shadow over his party. Political scientist Gary Bryner, in 
Politics and Public Morality, stated: “Clinton’s role in welfare reform was crucial. He made 
the idea of welfare reform acceptable in the Democratic party and among liberals”.32 
                                                          
28R. Kent Weaver, “Ending Welfare as We Know It”, in The Social Divide: Political Parties and the 
Future of Activist Government (New York: Russell Sage, 1998), 361. However, I agree with Weaver that 
moderate Republicans were more induced to shift to the right on welfare reform because of Clinton’s 
rhetoric. 
29Reagan did have some success rolling back welfare via budget cuts in 1981 and 1982 that reduced 
welfare benefits, however, congressional Democrats were able to prevent Reagan from a more substantial 
rollback. Another reform, the 1988 Family Support Act (FSA) was more of a political compromise that 
increased the emphasis for job training, but also increased dependency on child support benefits for single 
mothers. For more, consult: Charles Noble, Welfare as We Knew It: A Political History of the American Welfare 
State (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 119-123; Katz, The Price of Citizenship, 70-76; and Richard K. 
Caputo, U.S. Social Welfare Reform: Policy Transitions from 1981 to the Present (New York: Springer, 2011), 
29-38. However, others, such as Daniel Béland and Alex Waddan argue that FSA benefited conservatives more 
than liberals. For more on this perspective, see: Daniel Béland and Alex Waddan, The Politics of Policy Change: 
Welfare, Medicare, and Social Security Reform in the United States (Washington, DC: Georgetown University 
Press, 2012), 43-46.    
30Refer to the section on the House conservative Republican leadership for more information on this 
point. 
31One prominent Democrat that was well known for wanting to reform the welfare system was 
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan. Conversely, even though Moynihan did want to reform the welfare system, 
he did not support the welfare reform bill that was passed by Congress and signed into law by Clinton. There 
will be more on this at a later point in the chapter. 
32Bryner, Politics and Public Morality, 156.    
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Clinton’s stated intention to reform welfare, and also health care, increased the 
perception that the president and his party’s congressional majority were ineffective. This 
made him vulnerable to the harsher conservative Republican notion of welfare reform.33 
After the 1994 midterm elections, Democrats lost control of Congress, and as a result of this 
defeat he lost control of the legislative initiative in Congress. Although he did not control 
congressional Democrats, they did agree on more issues as Democrats than he would have 
agreed upon with a Republican controlled Congress.   
The conservative dominated House of Representatives led on the issue of welfare 
reform in the Republican controlled 104th Congress. They were able to coerce Clinton into 
agreeing to a reform that was much harsher than it would have been if he had passed a 
reform bill during the 103rd Congress.34 His insistence on changing welfare left him 
vulnerable on this issue, one that he and the Republican majority wanted to take advantage 
of leading up to the 1996 elections.35  
Before welfare was reformed in 1996, America’s welfare state was comprised of 
many programs, some of them included: social security, Medicare, Medicaid, unemployment 
benefits, food stamps and AFDC.36 America has a long history concerning welfare and aid to 
                                                          
33Clinton, in June 1994, did attempt to address welfare reform. He put forth legislation on the issue. 
During, the 103rd Congress, Congress also made some attempts at welfare reform but there were no votes on 
any of the proposals. For more, refer to: Bryner, Politics and Public Morality, 77-85; Michael Foley, “Clinton 
and Congress” in The Clinton Presidency: The First Term, 1992-1996 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), eds. 
Paul S. Herrnson and Dilys M. Hill, 22-42; Alex Waddan, Clinton’s Legacy? A New Democrat in Governance 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 119-122; and Béland and Waddan, The Politics of Policy Change, 49-51. 
34Three examples of this are child care, even more assistance with job training, and aid to legal 
immigrants. Even so, Clinton was hesitant to move on welfare reform because he feared the wrath of liberal 
Democrats, and he would need their support for health care reform. For more, consult: Bryner, Politics and 
Public Morality, 76-85, 157-161; and Kenneth Baer, Reinventing Democrats: The Politics of Liberalism from 
Reagan to Clinton (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2000), 215. 
 35For more information, refer to: Michael Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse, 326-332; Killian, The 
Freshmen, 346-350; Gillon, The Pact, 177-179; and Bryner, Politics and Public Morality, 149-166. 
 36For more information, read: Theodore Marmor, Jerry Mashaw and Philip Harvey, America’s 
Misunderstood Welfare State: Persistent Myths, Enduring Realities (New York: Basic Books, 1992); and Anne 
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families and children.37 However, the history of welfare can be forgotten or even ignored 
when considering the public perception of the welfare state.   
Instead of an historical perspective, the public focuses on how welfare affects 
individual freedom. In this regard, public policy scholars Theodore Marmor, Jerry Mashaw 
and Philip Harvey state: 
the negative image of American social welfare policy has much to do with our most 
basic ideas of individual – state relations. . . . In a polity where state is equated with 
government, and where liberty is equated with limited government, it is easy to 
regard the welfare state as a threat to liberty. . . . because government action is 
commonly viewed as threatening individual liberty, state action to promote social 
welfare can be portrayed as threatening individual welfare. A citizen dependent on 
the state is not free from it, but entangled with it.38   
This statement is central to the conservative Republican argument against the New Deal and 
its legacy. Yet what is missing from it is just how large a role taxes and trust in government 
also play in the conservative Republican “ideology that emphasized the individual, the 
family, voluntary associations, and the market as bulwarks against government profligacy 
and the erosion of freedom”.39 The authors also argue that support for the overall welfare 
state was tested in the 1930s, but this attack failed and another attempt was made in the 
1970s, which focused on the desire to both pay for and govern the welfare state.40  
                                                          
Marie Cammisa, From Rhetoric to Reform? Welfare Policy in American Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1998), 25-59.  
37For a more detailed analysis, see: Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political 
Origins of the Social Policy of the United States (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1992); 
Linda Gordon, Pitied But Not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare 1890-1935 (New York: The 
Free Press, 1994); and Steven Teles, Whose Welfare? AFDC and Elite Politics (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 1996), 19-40. 
 38Marmor, Mashaw and Harvey, America’s Misunderstood Welfare State, 5.  
 39Ibid., 12.  
 40Ibid., 13-16.  
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Besides being attacked for the cost effectiveness of its programs, the welfare state 
has also been accused of decreasing dependents’ work ethic.41 Political scientist Charles 
Murray in Losing Ground argues that poverty in America decreased from 1950 to 1968 and 
increased afterwards because “the economic independence – standing on one’s own abilities 
and accomplishments” of those on welfare was diminishing due to the programs provided by 
the federal government.42 His solution to help reverse the “economic dependence” that was 
created by government welfare programs would be to undo “the entire federal welfare and 
income-support structure for working-aged persons, including AFDC, Medicaid, Food 
Stamps, Unemployment Insurance, Worker’s Compensation, subsidized housing, disability 
insurance, and the rest”.43   
Murray’s disdain for the welfare state, along with his desire to undo the majority, if 
not all, of the New Deal and its legacy, fits nicely within the ideology of conservative 
Republicans.44 Yet the popularity of programs, such as social security and Medicare, makes 
it difficult to bring about the extinction of the entire American welfare state. On the other 
hand, tackling the welfare state in parts is a more feasible goal.    
                                                          
41Marriage and race are also two important issues when discussing welfare. I will not focus on these 
two areas. For more information on marriage and race, consider: For the liberal perspective, Katz, The 
Undeserving Poor; for the moderate perspective, Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, Beyond the Melting 
Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: The M.I.T. 
Press, 1970); and for the conservative perspective, Charles Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 
1950-1980 (New York: Basic Books, 1984). 
42Murray, Losing Ground, 65.  
43Ibid., 227-228.  
44Conservative Republicans were aware of Murray’s argument and they also were not opposed to 
pursuing a harsher version of welfare reform, but they had to compromise and were only able to eliminate a 
small portion of the welfare state. For more on their original aspirations on welfare reform, consult: Dan Balz 
and Ronald Brownstein, Storming the Gates: Protest Politics and the Republican Revival (Boston: Little, Brown: 
1996), 275-298; and Teles, Whose Welfare, 150-152. For more on Murray’s influence on conservative 
Republicans and welfare reform, see: Katz, The Undeserving Poor, 151-156; Weaver, “Ending Welfare as We 
Know It”, 371-372; Gingrich, To Renew America (New York: Harper Collins, 1995), 78-79; as well as Balz and 
Brownstein, Storming the Gates, 275-281. For a behind the scene perspective on welfare reform, refer to: Ron 




Conservative Republicans have strived to take advantage of the more unpopular 
portions, like welfare, of the New Deal legacy. This is part of a broader strategy to undo the 
welfare state. One example of a conservative Republican who desires this is Newt Gingrich, 
the House Speaker of the 104th Congress. As I stated earlier in the chapter, both Dick Armey 
and Gingrich, at the time leading up to the 104th Congress, argued for dismantling the social 
insurance portion of the New Deal legacy by letting individuals pay into personal accounts 
that relied upon the free market. Although that rationale still applies, the motive for doing so 
has evolved. More recently, Gingrich has argued that the New Deal legacy, and specifically 
entitlements such as social security and Medicare, will ultimately guide America into a 
“socialist system” that would have more in common with Karl Marx than it would with the 
founding fathers. This would result due to the level of taxes Americans would be paying to 
the federal government to fund the New Deal and its legacy.45 
Even though social security is the third rail of US politics, this has not stopped 
conservative Republicans, such as Reagan, Gingrich and George W. Bush, from discussing 
the benefits of its privatisation. As previously stated, in order for them to undo the entire 
New Deal legacy they need to attack it from the latest addition and work their way back to 
its beginning. The most established is social security, which means that the most likely way 
for social security to be privatised is for Medicare to be privatised first.      
Conservative Republicans employ such rhetoric for two main reasons: firstly, to 
undermine the faith of the public in the popular aspects of the New Deal legacy, and 
secondly, to offer answers that rely on privatising the programs as a preferable alternative. 
Before this can be accomplished, they have to first dismantle the less popular aspects of the 
                                                          
 45Newt Gingrich, To Save America: Stopping Obama’s Secular-Socialist Machine (Washington, DC: 
Regnery Publishing, 2010), 185-196.  
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legacy. The welfare portion of the legacy is not as popular as the social insurance 
component, thus the public can be more easily persuaded on the need to change the parts of 
the legacy it does not wholeheartedly support before it will agree to undo the more popular 
aspects.46 That is how welfare reform gave conservative Republicans the opportunity to 
claim they were correcting the mistakes of the Great Society, whilst being able to attack a 
government program in AFDC that can be traced back to FDR and the New Deal.  
The House of Representatives and the New Deal Legacy 
The Conservative GOP Leadership  
In the 104th Congress, the charge against the New Deal legacy was led by the House 
of Representatives. The House majority leadership positions were all occupied by southern 
conservatives: Newt Gingrich, the House speaker, Dick Armey, the Majority leader and Tom 
DeLay, the Majority whip. Gingrich was from Georgia, whilst Armey and DeLay were both 
from Texas. The House leadership positions of southern conservatives gave further evidence 
of the shift in power within the congressional wing of the GOP from moderates to 
conservatives. They devised a cohesive strategy for individual members and the House as a 
whole.  
Gingrich was one of the main architects behind the 1994 strategy. His desire for 
conservatives to win control of the House led to the founding of the Conservative 
Opportunity Society (COS), which he started in the early 1980s. He wanted to attract like-
minded individuals who would help to further the cause of conservative Republicanism. 
Gingrich, Armey and others amongst the House leadership devised and published a strategy 
                                                          
46Political scientist James Stimson considers welfare to be the least popular aspect “of the 
Democratic welfare state”. For more, consult: James Stimson, Tides of Consent: How Public Opinion Shapes 
American Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 48.   
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to outline their policy proposals, ones that they argued would halt and reverse the tax-and-
spend big government philosophy of Democrats. They called their plan the Contract with 
America.47 And in the view of political scientist Kenneth Cosgrove, the Contract was the 
“best example” of conservative rhetoric, and was able to frame a simple narrative in the form 
of good (GOP conservatism) versus evil (Democratic liberalism).48  
The overall emphasis of the Contract was to offer voters an alternative to a Congress 
controlled by the Democrats. 
The Clinton Congress defaulted on its proper responsibility for protecting the 
 citizenry. It mistook a responsibility to protect the public from violent crime for an 
 opportunity to spend billions more on social problems. But Big Brother is alive and 
 well through myriad government programs usurping personal responsibility from 
 families and individuals. . . . Our contract seeks to restore a proper balance between 
 government and personal responsibility.49      
The Contract’s central theme relied upon the public distrust in government, individual 
freedom and taxation.50 Its message was able to take advantage of the fact that the 
Democratic Party controlled both the executive and legislative branches of government. It 
                                                          
47With regards to welfare reform, the Contract’s reform section was a compromise amongst 
moderate and conservative Republicans in the 103rd Congress. Baltz and Brownstein stated that “In moving 
the bill closer to the retrocon agenda, the conservatives had out muscled the moderates, not persuaded 
them. Their doubts about cutting off aid to unwed mothers under eighteen remained. But they conceded the 
argument because few of them thought the Republicans would win back the House – or that the leadership 
could force them to stand with the Contract bill if they did. On that they proved spectacularly mistaken”; this 
quotation can be found on page 283. For more on this, read: Balz and Brownstein, Storming the Gates, 275-
285. For more on the strategy that was involved to come with the overall concept and policy initiatives of the 
Contract, refer to: John Bader, Taking the Initiative: Leadership Agendas in Congress and the “Contract with 
America” (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1996), 171-196.   
48Kenneth M. Cosgrove, Branded Conservatives: How the Brand Brought the Right from the Fringes to 
the Center of American Politics (New York: Peter Lang, 2007), 128-142.  
 49Ed Gillespie and Bob Schellhas, eds., The Contract with America: The Bold Plan by Rep. Newt 
Gingrich, Rep. Dick Armey and the House Republicans to Change the Nation (New York: Random House, 1994), 
14.  
50However, political scientist Lawrence Dodd made reference to how other factors also played into 
the hands of Republicans during the 1994 midterm elections. Republicans were able to take advantage of 
cyclical change in Congress and post-industrial tensions. For more, consider: Lawrence C. Dodd, Thinking 
about Congress: Essays on Congressional Change (New York: Routledge, 2012), 285-310.   
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also exploited public distrust of government and anti-tax sentiment in its attack on the record 
of the 103rd Congress.51 
Cutting taxes allows conservative Republicans, in some aspects, to starve the beast of 
government. This was a difficult task for Gingrich and his fellow conservatives in 1995 and 
1996 regarding Medicare, a more popular aspect of the legacy, especially when the proposed 
cuts to Medicare would help offset their tax cut plan, one which Clinton attacked as cutting 
Medicare in order to pay for the Republican tax breaks for the wealthy.      
During the 104th Congress, the House conservative Republicans wanted to address 
the size and the scope of government. They viewed welfare reform as a chance to actually 
reduce the size of government by ending the AFDC entitlement. This act allowed them to 
show that they took the proverbial scalp of big government by undoing part of the New Deal 
legacy. The Contract had a list of ten important goals that were to be accomplished during 
the 104th Congress. According to the order in the Contract, welfare reform came before tax 
cuts.52 Gingrich also stated that welfare reform was to be addressed before tax cuts.53 No 
matter which was the higher priority, both were appeals to social conservatives.54 I am not 
                                                          
51For more on the origins and goals of the Contract, see: Cosgrove, Branded Conservatives, 129-133; 
and John B. Bader, “The Contract with America: Origins and Assessments”, in Congress Reconsidered, 6th ed. 
(Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1997), eds. Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, 347-354.   
52Gillespie and Schellhas, The Contract with America, 15-19. On the other hand, journalist Elizabeth 
Drew considers the tax cuts to be ‘the crown jewel’ of the Contract for social conservatives because they 
were not “getting any other matter of real importance”; for more on Drew’s argument, refer to: Elizabeth 
Drew, Showdown: The Struggle Between the Gingrich Congress and the Clinton White House (New York: 
Touchstone, 1997), 171. However, welfare reform can also be considered ‘the crown jewel’ of the Contract 
due to the social-moral implications behind the reform. Journalists Dan Balz and Ronald Brownstein argue 
that “Satisfying the concerns of the social conservatives on welfare reform became especially important 
because the Contract offered them so little else”, 281. For more on this perspective, consult: Balz, and 
Brownstein, Storming the Gates, 281-283.       
53Gingrich, To Renew America, 133-134.  
54In the view of political scientist James Farney, welfare reform, The Family Reinforcment Act and tax 
cuts were three key caveats to appease social conservatives. For more on this point, see: James Farney, Social 




suggesting that many of the freshmen shared the same view as Gingrich, but as Speaker of 
the House he controlled both the issues that were to be addressed and in what order.55     
The Contract’s stance on welfare reform can be traced back to the previous Congress. 
During the 103rd Congress, Charles Murray met and discussed with Gingrich the need to 
shift the welfare reform debate to the right from the type of reform that Clinton mentioned. 
According to journalists Dan Balz and Ronald Brownstein, Murray was able to encourage 
Gingrich to target single mothers, which in terms of welfare reform meant addressing the 
AFDC benefit. Other conservative elites such as William Bennett, William Kristol and Jack 
Kemp also rallied behind Murray’s ideals of welfare reform and wanted conservative 
Republicans to adhere to his advice.56 According to Balz and Brownstein, the debates on 
health care and crime helped to sharpen the resolve of the Republican Party “that could help 
the party gain control of Congress and impose its own agenda [on welfare reform]” by not 
compromising with Clinton.57 They went on to state: “Armey and Gingrich had decreed that 
the provisions in the Contract must excite the grassroots antigovernment groups Republicans 
wanted to energize for the fall campaign”.58 Welfare reform was the one area that combined 
the anti-government sentiment with moral values that would appeal to the Religious Right 
(i.e. ending the AFDC benefit for unwed mothers). Armey even involved the conservative 
grassroots to pressure the moderate House Republican Ways and Means Committee 
members to agree with the conservative House Republicans. This was done to ensure that 
the House Republican response to welfare reform could form the basis of the reform 
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proposal that was in the Contract with America.59 Armey’s use of the grassroots is one 
example of how conservative Republican strategy is elite driven, but they do rely on the 
grassroots to help implement their strategy.       
One must consider how the centrepiece of the final reform bill eliminated AFDC. 
This benefit was not initiated during the Great Society but instead by the New Deal and the 
Social Security Act of 1935. The AFDC benefit was originally the part called Aid to 
Dependent Children (ADC) and the programme was for widowed mothers with children. 
ADC became AFDC in the 1960s, and part of this change allowed for aid to single mothers 
with dependent children.60 Conservative Republicans wanted to address the AFDC issue 
because it was one way to harness both themes within conservative Republicanism; which 
combines the original anti-state mentality on the economic front from the post-WWII era, 
the more one pays in taxes equates to a greater loss of freedom from big government, with 
the pro-state mentality on social-moral issues that has taken on a greater importance since 
the 1970s.       
The brilliance of the Contract with America was its exploitation of the public desire 
for change in Washington, DC. It gave a general overview of what the compilers believed 
would offer a vision of reform and change in America’s federal welfare policy. However, the 
Contract with America did not state that it would terminate the AFDC benefit, but instead 
would give control of this programme to the states, and also implement enrolment 
requirements, eligibility time and a pay cap to this benefit, which in reality would end AFDC 
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as an entitlement.61 The intent of the Contract was to change the concept of the benefit. 
Liberal Democrats viewed the entitlement as the key component of the benefit and 
conservative Republicans considered the entitlement to be a hindrance to society. The AFDC 
programme fit into the larger argument of conservative rhetoric, one that encompasses their 
belief in the equality of opportunity and attacks liberals for believing in government 
mandated equality.62 Conservative Republicans wanted to end the entitlement as a way of 
ending the liberal Democratic belief of entitlement that began with the New Deal and further 
expanded with the Great Society. According to Michael Katz, “The Contract criticized 
Clinton’s proposals to reform AFDC – which were attacked as too harsh by Democrats to 
the left of the president – as tepid and inadequate. Instead, conservative Republicans 
proposed much tougher changes, including the abolition of AFDC”.63 What one can take 
away from the reform to welfare is this - the lack of public interest and knowledge on 
specific reforms in welfare allowed House conservatives the flexibility to make the reform 
bill as punitive as they could get away with.64          
Regarding welfare reform, the Contract focused on the New Deal legacy via the 
Great Society. It stated, “The Great Society had had the unintended consequence of snaring 
millions of Americans into the welfare trap. . . . Our Contract with America will change this 
destructive social behavior by requiring welfare recipients to take personal responsibility for 
the decisions they make.”65 To include an added emphasis on the importance of welfare 
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reform during the 104th Congress, Gingrich also affixed a personal comment in the Contract 
about the welfare state and the Great Society. He said, “We have to replace the welfare state 
with an opportunity society. It is impossible to take the Great Society structure of 
bureaucracy, the redistributionist model of how wealth is acquired, and the counterculture 
value system that now permeates the way we deal with the poor, and have any hope of fixing 
them”.66 
It is clear that the House conservative Republican leadership abhorred liberal 
Democrats. The Majority whip, Tom DeLay makes it obvious what he thinks of liberals in 
his book No Retreat, No Surrender, revealing how he, as a member of the conservative elite, 
uses the terms liberal and socialist interchangeably. One example is his comment on 
“revolution” at the opening of this chapter. If there were any doubts about who he blamed 
for the creeping socialism in America, his next statement puts it in a clearer perspective. “I 
have learned something about liberals. They are much like communists”.67 His comments 
clearly indicate how he believed liberals have altered the true course of America, and are 
important when one considers that his views represent those of the conservative elite.68  
As a member of the conservative elite, DeLay also provides a clear message of 
conservative Republican ideology.  
I have tried throughout my political life to maintain a rigorous devotion to 
conservative principles. This has won me the hatred of liberals and the irritation of 
less conservative Republicans, but from the time I entered politics I have fought for 
certain clear principles that I think are the principles of freedom: small government; 
low taxes; the rule of law; an unrestrained free market; protection of private property; 
a strong defense; and traditional family values. These are what I believe in, and these 
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are the principles that have been my guide. In fact, I have been devoted to these 
truths ever since my conservative epiphany during the Goldwater speech of 1964.69  
He considered the policies of liberal Democrats to be the antithesis of the type of freedom he 
described, implying that liberals are in favour of big government, high taxes, government 
regulation, are weak on national defence, and adhere to the anti-family feminist agenda.   
DeLay also believed that the conservative Republican ideology was successful in 
attacking Clinton’s liberalism.      
We moved a liberal president to the center and drove him toward a balanced budget; 
welfare reform legislation of a far more conservative type than he had intended; and 
more spending on defense . . .  
What set me over the top about Clinton is that his brand of liberalism had an 
almost anti-American feel to it.70 
This remark demonstrates that DeLay believed he and his fellow conservative Republicans 
were successful in moving the leftward policies of Clinton, which were un-American, to a 
more compromised centrist position overall, but with welfare reform they were able to get 
Clinton to agree to a much more conservative version than if he had tried it during the 
previous Congress.71    
When analysing all of DeLay’s remarks, it is important to remember that he was a 
man of great influence and power, as a member of the House Republican majority leadership 
in the 104th Congress and also as a member of the conservative elite.72 His statements also 
reflect the overall message of conservative Republicans, which is that liberals pursue 
policies, which are both socialist and un-American, that undermine the conservative vision 
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for America. He stated that Barry Goldwater made him a conservative, and in this regard he 
and the current batch of conservative Republicans were continuing the work that Goldwater 
began during the 1964 presidential election.  
As part of the House majority leadership and the conservative elite, Dick Armey also 
targeted liberal Democrats and the New Deal legacy. He believed that the Republican 
revolution of 1994 represented a victory for Freedom in America. He stated that liberal 
Democrats have beliefs that are on par with the Nazis, Karl Marx, and communists, and they 
all failed because they opposed freedom.73 On this subject Armey said,  
At home, the spectacle of a passing order – with the “progressives” furiously digging 
in – is different only in degree. The odds for their success do not look good. Theirs is 
another lost cause, waged without even the dignity of an unselfish faith. The 
direction of events is evident in the occasional breaking of the ranks, as Big 
Government types pay rhetorical homage to economic Freedom. We didn’t use to 
hear this. Fifty years ago unionists and New Dealers proudly avowed their Socialist 
creed. During the Great Society we had “Social Democracy” – meaning “capitalism, 
but….” Then came the managed-decliners of the Carter era. And finally, after 
Reagan, we got the vague “New Democrat” – the “I’m not like those other folks the 
public has come to despise” types. But these were verbal equivocations only, new 
labels for old reactionary nostrums.74  
Armey’s argument, unlike previous observations made by Gingrich and DeLay, 
attempts to link liberal Democrats to an ideology similar to that of Adolf Hitler, Karl Marx, 
Vladimir Lenin, Joseph Stalin and Fidel Castro. What Armey and his fellow conservative 
Republicans were implying is that liberal Democrats use their political power to attack 
capitalism and the free-market, two of the essential aspects of freedom. Armey implied that 
to be against freedom is to be against free-market capitalism, which is un-American. With 
these words he suggests that liberal Democrats want to turn America into something akin to 
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Nazi Germany or global communism. Even the phrase “New Democrat” is a ploy to trick the 
people into allowing the continuation of this assault on freedom. 
 However, unlike DeLay, both Armey and Gingrich were more subtle and adept at 
using the mantra of the free-market to undermine the credibility of the New Deal legacy. 
They knew that labelling popular programmes, such as social security and Medicare, as 
socialist hinders the support they need to undo the entire legacy of the New Deal. They 
argued for turning both Medicare and social security from government entitlement 
programmes to personal account programmes that allowed the individual to rely on the free-
market. Doing so, they said, would give the individual more freedom from government, with 
the possibility of getting more value out of their contributions (what they pay in taxes).75 
 Armey and his fellow conservatives also argued that they were the party of choice to 
best help Americans maximize their individual freedom. He argued that liberal Democrats 
and conservative Republicans differed on their versions of freedom. The difference was that 
the conservative version relied more on “self-regulation” and “personal responsibility”, 
whereas liberals wanted more government regulation for “its next great social mission,” in 
“statist liberalism”.76 Thus what he was suggesting was that his party offered freedom from 
government, whilst the other party offered more government at the expense of personal 
freedom.   
 The conservative ideology of the House Republican leadership offered an alternative 
to the New Deal legacy. However, it must also be said that the House reforms made during 
the start of 104th Congress further helped Gingrich to pursue the conservative Republican 
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agenda. The reforms gave him more centralized control over the legislative process in the 
House, they helped him to discourage defections, reduce bargaining costs, and allowed him 
to both focus on and publicize the agenda.77 The reforms also helped him to attack the New 
Deal legacy. Nonetheless, the rhetoric of Gingrich, Armey and DeLay formed the basis for 
how the conservative Republicans would rebrand the legacy. The Great Society and welfare 
reform are two examples of how this strategy unfolded during the 104th Congress.         
The Freshmen  
The message that emerged from the House majority leadership was very aggressive 
and confrontational towards liberal Democrats and the New Deal legacy, so it is no surprise 
that many of the new conservative Republican House majority also echoed similar views.  
What made the House Republican conservative freshmen stand out was the belief that they 
were elected to shrink both the size and the power of the federal government. Many of them 
were hostile towards the New Deal legacy just like their House leadership. One such 
freshman was Rep. George Radanovich (R-CA).78 He stated: “in the last hundred years, 
through socialism, Communism, [and] fascism we have experienced disproportionate 
government over the other institutions in this country. And in America we felt the ancillary 
effects of that through the [New] Deal and also the Great Society”. He went on to assert that 
the New Deal legacy, especially the Great Society, was responsible for attacking both the 
individual freedom of America itself and all of its citizens.79   
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Another example of a conservative Republican freshman targeting the New Deal 
legacy, via the Great Society, was Rep. David Funderburk (R-NC).  
Before I came to Washington, I watched the liberal Democrats and their allies in the 
permanent poverty industry heap scorn upon anyone who dared stand up and say that 
welfare socialism was destroying our country from within. But on November 8, 1994 
we the people finally rose up and said enough is enough. . . . They had 30 years to do 
something about welfare and they sat on their hands and did nothing. 
. . . we are debating two visions of America. We know where the liberal 
version has taken us. The second version – the conservative version – begins and 
ends with individual liberty.80     
These examples of freshmen conservative Republicans demonstrate just how their 
approach to the New Deal legacy centred on the way the legacy was undermining individual 
freedom by allowing un-American ideologies that derive from fascism, communism and 
socialism to destroy the county. Whilst both the New Deal and the Great Society have 
contributed to America’s decreasing level of freedom, the “welfare socialism” of the Great 
Society caused those on welfare to be trapped and dependent upon socialism, which subdued 
them into “permanent poverty”. The two statements echoed the preferred approach of the 
House majority leadership in declaring one of the more unpopular portions of the legacy, 
such as welfare, to be at fault for what was ailing America. Conservatives wanted to imply 
that by fixing welfare, the country could start to address the problems caused by the New 
Deal legacy. 
The rhetoric the freshmen used against the New Deal legacy, and especially the Great 
Society and welfare, was based on the legislative agenda presented to them from the outset, 
before the actual start of the 104th Congress. There were two influential reference points that 
provided the freshmen with the message the conservative elite wanted them to hear. The first 
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point of reference was that the Contract with America had an entire section on welfare and 
focused on how the Great Society was to blame for the welfare problem. The second point of 
reference was during the freshman Republican orientation in December 1994. This 
conservative theme of events was underlined by the presence of Rush Limbaugh as a guest 
speaker.81 
Limbaugh was and continues to be a very influential member of the conservative 
elite, one that can reach an extremely wide audience with his nationally syndicated radio 
show.82 Another conference attendee was Charles Murray, whom I also regard to be a 
member of the conservative elite.83 As previously stated, he is very influential amongst 
conservative Republicans for his views on welfare reform.84 His book, entitled Losing 
Ground, is the foundation conservatives adhere to, in regards to what would be their ideal 
remedy for resolving the problems of America’s welfare system. Murray gave the freshmen 
a seminar titled the “Real Welfare Reform”.85 His view toward welfare reform went well 
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beyond what was stated in the Contract with America. Whilst the Contract called for setting 
limits to payments for benefits, Murray believed that all aid for welfare should be 
terminated.86   
 This demonstrates that the conservative Republican freshmen were well informed by 
both the Contract with America and the seminar given by Charles Murray. The conservative 
elite made it clear that both the Contract and Murray’s seminar were important reference 
points, which the freshmen should remember when welfare reform was addressed during the 
104th Congress. On the other hand, Murray’s message to eliminate all welfare payments 
goes, at least, one step further than what was in the Contract – but Murray’s influence via his 
research, writings, Senate Finance Committee testimony and credibility amongst 
conservative Republicans cast a looming presence throughout the GOP policy formulation 
process.87 
 I do not believe the Contract with America was an instrumental tool that the 
freshmen relied upon to get elected. That was certainly not the case for all of the freshmen, 
indeed only some explicitly used the Contract when campaigning during the 1994 midterm 
elections.88 According to politics professor Nicol C. Rae, who interviewed some of the 
freshmen, the Contract took on a greater importance during the 104th Congress. To this 
extent he said, “while the impact of the Contract on the 1994 election result was 
considerably overstated, the document ironically would become much more important after 
the election, when it set the legislative agenda for the new Republican Congress”.89 Whilst I 
agree with his argument, I also consider the relevance in how the Contract was a way for 
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conservative Republicans to campaign against the New Deal legacy. This framework was 
not important leading up to the election for the freshmen, but it did start out as the 
foundation for how to proceed with welfare reform.   
The hidden value of the Contract was that it was only the starting point. Murray’s 
seminar on “Real Welfare Reform” provided the ideological groundwork that would fit 
within the overall theme of the Contract.90 His December 1994 article can shed some light 
on to what was most likely the theme of his seminar. Some of his main points were that “The 
centrepiece of the legislation should be freedom for the states to experiment”, “Limit the 
reform to unmarried women” as well as “‘Ending welfare’ should mean at a minimum 
cutting off all payments which are contingent on or augmented by having a baby. The core 
benefit to be ended is AFDC”.91 However, the approach he preferred was to scrap “welfare 
altogether, a proposal with which I have been associated for some years”, yet he was “under 
no illusions that Congress is about to pass such a plan nationally”.92 Part of what he said was 
in the Contract and other parts were included on the final bill passed by Congress and signed 
into law by Clinton. 
The Contract, with regards to welfare reform, mattered more as a basic guideline for 
helping the conservative Republican House leadership to focus on which platform to 
establish. It did not matter if the freshmen echoed the plan or any of the specifics, though 
Gingrich would not mind if any of the freshmen did just that, but that was the intended 
starting point for the House majority leadership. Murray’s seminar at the freshmen 
orientation, Murray’s meeting with Gingrich, and Armey’s efforts to get key committee 
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House Republican moderates to support the Contract bill suggest that the intent of the 
conservative elite, especially Murray, Gingrich and Armey, was to emphasize the 
importance of welfare reform. The importance of Murray’s seminar was to make the 
freshmen aware of the need to support their leadership in this endeavour.  
 However, as I mentioned earlier, even though the freshmen were eager to help 
Gingrich implement the conservative Republican agenda, they did not always see eye to eye 
with the agenda of the majority leadership. Although both the freshmen and the House 
leadership wanted to implement a conservative Republican version of change in America, 
the leadership, and especially Gingrich, knew that any sort of change had to pass through the 
Senate, the House, and Clinton before the bill could be signed into law. Of course, Congress 
could override a Clinton veto with a two-thirds majority, but that level of support was not to 
be found in the 104th Congress. There were enough moderates, Republicans and Democrats, 
and liberal Democrats to quash any attempt by conservative Republicans to override a 
presidential veto. When it came to welfare reform, many of the freshmen realised that 
legislating for change meant having to accept a lesser degree of change, in order to achieve a 
transformation that can still be described as revolutionary when compared to the previous 
status quo.93          
Overall, the freshmen were influential but only for a brief amount of time. This was 
due to their original intent in getting elected to Congress. They came to Washington, DC to 
change the way of government, from the big government ideology of liberal Democrats to 
the limited government ideology of conservative Republicans. According to journalist Linda 
                                                          
93Rae, Conservative Reformers, 206-209.   
172 
 
Killian, the freshmen “were not believers in that government was the answer to people’s 
problems. They thought government was the problem”.94 She also stated:  
The first Republican president of their adult lives was Ronald Reagan. Reagan was a 
God to them, a religion. He represented a shining example of what the Republican 
Party should stand for. Most of them would say without hesitation that he was one of 
the finest presidents in history.   
Never mind that they had arrived in Washington specifically to fix the mess 
that Ronald Reagan had begun, with his tax cuts, military spending on steroids, and 
unchecked government growth. It was under Ronald Reagan that the federal deficit 
first hit $200 billion. But never mind that. It was what Reagan represented, not what 
he really was, that they loved – that clean-cut, gung-ho, America-first, pro-business, 
shining-city-on-a-hill thing he had going. They loved it because that was who they 
were, too. They did seem much angrier than Reagan was, though. And louder.95    
Her two statements reveal the paradox of getting elected to government on an anti-
government platform. Many of the House freshmen believed that Reagan, as president, had 
actually reduced the size of government by cutting taxes. However, they were unaware that 
whilst Reagan believed in less government, he was only able to reduce government 
revenues, via tax cuts, whilst at the same time increasing government spending and the 
overall size of government. 
The budget showdown with Clinton and the Republican controlled Congress ended 
the brief period of influence that the House freshmen wielded in the 104th Congress. 
According to Rae in Conservative Reformers, the freshmen took the budget issue very 
seriously. He said, “the budget issue alone not only symbolized everything they felt was 
wrong with the American political system but was also the central reason why many of them 
had taken the decision to enter politics. As a result, they were the most unyielding 
Republicans when it came to negotiating with the Senate and the White House,” and being 
“Unable to compete with Clinton, the freshmen found themselves being blamed by the 
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Democrats, the news media, and their own leadership for . . . failing to bring the shutdown to 
an end”.96 The Republican Congress lost the public relations battle with Clinton over which 
side, the president or the Congress, won public support during the ongoing political struggle 
to see which side could gain the upper hand in the budget negotiations. Two closures of 
government occurred before Congress reached an agreement with Clinton. 
However, the House leadership was not blameless for the budget debacle. Gingrich 
encouraged the freshmen’s rhetoric and used it to his advantage as speaker to move forward 
with the Contract, but as a result he had a hard time controlling them when they did not 
agree with him on policy issues.97 Armey and DeLay were even more ideologically 
committed than Gingrich to shutting down the government and keeping it closed. As a result, 
Gingrich was leading House conservative Republicans, before the fiasco of the budget 
showdown, who viewed compromise more as a sign of weakness than as a trait of 
governing.98     
The conservative ideology of the freshmen, one of less taxation, less government and 
more freedom from government, did not take into consideration that governing included 
having to compromise with non-conservative Republicans in the Senate, the Democrat 
minority and President Clinton. They seemed to believe that they could rely on their 
majority leadership to set the agenda and they could then pass legislation without concerning 
themselves of any serious opposition, as if they were legislating in a parliamentary system. 
They eventually realised that in order to get re-elected they had to compromise, which meant 
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accepting not effecting radical change in government but practical change, given the current 
political dynamic in Congress and the White House. They still achieved their mandate for 
change but it was more subdued from the lofty expectations they had had at the outset of the 
104th Congress.99 Tea Party Republicans in the 112th Congress, however, were even more 
determined to adhere to a robust ideological fervour, and considered pragmatism as 
betraying limited government. 
The Significance of Welfare Reform on the New Deal Legacy 
The welfare reform bill that was signed into law by Clinton had an effect on the 
legacy of the New Deal. Although welfare reform had previously taken place from the 1960s 
to the 1980s, the reform to welfare that occurred in 1996 brought about a drastic change that 
affected the legacy, especially the concept of welfare, the precedent that began with the New 
Deal in 1935.100 Ron Haskins, a social policy analyst at the Brookings Institution, viewed the 
reform as “the most fundamental change in American social policy since the Social Security 
Act of 1935”,101 whereas political scientist Nolan McCarthy highlighted how polarisation 
enabled conservative Republicans to achieve a preferable outcome on welfare reform.102 
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Bush in 2002; Waddan and Béland, The Politics of Policy Change, 41, 55-56, 72 (note twelve). 
102Nolan McCarthy, “The Policy Effects of Political Polarization”, in The Transformation of American 
Politics: Activist Government and the Rise of Conservatism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), eds. 
Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol, 240-243.   
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This outcome, however, varied in its significance amongst both parties in Congress and with 
Clinton.   
Congressional members were mostly either in favour of or against the bill.103 But the 
difference between the two final voting sessions reveals that voting for this bill had added 
implications.104 The number of Democrats, in both the House and the Senate, who voted for 
the bill increased from the first to the second vote, whilst support amongst Republicans was 
mostly the same for both votes.105 For conservative Republicans there was no dilemma, the 
final version, from their perspective, was a compromise to ensure the support of many 
moderates. However, for moderate Democrats and moderate Republicans, supporting the 
welfare reform bill became a mixture of personal choice and political survival.106 Moderate 
Democrats had the opportunity to support a bill that decreased the size and power of 
government. Whilst this was true as well for moderate Republicans, they also had to contend 
with the conservative members of their own party. On the other hand, many liberal 
Democrats wanted to defend this part of the New Deal legacy, but the notion of welfare 
reform was popular with the public and they risked having to defend their vote for an 
                                                          
103For a general overview of the welfare reform debate during the 104th Congress, consult: Bryner, 
Politics and Public Morality, 106-166; and Cammisa, From Rhetoric to Reform, 63-93.  
104The first House vote was 256-170 and the second vote was 328-101. The first Senate vote was 74-
24 and the second vote was 78-21, Thomas (Library of Congress), 104th Congress, Bill Summary and Status for 
H.R. 3734, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d104:HR03734:@@@R (accessed 25 July 2014).  
105Support amongst Democrats for the first House vote was 30-165 and for the second vote it was 
98-98. In the Senate, Democrat support during the first vote was 22-24 and for the second vote it was 25-21.  
House Republican support for the first vote was 226-4 and for the second vote it was 230-2. Senate 
Republican support for the first vote was 52-0 and for the second vote it was 53-0. For the House: Office of 
the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives, 104th Congress, “Final Vote Results for Roll Call 331”, 
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1996/roll331.xml; and “Final Vote Results for Roll Call 383”, 
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1996/roll383.xml. For the Senate: U.S. Senate, 104th Congress, Roll Call Vote 232, 
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=104&session=2&vote=
00232; and Roll Call Vote 262, 
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=104&session=2&vote=
00262. All four were accessed on 23 July 2014.    
106Weaver, “Ending Welfare as We Know It”, 384-394; and Bryner, Politics and Public Morality, 157. 
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unpopular, if not controversial, component of the legacy. In fact, only one liberal Democrat, 
Sen. Paul Wellstone (MN) was willing to vote against the reform bill, whilst also running for 
re-election in 1996.107 To further illustrate the difficulty of uniting a majority of Democrats 
in Congress against this bill, one only has to look at their congressional leadership, for even 
their minority leadership was not united against welfare reform.108 Of all of the Democratic 
votes, one of the more notable liberal Democrats to vote for this bill was Sen. John Kerry 
(MA), whilst one of the more distinguished moderate Democrats to vote against this bill was 
Sen. Daniel Moynihan (NY).109 
What made Moynihan’s no vote important was his vast experience in both 
researching and writing about welfare.110 Aside from his academic background, as a Senator 
he was an eminent proponent of reforming the welfare system. Yet the main reason he did 
not support welfare reform during the 104th Congress was due to the elimination of AFDC. 
Regarding the Republican welfare reform proposal, he said,   
This is a bill that would repeal Title IV-A of the Social Security Act of 1935 that 
provides aid to dependent children. It will be the first time in the history of the nation 
that we have repealed a section of the Social Security Act. That the White House 
should be so eager to support such a law is beyond my understanding and, certainly 
in 34 years’ service in Washington, beyond my experience. If this administration 
wishes to go down in history as one that abandoned, eagerly abandoned, the national 
commitment to dependent children, so be it. I would not want to be associated with 
such an enterprise, and I shall not be.111  
                                                          
107Waddan, Clinton’s Legacy, 125-126.  
108The House leadership, which included the Minority leader Rep. Richard Gephardt (MO) and the 
Minority whip David Bonior (MI) were united against the bill; whilst the Senate leadership was divided, the 
Minority leader, Sen. Tom Daschle (SD) voted against the bill, and the Minority whip, Sen. Wendell Ford (KY) 
voted for the bill. 
 109Kerry was one of the twenty-five Democratic Senators who voted for the final welfare bill, whilst 
Moynihan was one the twenty-one Democratic Senators who voted against the final bill.  
110Besides Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negros, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York 
City, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1970), some of his other works have included Maximum Feasible 
Misunderstanding: Community Action in the War on Poverty (New York: Free Press, 1970) and Miles to Go: A 
Personal History of Social Policy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996).  
111Moynihan, Miles to Go, 38.  
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Whilst Moynihan was upset with Clinton for not supporting one of the prominent aspects of 
the New Deal and its legacy, he was also disappointed that Clinton did not make welfare 
reform a higher priority during the 103rd Congress.112  
Aside from criticising Clinton’s support on welfare reform, Moynihan also argued 
that many Senate Democrats “are humiliating themselves. Having failed to push welfare 
reform when they controlled the Senate”, they are now unwilling “to take a stand that will be 
unpopular with the voters”.113 He was critical of Democrats for being more willing to vote 
for welfare reform for political reasons instead of reforming welfare when they controlled 
the presidency and the Congress, which would have allowed them to have much more 
control on how the welfare system was reformed.114    
In contrast to Moynihan’s remarks concerning Democrats, with regards to the 
conservative Republican agenda he states that the Contract with America helped to install “a 
new vocabulary”, which had  
supplanted the old. Welfare was child abuse; to end child abuse, end welfare. . . . The 
reasoning, occasionally quite explicit, was that ending welfare would make the lives 
of illegitimate babies so unendurable that mothers would forbear to bear more. 
Cruelty to children – “tough love” – became an instrument of social policy. No 
Social Darwinist can ever have dreamed of a measure. . . In fairness, the 
conservatives were serious. Liberals never have been, and now they were merely 
silent.115     
In sum, Moynihan’s comments offer an explanation as to how conservative 
Republicans were determined to attack the New Deal legacy via the New Deal instead of the 
Great Society. The earlier comments from Gingrich, Armey, DeLay and the two House 
                                                          
 112For more, consult: Bryner, Politics and Public Morality, 78-80; Weaver, “Ending Welfare as We 
Know It”, 382; and Harris, The Survivor, 234-235.  
113Moynihan, Miles to Go, 40.  
114However, in all fairness, a question has to be asked. How many Democrats viewed welfare reform 
in the same manner as Moynihan?  
115Moynihan, Miles to Go, 30.  
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freshmen demonstrate that conservatives, especially House Republicans, would seize upon 
any opportunity to attack the legacy of the New Deal in the most malicious way. Even 
though this line of attack did force them to compromise on some issues, they were still able 
to assert that they had addressed the problems caused by the Great Society, yet they did so 
by targeting a programme that stemmed from the New Deal. To a conservative Republican 
this was seen as the best of both worlds, fixing the social ills of the Great Society by 
targeting the New Deal. What welfare reform has shown is that the New Deal legacy is 
vulnerable and further aspects or even all of it can also suffer, just as the AFDC benefit was 
eliminated with a few strokes of a pen.          
Conclusion 
 Conservative Republicans viewed welfare reform as a way to incorporate social 
values into entitlement reform. The intent was to combat socio-cultural liberalism by 
upholding traditional family values. As was evident with the remarks of Armey, DeLay, 
Gingrich and freshmen congressional members, they put great emphasis on linking 
liberalism to socialism. Conservatives support the notion that the attack against family 
values began in the turbulent 1960s and has continued ever since. A major point of reference 
for social decay is placed at the doorstep of 1960s counter-cultural liberalism. Cultural 
identity enables conservatives to critique the New Deal legacy for embodying un-American 
socialistic ideals championed by liberals and funded via big government.  
As discussed in the introduction and previous chapter, as GOP conservatism has 
evolved from the 1930s to the post-Cold War era, what it stands for has merged an economic 
critique against the legacy with moral condemnation. The influence of southern 
conservatives has been vital in this regard. Southern traditionalism values order, or put 
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another way, a social hierarchy. The Great Society challenged this notion as it expanded 
welfare beyond the original New Deal intent. The greater access to welfare led to more 
economic assistance that challenged southern traditionalism. A conservative dominated 
Republican House channelled this belief as it set utilise the new GOP congressional majority 
in an attempt to fix, or to “right”, America’s moral compass. Reagan’s rhetoric echoed this 
sentiment, but the congressional four-party dynamic did not present either a GOP 
congressional majority or a powerful conservative bloc that he could rely on to support such 
an endeavour. The 104th Congress, however, presented such an opportunity for a GOP 
congressional majority to right the wrongs of the past, and did so with the reluctant support 
of a Democratic president. 
This chapter shows how four-party politics was used by conservative Republicans to 
unite their party and press Clinton into either reforming welfare before the 1996 presidential 
election or leaving it as a possible issue leading up to the election. This is an example of how 
any future attempt to reform entitlements by either ending them, as was the case with the 
AFDC benefit, or reducing/reforming them to rely more on the free-market for individual 
benefits, in the cases of Medicare and social security, can benefit conservatives. Since they 
assert great influence within both the Republican congressional and presidential parties, they 
are more united than the Democratic Party in this regard. However, as the next chapter 
demonstrates, even when the GOP controls both the presidency and Congress, entitlement 




Four-Party Politics and the Legacy of George W. Bush 
We need a new generation of Ronald Reagan Republicans who, instead of making a separate 
peace with big government, will fight a containment policy that concedes not another inch of 
territory to the Socialist agenda. 
-Stephen Moore1 
Of all of the post-World War II Republican presidents, George W. Bush presented 
the greatest challenge to the New Deal and its ongoing legacy. A member of the 
conservative elite and chief economist of the Heritage Foundation, Stephen Moore’s remark 
illustrates that conservatives were far from united on Bush’s approach to combating the 
liberal welfare state.2 Bush attempted to expand both social security and Medicare via free 
market reforms, a goal that divided opinion amongst conservatives. Yet with a popular and 
entrenched entitlement system in place, how else would conservative Republicans be able to 
reform the entitlements and further implement government policies that better adhered to 
their ideology?  
Bush was even more of an adversary to the New Deal legacy than Ronald Reagan. 
William Leuchtenburg, In the Shadow of FDR, considers Bush to be “a kind of anti-FDR” 
who, whilst at the Harvard Business School, “denounced Roosevelt as a ‘socialist’ and had 
deplored old age pensions, unemployment insurance, the SEC, and other New Deal 
departures”.3 This is not to say that Reagan did not believe in rolling back the New Deal 
legacy, because Reagan and Bush both agreed that the free-market offered a superior 
alternative to government sponsored social insurance programmes, such as social security 
and Medicare. However, unlike Bush, Reagan respected Roosevelt’s legacy – as illustrated 
                                                          
1Stephen Moore, “Is U.S. in Slow Motion to Socialism”? Human Events 61, no. 16 (9 May 2005): 5, 
Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed 25 May 2012).     
2This was as of January 2014, before that he worked for the Wall Street Journal. For more, see: 
http://www.heritage.org/about/staff/m/stephen-moore (accessed 14 July 2014).   
3William E. Leuchtenburg, In the Shadow of FDR: From Harry Truman to Barack Obama, 4th ed. 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 297.  
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in chapter one, Reagan was vocal in his opposition to LBJ and the Great Society whilst 
acknowledging his support of FDR and the New Deal.4 Another element that separated Bush 
and Reagan is that whilst Reagan had to deal with either a split Congress or a Democratic 
Congress, Bush, from 2003 to 2006, had a Congress that was under conservative Republican 
control which greatly enhanced the opportunity to reform both social security and Medicare; 
two goals that were part of an agenda that led politics scholar Alex Waddan to note: “Bush’s 
initiative . . . presented a greater theoretical threat to the American welfare state than 
anything attempted by Ronald Reagan”.5 But in doing so, Bush had to proceed with caution 
when addressing two of the more popular government programmes. Labelling them or the 
New Deal legacy as socialist would not have helped his reform initiatives at all. Instead, he 
opted to focus on their alleged shortcomings.6 
Bush, on the other hand, did use the liberal and socialist labels to attack Democrats 
and their initiatives, but this was only done when he was trying to distance himself from 
Democrats. One instance was during a 2004 presidential debate, where he elaborated on 
John Kerry’s tax-and-spend liberalism:  
He's been there [in the Senate] for 20 years. . . . He voted 98 times to raise taxes. I 
mean, these aren't make-up figures. And so people are going to have to look at the 
record—look at the record of the man running for the President. . . . [The National 
Journal does not] name him the most liberal in the United States Senate because he 
hasn't shown up to many meetings. They named him because of his votes, and it's 
reality. It's just not credible to say he's going to keep taxes down and balance 
budgets.7 
                                                          
4But Reagan also became more critical of the New Deal, not Roosevelt, as he became more in line 
with conservative Republicanism – examples include the TVA and social security.   
5Alex Waddan, “Bush and Big Government Conservatism”, in Assessing George W. Bush’s Legacy: The 
Right Man? (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), eds. Iwan Morgan and Phillip John Davies, 177. 
6I am not suggesting that Medicare and social security are perfect programmes, reforms are needed 
to ensure they have the funds to function as intended, however, Bush opted to only focus only on free-
market reforms.  
7George W. Bush, "Presidential Debate in St. Louis, Missouri”, 8 October 2004, compiled by Gerhard 
Peters and John T. Wolly, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=72776 
(accessed 30 January 2014). For more on how Bush used the liberal label against Kerry, see: Kenneth M. 
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Another was in 2007, after Republicans lost control of Congress, where Bush vetoed 
the Democratic congressional legislation that expanded the State’s Children Insurance 
Program (SCHIP). His rationale for doing so, was   
socialized medicine has led to lower standards, longer waits, rationing of care. We've 
tried, by the way, here in Washington to have a major effort to put the Federal 
Government square in the center of health care in 1994, and the legislation didn't 
pass. I believe many of the Democrats in Congress who supported that legislation 
have learned from the experience. So instead of pushing to federalize health care all 
at once, they're pushing for the same goal through a series of incremental steps. . . .  
. . . the bill Congress passed would lead one out of every three children who 
moves on to Government coverage to drop private health insurance. . . . That is the 
wrong direction . . . private health care is the best medicine possible for the American 
people.8    
But during the four years of conservative Republican control of the executive and legislative 
branches, he was better able to control the political narrative. 
Bush’s disdain for tax-and-spend liberalism placed him at the forefront of the 
continuing conservative Republican condemnation of the New Deal and its ongoing legacy, 
in the tradition of Herbert Hoover, Robert Taft, Barry Goldwater and Ronald Reagan.9  
On the other hand, what it means to be a conservative Republican has evolved over 
time. Leading up to World War II, conservatives like Taft favoured an isolationist foreign 
policy approach, but they shifted to a more hawkish foreign policy stance in the Cold War. 
There have been other changes that have led to the evolution of conservative Republicanism 
– resulting in a gradual shift towards a pro-state mentality on moral values whilst 
                                                          
Cosgrove, Branded Conservatives: How the Brand Brought the Right from the Fringes to the Center of 
American Politics (New York: Peter Lang, 2007), 243-273.  
8George W. Bush, "Remarks at the Grocery Manufacturers Association/Food Products Association 
Fall Conference", 31 October 2007, The American Presidency Project, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=76003 (accessed 30 January 2014). 
9For more on Bush and his importance to GOP conservatism, see: David R. Farber, The Rise and Fall 
of Modern Conservatism: A Short History (Princeton University Press, 2010), 209-256.     
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maintaining their anti-statist position on economic issues. Consequently there were 
significant differences between Bush’s conservatism and that of Taft and Goldwater.   
Yet even with the evolution of conservative Republicanism, the goal of rolling back 
the New Deal legacy has remained consistent. Bush’s attempts to reform social security and 
Medicare presented an opportunity for them to combat “the liberal tradition” legacy, but also 
revealed a rift amongst conservatives. This rift developed from Bush’s promotion of big 
government conservatism as the remedy to big government liberalism. Some members of the 
conservative elite even went as far as branding his attempted reforms as socialist, however, 
this was largely done by elites outside of Congress, especially via conservative periodicals 
such as the National Review and Human Events – and were mainly focused on Medicare, not 
social security. Echoing the likes of Stephen Moore, quoted earlier, Phyllis Schlafly, berated 
Bush’s Medicare reform as “one more step incrementally for socialized medicine”.10  
Overall, the difference in opinion can be broken down into two opposing viewpoints. 
The arguments are: firstly, Bush was increasing the scope of government in the short term, 
by adding free-market reforms that would over time reduce the size of the New Deal legacy; 
and secondly, Bush was correct in his attempt to privatise social security but he was wrong 
with regards to Medicare (Part D).11  
 
                                                          
10Quote was taken from: John Gizzi, “Conservative Activists Rebel Against Drug Plan”, Human Events 
59, no. 22 (30 June 2003): 5, Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed 23 May 2012).   
11There was also another argument offered by a small minority of conservatives like Rep. Ron Paul 
(R-TX) who argued against both of Bush’s reform initiatives. Paul is a libertarian and considered Bush’s 
Medicare plan to be a form of “Republican Socialism”; Ron Paul, “Republican Socialism”, 25 November 2003, 
http://www.lewrockwell.com/paul/paul143.html (accessed 9 September 2012). Paul believes that “The best 
private solution, of course, is simply to allow the American people to keep more of their paychecks and invest 
for retirement as they see fit.” Instead of having to invest in “government-approved investments”; Ron Paul, 
“Social Security: House of Cards”, 9 November 2004, http://www.lewrockwell.com/paul/paul215.html 
(accessed 8 October 2012).    
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The differences in the opposing viewpoints offer two questions for consideration. They are:   
1. What is the significance of Bush’s attempts to reform Medicare and social 
security as a way to promote a conservative governing philosophy? 
2. How did Bush’s conservatism differ from congressional Republicans?  
When using the parameters of four-party politics, two points are evident. Firstly, the 
Republican presidential and congressional parties are to the right of their Democratic 
counterparts. Secondly, a vital distinction emerges between the Republican parties – Bush’s 
conservatism placed him to the left of his congressional colleagues.12 As a result, this 
exposed Bush to the accusation that his policies had as much in common, if not more, with 
the ideas of liberal Democrats than with those of “small government” conservative 
Republicans.13  
In this chapter I will argue that George W. Bush did not betray conservative 
Republicans. Instead, he attempted to combat the two most popular components of the New 
Deal legacy. However, in order to undo the legacy, free-market reforms became the only 
realistic options for them. The public would not stand for the complete undoing of both 
programmes, even if this was their ultimate goal. According to journalist Ryan Sager, 
“[Conservative] Republicans are never going [to be able] to roll back the New Deal [legacy]. 
But they can shape what takes its place”.14 Given the circumstances, Bush was trying to use 
                                                          
12John Kenneth White, The Values Divide: American Politics and Culture in Transition (New York: 
Chatham House Publishers, 2003), 186-193. 
13The Cato Institute, a conservative think tank, made this argument very adamantly. For examples, 
see: Michael Tanner, Leviathan on the Right: How Big-Government Conservatism Brought Down the 
Republican Revolution (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2007); Stephen Slivinski. Buck Wild: How Republicans 
Broke the Bank and Became the Party of Big Government (Nashville: Nelson Current, 2006); and John 
Samples, The Struggle to Limit Government: A Modern Political History (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2010). 
14Ryan Sager, The Elephant in the Room: Evangelicals, Libertarians, and the Battle to Control the 
Republican Party (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2006), 109. 
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the most popular means at his disposal to confront the New Deal legacy and ultimately give 
it a conservative twist. 
Bush and Entitlement Reform: A Conservative New Deal? 
Regarding Bush’s overall strategic plan, conservative historian Donald Critchlow in 
The Conservative Ascendancy argues that the way Bush envisioned undoing the New Deal 
and its ongoing legacy differed from what “the first generations of postwar conservatives . . . 
had called for when they sought to overturn the New Deal liberal order”. Instead of 
“dismantling the welfare state” Bush wanted to “transform the liberal welfare state into a 
conservative welfare state”.15 In order to accomplish his task, however, he needed to 
challenge the underlying attitudes towards key programmes of the New Deal legacy, social 
security and Medicare.   
In a more detailed analysis of Bush’s reform initiatives, social policy scholar David 
Blumenthal and political scientist James Morone in The Heart of Power state, “In the 1930s, 
liberals imagined a universal right to health care by a national, compulsory insurance plan – 
Social Security extended to medical care”. But after the death of President Roosevelt, Harry 
Truman and other “Liberal Democrats turned national health insurance into the New Deal’s 
unfinished legacy. They would fervently pursue it for the next thirty years; some pursue it to 
this day”.16 Blumenthal and Morone also contend that Bush’s Medicare reform centred on a 
“promarket approach” which would “drag Medicare out of the Social Security mindset”.17 
                                                          
15Donald T. Critchlow, The Conservative Ascendancy: How the Republican Right Rose to Power in 
Modern America, 2nd ed. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 257, 278. For more, also see: Lewis L. 
Gould, The Republicans: A History of the Grand Old Party (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 331, 337-
339.  
16David Blumenthal and James A. Morone, The Heart of Power: Health and Politics in the Oval Office 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 15.  
17Ibid., 19.  
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According to them, “When the spirit and the politics moved him, Bush could set health care 
goals, pursue them relentlessly, give and get in the legislative process, and emerge with a 
program he was proud of. This is the story of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, 
which provided prescription drug coverage for the elderly”.18 They claim that the Bush 
administration “would support Medicare as an entitlement and drug coverage as a benefit, 
but it wanted to reform – the administration always called it modernizing – the program 
along conservative lines.”19   
This argument suggests that Bush wanted to remove the “Social Security mindset” 
from Medicare and replace it with a free-market mindset, but he wanted to go beyond what 
Blumenthal and Morone argue was the case with his Medicare reform plan. Even though he 
wanted to remove Medicare from the “Social Security mindset”, he also sought to change 
the “Social Security mindset”, from viewing social security as a defined benefit, to a defined 
contribution.20  
Bush argued: “Medicare has lived up to President Johnson’s vision. . . . Medicare is a 
binding commitment. The Medicare promise we made in 1965 will never change. And as 
medicine advances and the needs of our seniors change, Medicare, too, must advance, and it, 
too, must change. Thus generation of leaders must honor and renew the promise of Medicare 
                                                          
18Ibid., 385.  
19Ibid., 395.  
 20A defined contribution’s pay-out amount is determined by the free-market. For more information, 
see: http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/key-elements/savings-retirement/defined-
contribution.cfm (accessed 20 October 2012); and http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/key-
elements/savings-retirement/defined-benefit.cfm (accessed 20 October 2012). For more on Bush and define 
contributions, consult: Steven E. Schier, Panorama of a Presidency: How George W. Bush Acquired and Spent 
His Political Capital (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2009), 108-109. For an in-depth analysis on the battle over 
benefits in contemporary American political history, see: Jacob S. Hacker, The Divided Welfare State: The 




by strengthening Medicare for the future”.21 After the passage of the prescription drug 
benefit, he defended the reform on the grounds that it “put market-oriented principles in the 
bill”; which was key because “the marketplace is a much better allocator of resources than 
the Government”.22   
Near the end of his second term, Bush reflected on his failed effort to reform social 
security. His argument for reform was similar to the one he made for Medicare. Even though 
he was unsuccessful, Bush argued that his reform initiative was the way forward because 
the younger worker would gain a rate of return which would be more substantial than 
the rate of return of the money now being earned in . . . Social Security . . . the 
current system can’t sustain that which has been promised to the workers. . . .  
Now, the benefits, as far as I’m concerned . . . the personal savings account     
. . . encourages an ownership society. . . . The Social Security system was designed in 
. . . an era that is long gone . . . the question is whether or not our society has got the 
will necessary to adjust from a defined benefit plan to a defined contribution plan.23   
These remarks reveal a great deal about Bush’s intentions toward both Medicare and 
social security. His attempted reforms aimed to challenge the legacy behind both 
entitlements. Medicare reform added a new entitlement, Part D, which gave private 
pharmaceutical companies more of a foothold into Medicare.24 Social security reform 
challenged the current system by allowing private accounts to start changing it “from a 
defined benefit plan to a defined contribution plan”. Social security reform was the more 
direct assault on the New Deal legacy. Bush’s social security reform attacked the programme 
                                                          
 21George W. Bush, “Remarks on Medicare Reform”, 12 July 2001, The American Presidency Project, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=73361&st=medicare&st1= (accessed 1 June 2012).   
 22George W. Bush, “Remarks to the American Enterprise Institute and a Question-and-Answer 
Session”, 18 December 2008, The American Presidency Project, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=85272 (accessed 1 June 2012).  
 23George W. Bush, “The President’s News Conference”, 20 December 2004, The American Presidency 
Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=62982 (accessed 1 June 2012). 
24Medicare Part C, Medicare Advantage was another, it allows private insurers to purchase Part A 
and Part B for its enrolees. For more, see: http://www.medicare.gov/sign-up-change-plans/medicare-health-
plans/medicare-advantage-plans/medicare-advantage-plans.html (accessed 5 November 2012); and Daniel 
Béland and Alex Waddan, The Politics of Policy Change: Welfare, Medicare, and Social Security Reform in the 
United States (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012), 114. 
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as a whole, whereas his Medicare reform was a back door attack, a “Trojan Horse” which 
allowed the free-market into the system and could in future expand its influence over the rest 
of the programme.25          
Bush’s failed attempt at social security reform is based on the larger conservative 
agenda to discredit the programme.26 Its core goal to question the long term viability of the 
programme drew on a strategic plan outlined by conservative social policy scholars Stuart 
Butler and Peter Germanis in a 1983 article, “Achieving A “Leninist” Strategy”.27 Their 
intent was to help frame the policy debate around the notion “that Social Security would be 
vastly improved if it were restructured into a predominately private system”.28 They 
conclude “that Social Security can be reformed only by treating the issue primarily as a 
political problem. . . . the strategy we adopt must be flexible. . . . [and] we must be prepared 
to redefine segments of the plan . . . to meet the changing political circumstances”.29   
In a comparison to the authors’ concluding remarks, Bush did treat social security 
reform as a political problem, but one can question if he was flexible enough in his 
                                                          
25Béland and Waddan argue that Bush’s “frontal” attack on social security scared off conservative 
Republican support, whereas Bush’s approach to Medicare reform did not do so, which spared his 
conservative supporters the wrath of the electorate; The Politics of Policy Change, 170-171. I agree, however, 
a vocal minority of conservative Republicans opted not to support Medicare reform and also did not have to 
face the wrath of the public. Although Rep. Nick Smith (R-MI) made enough enemies from the GOP 
leadership, and retired later that session, his son, who was running to take over the seat, had to suffer the 
consequences of his decision; Slivinski, Buck Wild, 137-138.                                                                                                                                                                                                  
26Peter Baker, Days of Fire: Bush and Cheney in the White House (New York: Doubleday, 2013), 380-
382, 390. And even centrist Democrats like Bill Clinton are not opposed to reforming social security to also 
include private accounts; Steven M. Teles and Martha Derthick, “Social Security from 1980 to the Present: 
From Third Rail to Presidential Commitment – and Back?” in Conservatism and American Political 
Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), eds. Brian J. Glenn and Steven M. Teles, 267-273; as 
well as Béland and Waddan The Politics of Policy Change, 132-142.  
27Stuart M. Butler and Peter Germanis, “Achieving A “Leninist” Strategy”, Cato Journal 3, no.2 (Fall 
1983), 547-556, http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj3n2/cj3n2-11.pdf (accessed 23 July 2012). At the time, 
both worked for the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank. Butler is now a Senior Fellow in 
Economic Studies at the Brookings Institution; http://www.brookings.edu/experts/butlers (accessed 30 June 
2015). 
28Butler and Germanis, “Achieving A “Leninist” Strategy”, 547.  
29Ibid., 556.  
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approach. However, he adhered more to this strategy with Medicare than he did with social 
security. The final voting tally, which included a mixture of both Democrats and 
Republicans supporting the prescription drug benefit, was a testament to his approach. 
Ironically, Bush had more issues getting conservative votes, for ideological reasons, during 
Medicare reform than he did during social security reform.30 The lack of a united 
conservative front on social security was caused by his inflexibility. Historian Lewis Gould 
viewed Bush’s social reform effort as a purely “hyperpartisan approach” to rolling back the 
New Deal legacy.31 He did not reach out to Democrats and was mostly focused towards his 
own party, and this allowed Democrats and interest groups such as the AARP to make his 
party and many conservatives afraid to face the political consequences of such a policy 
proposal.32   
Overall, Bush’s domestic goals, especially from 2003-2006, were constructed around 
a highly partisan agenda.33 However, his agenda did not come without consequences. 
Although his 2001 tax cuts had moderate Democratic support, the means by which the 
conservative GOP leadership whipped fellow congressional Republicans to support Bush’s 
agenda compelled Senate moderate James Jeffords (R-VT) to leave the party, become an 
Independent and caucus with Democrats. This was an act that swapped control of the Senate 
from the GOP to the Democratic Party for most of the 107th Congress.34 Yet throughout the 
                                                          
30Barbara Sinclair, “Living (and Dying?) by the Sword: George W. Bush as Legislative Leader”, in The 
George Bush Legacy (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2008), eds. Colin Campbell, Bert A. Rockman and Andrew 
Rudalevige, 182. 
31Gould, The Republicans, 338-339.  
32Ibid., 168-169, 177-182.  
33For more on Bush and partisanship, consider: Richard M. Skinner, “George W. Bush and the 
Partisan Presidency”, Political Science Quarterly 123, no. 4 (Winter 2008): 605-622, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25655567 (accessed 17 January 2015); Gary C. Jacobson, A Divider, Not a Uniter: 
George W. Bush and the American People, 2nd ed. (Boston: Longman, 2011); and Sinclair, “Living (and Dying?) 
by the Sword”. 
34Joseph A. Pika and John Anthony Maltese, The Politics of the Presidency, rev. 7th ed. (Washington, 
DC: CQ Press, 2010), 203-204; Geoffrey Kabaservice, Rule and Ruin: The Downfall of Moderation and the 
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first six years of Bush’s presidency, the congressional makeup allowed him to be very 
assertive with his agenda.35 Historian Gil Troy considered Bush to be driven by conviction 
more so than Reagan, Clinton or Obama.36 Of course, the conservative GOP control of 
Congress allowed Bush to take advantage of the four-party dynamic in a way that Clinton, 
Obama, and even Reagan could not.37 
Alex Waddan in “The Politics of Aging” argues that Bush’s Medicare reform was a 
“hybrid package” that in theory could appeal to conservative Republicans and liberal 
Democrats. However, liberal Democrats were not happy with the reform package because it 
did not allow the government to directly “negotiate with the pharmaceutical companies” 
with regards to how much the prescription drugs would cost, and it “also stipulated that the 
benefit be provided by private insurers rather than directly through the Medicare 
programme”. Conservative Republicans voiced concerns about the reform because it 
expanded the Medicare entitlement and especially afterwards when the hitherto hidden true 
costs of the reform became known after its enactment.38   
Regarding social security reform, Waddan argues that Bush was determined to spend 
some of the “political capital” he acquired from his 2004 re-election victory in an attempt 
“to challenge the fundamental tenets of the Social Security programme”; and even though 
                                                          
Destruction of the Republican Party (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 382-384; Baker, Days of Fire, 
80, 103-105; and Sinclair, “Living (and Dying?) by the Sword”, 169-174, 176-177. 
35The GOP House, however, was more aligned with Bush in comparison to the GOP Senate, where 
compromising was more common in order to gain the votes required to move legislation forward. For more, 
consult: Charles O. Jones, “The U.S. Congress and Chief Executive George W. Bush”, in The Polarized 
Presidency of George W. Bush (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), eds. George C. Edwards III and 
Desmond S. King, 405-408, 412-416; and Sinclair, “Living (and Dying?) by the Sword”.    
36Gil Troy, Why Moderates Make the Best Presidents: George Washington to Barack Obama, 2nd ed. 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2012).   
37For more, refer to: Michael A. Genovese, Todd L. Belt and William W. Lammers, The President and 
Domestic Policy: Comparing Leadership Styles, FDR to Obama, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2014). 
38Alex Waddan, “The Politics of Aging”, in Assessing the George W. Bush Presidency: A Tale of Two 
Terms (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009) eds. Andrew Wroe and Jon Herbert, 167-172. 
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conservative Republicans wanted to target what they consider “the holy grail of politics . . . 
one of the fundamental building blocks of New Deal liberalism”, the Republican Congress 
deserted Bush. He was, however, more determined than Reagan to alter social security. 
Reagan focused on fiscal solvency, whilst Bush wanted “a much more far-reaching reform 
that focused on the collectivist principles of the programme”. Moreover, this attempt on 
social security allowed congressional Democrats to form a united opposition against reform, 
whereas congressional Republicans were not willing to go out on a limb politically as they 
were with Medicare reform and support the administration at the risk of their constituents’ 
discontent.39 As Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) observed. Bush “ran on it. We didn’t. He’s 
not up for election again. We are”.40 
In retrospect, despite the mixed results of Medicare and the attempted reform of 
social security, Bush was successful in striking a blow against “New Deal liberalism”. In the 
case of Medicare, he added a conservative Republican reform to this liberal Democratic 
creation. Moreover, whilst he failed to privatise social security, he was able to build upon the 
conservative Republican victory on welfare reform in 1996 with his achievement on 
Medicare reform. The reason Bush failed to reform social security is that he did not propose 
an addition but a change to the existing system, which would be costly to start but would 
have been a significant victory for conservative Republicans. From the conservative 
Republican perspective, they would have achieved a result they had desired since 1933, a 
                                                          
39Ibid., 172-177; and Sinclair, Party Wars, 173, 240-241. 
40Graham’s remark was taken from: Terry Weiner, “Touching the Third Rail: Explaining the Failure of 
Bush’s Security Reform Initiative”, Politics & Policy 35, no. 4 (2007): 888-891. 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2007.00087.x/pdf (accessed 17 October 2012). 
Another example from the conservative elite is William Kristol. Kristol is the founder and editor of the 
conservative magazine The Weekly Standard. Kristol wanted Bush to focus on taxes, jobs and the war on 
terror. For more on this point, see: Tanner, Leviathan on the Right, 132-133; and Samples, The Struggle to 
Limit Government, 239. However, both Tanner and Samples downplay Kristol’s political rationale for opposing 
Bush’s social security reform and focus their arguments on Kristol supporting big government conservatism 
over limited government conservatism.   
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victory that would bring the entire New Deal legacy into question and quite possibly drive a 
political stake into the heart of liberal Democrats, including Franklin Roosevelt. 
Even though the prescription drug benefit angered many within the conservative 
elite, and a vocal minority in Congress voiced opposition to it, the Bush White House 
considered it a major domestic policy victory.41 
Medicare and social security are entrenched entitlements, but will always be subject 
to reform, and although Bush failed to reform social security, it was not due to a lack of 
effort on his behalf.42 His desire to reform social security spanned back over three decades.43 
According to journalist Robert Draper, privatising social security was something Bush first 
envisioned in 1978 and his desire never waned. Draper also mentions that even before the 
start of Bush’s second term, he attempted to court Senator Max Baucus (D-MT) to work 
with him on reforming social security. Baucus was willing to discuss entitlement reform, 
with an emphasis on Medicare, but “it dawned on him that solvency wasn’t what was 
preoccupying Bush and Rove. This was about privatizing the New Deal”. Bush was 
determined to push ahead with his initiative because “This is what the people want. I’ve got 
                                                          
41Waddan, “Bush and Big Government Conservatism”, 174-175. 
42For more on social security’s history, see: Daniel Béland, Social Security: History from the New Deal 
to the Privatization Debate (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005); as well as Teles and Derthick, “Social 
Security from 1980 to the Present”, 261-290. For more on Medicare’s history, consult: Jonathan Oberlander, 
The Political Life of Medicare (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003); and Theodore R. Marmor, The 
Politics of Medicare, 2nd ed. (New York: A. de Gruyter, 2000).   
43Although, the actual plan Bush devised may have been inspired by Chile’s privatisation of its 
pension system by José Piñera. The two met in the late 1990s. For more, see: Barbara T. Dreyfuss, “The Siren 
of Santiago”, Mother Jones, March/April 2005, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2005/03/siren-santiago 
(accessed 1 June 2012). Piñera works for the Cato Institute. For more, consult: 
http://www.cato.org/people/jose-pinera (accessed 9 November 2012). The Cato Institute had a vital role in 
helping to craft Bush’s social security initiative. For more on this perspective, consult: Nelson Lichtenstein, 
“Ideology and Interest on the Social Policy Home Front”, in The Presidency of George W, Bush: A First 
Historical Assessment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), ed. Julian E. Zelizer, 190-192; Béland, 
Social Security, 170-177; as well as Teles and Derthick, “Social Security from 1980 to the Present”, 268-271.  
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political capital, and I intent to spend it”.44 However, it is highly debateable if Bush had any 
political capital.  
Political scientists Lawrence Grossback, David Peterson and James Stimson 
highlight that electoral mandates rarely happen, although such a claim is made more often 
than it is merited. Their analysis offers very few examples over a forty-four year period 
(1960-2004) where a party or president had any “political capital . . . to spend”. The 2004 
election did not mirror the election results of 1964, nor did it match the outcomes of 1980 or 
1994. And even when there is a mandate, its time is limited before the political capital 
dissipates.45 Yet even without a mandate, it is possible to bequeath a legacy.  
Public policy scholars Christian Weller and Amanda Logan argue that President 
Bush has left a legacy within the Republican Party regarding how it will address social 
security reform. However, this type of reform was both unpopular with the public and failed 
to address any future solvency issues, nor did it address the growing concerns about 
retirement security. The main concern was to introduce privatised accounts into a 
government entitlement programme.46   
What I would add to the previous analysis is that Bush never intended to address the 
solvency of social security. His attempt to reform social security, as well as reforming 
Medicare, was politically motivated, and by taking advantage of the doubts about the long 
                                                          
44Robert Draper, Dead Certain: The Presidency of George W. Bush (New York: Free Press, 2007), 293-
294. 
45Lawrence J. Grossback, David A.M. Peterson and James A. Stimson, Mandate Politics (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 43-50, 179-189. 
46Christine E. Weller and Amanda M. Logan, “President Bush’s Legacy on Social Security”, in 
Perspectives on the Legacy of George W. Bush (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2009), eds. Michael Orlov 
Grossman and Ronald Eric Matthews Jr., 96-119. For more, also see: Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, Off 
Center: The Republican Revolution and the Erosion of American Democracy, with a new afterword (New 
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term stability of social security he attempted to offer a conservative Republican solution, 
which was to diminish, as much as possible, the state’s role in this social insurance 
programme. An agenda that journalist Michael Hiltzik depicts as “the plot against Social 
Security”.47   
In essence, Bush was much more open to a compromised solution with Medicare 
than with social security. He wanted to privatise social security in a way that was more 
ideologically driven than Medicare. In the end, it cost support from centrists within both 
parties, whereas with Medicare he received just enough support to pass the legislation.48    
There is an ongoing debate, which asks whether what Bush did as president – 
especially to Medicare and social security, but also to tax cuts, education, social issues and 
the war on terror – did or did not adhere to Reagan’s legacy.49   
Bush’s Conservatism: “Red George” or Reagan’s Heir?           
Lou Cannon and Carl Cannon in Reagan’s Disciple argue that Bush is Reagan’s 
legatee, especially on issues such as “tax and trade policies, immigration issues, and judicial 
                                                          
47Michael A. Hiltzik, The Plot Against Social Security: How the Bush Plan Is Endangering Our Financial 
Future (New York: HarperCollinsPublishers, 2005).  
48Sixteen House Democrats and 11 Senate Democrats voted for the final bill, whilst this is not a large 
number it does illustrate that this bill had some crossover appeal. The vote tally is from Office of the Clerk, 
U.S. House of Representatives, 108th Congress, “Final Vote Results for Roll Call 669”, 
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2003/roll669.xml (accessed 25 July 2014); and U.S. Senate, 108th Congress, Roll 
Call Vote 459, 
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=108&session=1&vote=
00459 (accessed 25 July 2014). Although, the level of support in the Senate was much less than the original 
version that was supported by Sen. Ted Kennedy (D-MA) and opposed by many conservative Republicans. For 
more on this point, see: Sinclair, “Living (and Dying?) by the Sword”, 177-179.     
49Reagan’s legacy is also argued to have been turned into a myth. For more, see: Will Bunch, Tear 
Down This Myth: How the Reagan Legacy Has Distorted Our Politics and Haunts Our Future (New York: Free 
Press, 2009); John W. Sloan, “The Economic Costs of Reagan Mythology,” in Deconstructing Reagan: 
Conservative Mythology and America’s Fortieth President (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2007), eds. Kyle Longley, 
Jeremy D. Mayer, Michael Schaller and John W. Sloan, 41-69; and Michael Espinoza, “Myth, Memory and the 
Reagan Legacy: Taxes and the GOP”, 49th Parallel 31 (Spring 2013): 1-39, 
http://www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue31/Espinoza.htm (accessed 28 January 2014). 
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appointments” and budget deficits.50 On the issue of social security, however, they believe 
that he was more determined to strive for a grand solution instead of compromising to help 
defuse a heated political fight between the parties.51 
Amongst others, conservative economist and former Reagan administration official 
Bruce Bartlett offers an opposing narrative that Bush “is an imposter, a pretend 
conservative” in much the same manner as Richard Nixon.52 He considers Bush’s tax cuts, 
trade policy, prescription drug benefit and failure to reform social security as policies that 
went against the Reagan legacy.53 Journalists John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge 
argue that those who hold a viewpoint similar to Bartlett may become prone to view Bush as 
“Red George”, due to his engagement “in a bold experiment: to see whether programs that 
were created by liberals from the 1930s to the 1970s can be reshaped in a conservative 
fashion”.54 So if Bush has betrayed Reagan’s legacy as some suggest, what has happened to 
conservatism?   
Conservative historian Gregory Schneider suggests that big government 
conservatism “has moved conservatism in the public mind far away from its original small 
government principles. On a majority of issues it is hard to see Bush as a conservative, yet 
the equation of Bush with conservatism echoes in the public’s mind and will hasten the 
                                                          
50Lou Cannon and Carl M. Cannon, Reagan’s Disciple: George W. Bush’s Troubled Quest for a 
Presidential Legacy (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008), 38-40, 304.    
51Ibid., 38, 84, 253-254, 292-293, 305. For more on Reagan and social security reform, consult: 
Martha Derthick and Steven M. Teles, “Riding the Third Rail: Social Security Reform”, in The Regan Presidency: 
Pragmatic Conservatism and Its Legacies (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003), eds. W. Elliot Brownlee 
and Hugh Davis Graham, 182-208; Lichtenstein, “Ideology and Interest on the Social Policy Home Front”, 187-
189; Sean Wilentz, The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974-2008 (New York: Harper Perennial, 2009), 149, 169, 
204; Béland and Waddan, The Politics of Policy Change, 129-132; and Béland, Social Security, 149-162.  
52Bruce R. Bartlett, Imposter: How George W. Bush Bankrupted America and Betrayed the Reagan 
Legacy (New York: Doubleday, 2006), 1.   
53Ibid., 16-19.    
54John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, The Right Nation: Why America is Different (London: 
Penguin Books, 2005), 259.  
196 
 
speed at which the Reagan conservatism crumbles”. In this regard, Bush may have been 
burdened by Reagan’s legacy.55 On the other hand, Schneider also acknowledges that as a 
movement,  
Conservatives continue to face difficulties over what their ideas stand for and what 
their legacy is in the new century. Conservatism continues to be remarkably protean 
and conservatives have altered their ideas, changed their perspectives, and altered 
their movement’s history over the course of the twentieth century. Yet the current 
conservative identity crisis is a severe one and is testing the will of both politicized 
conservatives to stay the course in the pursuit of smaller government and low taxes, 
as well as the conservative intellectuals to have faith in a restoration of the primacy 
of Western culture in an increasingly fragmented and multicultural society. What 
emerges from this identity crisis will, for all practical purposes, bear little 
resemblance (on most levels) to the conservatism that preceded it. But if history 
should teach us anything it is that conservatives have been at this point before – 
repeatedly – in what turned out to be the conservative century.56  
As his analysis suggests, pragmatism was the mould that helped to shape and drive 
conservative Republicanism from the periphery to the mainstream of American politics – a 
pragmatism that has also shaped how to combat the New Deal legacy. 
Although Bush and many conservative Republicans claim to be following in 
Reagan’s shadow, Reagan was more pragmatic than they were during the Republican 
controlled 104th Congress and during the four years of complete Republican control of both 
the executive and legislative branches from 2003-2006. Of course, when Reagan governed 
he did not have such a luxury and was thus more reliant on reaching out across the aisle to 
compromise with Democrats. Bush also sought bipartisanship on some occasions, as with 
Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) over the educational reform initiative, the No Child Left 
Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB). However, his compromises with Democrats did not challenge 
                                                          
55Paul Kengor, “Reagan’s Legacy, Bush’s Burden”, in The Enduring Reagan (Lexington, University 
Press of Kentucky, 2009), ed. Charles W. Dunn, 93-117.   
56Gregory L. Schneider, The Conservative Century: From Reaction to Revolution (Lanham: Rowman & 
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the New Deal and its ongoing legacy in nearly the same fashion as with Medicare and social 
security.57   
Bush may be Reagan’s Disciple in the ways mentioned by Cannon and Cannon, but 
he was also following in the footsteps of Herbert Hoover. Fred Barnes in Rebel-in-Chief 
offers a perspective on Bush which differs in some regards from that of Cannon and Cannon. 
He considers that Bush is not a “typical conservative” but instead is a new conservative, a 
big government conservative who “favors an activist federal government” that will uphold 
conservative Republican values.58 He claims that Bush’s attempt with social security reform, 
and to a lesser extent Medicare reform, was due to his vision for the “ownership society”.59 
Barnes suggests that Bush’s “opportunity society” built upon the theme of Newt Gingrich’s 
Conservative Opportunity Society formed in the early 1980s as a political strategy to turn the 
GOP from the minority me-too party into the majority conservative party.60 
He argues that conservatives who do not agree with Bush on his “opportunity 
society” for social security and Medicare do not realise that he was using “government 
policies to expand personal freedom, a conservative virtue. His reforms to create voluntary 
                                                          
57Whilst it is true that Reagan desired and achieved welfare reform, he did so working with a 
Democratic controlled Congress in 1988. However, the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act was repealed 
seventeen months later because of the backlash from upset seniors who were not informed of the increase 
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58Fred Barnes, Rebel-in-Chief: Inside the Bold and Controversial Presidency of George W. Bush (New 
York: Crown Forum, 2006), 157-158.  
59Ibid., 126. For a general overview of what Barnes describes as the “ownership society”, consult 
pages 125-139.  
60Ibid., 125-126.  
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investment accounts in Social Security and health savings accounts in Medicare aim to do 
that,” which help to summarise Bush’s conservatism “in three words and one institution”, 
“choice, accountability, and freedom. The institution is a strong national government. These 
themes hang together and constitute a sensible new conservatism”.61 In Barnes’ estimate, 
therefore, Bush is “best characterized as a strong-government conservative”. Moreover, 
“Given Bush’s influence”, he asserts, “many more conservatives will adopt that label and the 
ideology that goes with it”, because Bush’s brand of conservatism helped the Republican 
Party to be “America’s majority party for the first time since the 1920s”.62 
Barnes’ argument makes it seem that Bush’s conservatism was the next evolution of 
conservative Republicanism, beyond the Reagan and Gingrich brands. However, he does not 
give much, if any, coverage on conservative Republicans from Hoover to Goldwater, and 
instead starts the reflection on conservatives beginning with the Reagan presidency. This 
short-sighted approach did not acknowledge the gradual evolution that conservative 
Republicans have made over time. The majority Republican Party of the 1920s was very 
different from today’s GOP. Amongst conservatives, supporting limited government has 
gradually evolved to supporting a big government in certain domestic and foreign policy 
realms, but this support did not condone ballooning budgets. This approach has led to 
criticism within the conservative Republican ranks about Bush’s policies. For example, 
whilst libertarians may have supported his proposal for social security reform and his desire 
for tax cuts, they did not support a number of his policies, especially the war on terror and 
Medicare reform.63      
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Barnes’ argument can also lead one to conclude that Bush was offering his party the 
path to the future by challenging the ongoing legacy that spawned both social security and 
Medicare. However, in order for this to happen the GOP would become a hybrid party of 
sorts, part Republican Party of 1928, and part of the Democratic Party from the Roosevelt to 
Johnson era. The conservative led GOP would use state power to make America more 
compliant to free-market principles. Thus in essence, Barnes argues that, domestically, 
Bush’s role was to lead conservative Republicans to offer the complete opposite to that of 
liberal Democrats, using state power to deliver more economic freedom from government 
via the free-market, whilst also using state power to mandate less freedom from government 
on social values.   
Barnes’s defence of Bush ignites a lot of controversy within the conservative elite.64 
Steven Slivinski, of the Cato Institute, argues against the perspective of those who defend 
Bush’s policies, such as Fred Barnes and David Brooks of the New York Times. He asserts: 
“The first controversial notion here is that the size of government doesn’t matter. That’s 
automatically something many small-government conservatives would take umbrage with, 
and rightly so. There’s a moral argument to be made in defense of smaller government. 
Every increase in the size of government beyond a few core functions does, by definition, 
                                                          
64Two other conservative elites who argued against Bush’s policies were Pat Buchanan and Richard 
Viguerie. For more on their critiques, consult: Patrick J. Buchanan, Where the Right Went Wrong: How 
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translate into a decrease in personal liberty in some way”.65 In particular, he asserts that 
Barnes’ argument  
is hardly a new idea. It’s a good one, though. The intellectual case for just this sort of 
market-driven reform has been constructed by small-government think-tanks during 
a period of close to three decades, and some of these reforms have been implemented 
and been phenomenally successful in other countries. . . .  
The major downside, however, is that Bush’s political strategy hasn’t worked. 
What Barnes suggests is a political winner – coupling the reform with an increase in 
spending to make the package palatable to all ideological persuasions – has 
backfired. What we’ve ended up with instead is more government and no reform to 
speak of.66   
Is Slivinski suggesting that if Bush succeeded in reforming social security then 
Barnes’ argument would have been valid – conservatives would learn to live with the parts 
of Bush’s accomplishments they disagree on and learn to praise the accomplishments they 
adore? One conservative Republican who would have had to face that dilemma is Rep. Mike 
Pence (R-IN), who opposed Bush on Medicare and No Child Left Behind, but fully 
supported the president on social security, tax cuts and social issues.67     
Although Pence was not arguing against Barnes specifically, he did not agree with 
big government conservatism. For example, he voiced harsh criticism against the expansion 
of Medicare by stating that “a universal drug benefit could . . . usher in the beginning of 
socialized medicine in America”, where “Congress threatens our nation’s fiscal stability, the 
private prescription plans of millions of seniors and the survival of our free-market health 
care system”.68  Another is after the 2004 elections, when he declared:  
In the wake of the historic landslide on November 2, American conservatives must 
steer government back to the limited-government course charted by Ronald Reagan 
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Government”, Human Events 60, no.39 (15 November 2004): 1, 8, Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost 
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when he took the helm of state in 1981. We must rediscover the freedom agenda of 
less government and greater fiscal discipline. We must be strong and courageous and 
do the work knowing that this cause will prevail. For the cause of freedom is not our 
story but His – the author and finisher of our faith and our freedom.69 
However, Daniel Casse, former managing editor of The Public Interest70 and George H.W. 
Bush administration official, is a business, politics and policy pundit who, in his support of 
Barnes’ rationale, argues: 
Barnes’ pithy formulation . . . does convey accurately enough the direction of ‘Bush 
conservatism’ – and it does undeniably comport with political reality. . . .  
Nor . . . should one forget that Reagan’s two terms in office were full of 
contradictions of their own. Reagan’s speeches may have excoriated Congress for its 
failure to send him balanced budgets, but his (admirable) build-up of defense 
expenditures made such a balanced budget impossible. His embrace of supply-side 
tax cuts was countered by the tax increases he signed in 1982 – at the time, the 
largest in American history. . . .    
. . . The ‘Bush revolution’ may still not have fully taken off, but if the 
Republican party is truly to remain the party of ideas, then it has no choice but to 
embrace and explain a ‘preemptive’ program modelled more or less along the lines 
that Bush has laid out. If it is to succeed, that program should always remain 
cognizant of the ideals Ronald Reagan pursued in launching the modern conservative 
era 25 years ago. But it need not be bounded by them, either.71   
Casse’s argument both supports Barnes’s argument and refutes Pence’s claim of Reagan’s 
ideological purity. However, Slivinki’s argument is accurate in that Bush’s reform plans for 
both Medicare and social security did not deliver a new GOP majority.72 Although in future 
that may indeed be the case with the likes of Rep. Paul Ryan (R-WI) – who supported Bush 
on many issues, including Medicare and social security – offering similar ideas as Chairman 
of the House Budget Committee in the 112th and 113th Congress.73    
                                                          
69Pence, “House Conservatives Steer Course For Return to Limited Government”.  
70The Public Interest (1960-2005) was a neo-conservative magazine co-founded by Irving Kristol and 
Daniel Bell. Casse was the managing editor from 1985 to 1987.   
71Daniel Casse, “What Is a Bush Republican?” Commentary 121, no. 3 (March 2006): 43-44, Academic 
Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed 6 December 2011).      
72This will be analysed in more detail in the next section.   
73For more on why Ryan support Bush’s agenda on Medicare and social security, see: Representative 
Paul Ryan, Thomas (Library of Congress), Congressional Record, 108th Congress, 10 September 2003, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/LegislativeData.php?&n=BSS&c=108 (accessed 9 October 2012); Thomas 
(Library of Congress), Congressional Record, 109th Congress, 27 April 2005, 
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On the other hand, most within the conservative elite supported Bush’s social 
policies, especially his policies on stem cell research and the Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA). Many conservatives favour more government involvement on social-moral issues, 
such as abortion, gay rights, immigration and school prayer.74 From the conservative 
Republican perspective, this is one area where Bush was more successful than Reagan. 
Political scientist James Farney posits that the social views of George W. Bush established 
that he “gave more rhetorical recognition . . . [to] social conservatives and policy changes 
than any previous president, even Ronald Reagan. . . . In short, by 2008 the transformation 
of the American right that began with Goldwater in 1964 and that had taken lasting steps 
with Reagan and the Moral Majority in the 1980s had come to fruition”.75 Bush was also 
more successful than Reagan with tax cuts.76 Both cut taxes, but Reagan also raised taxes on 
numerous occasions, whereas Bush only cut taxes, and most of the tax cuts have become 
permanent.77  
                                                          
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/LegislativeData.php?&n=BSS&c=109 (accessed 9 October 2012). For more on 
Ryan’s House Budget plans, refer to: Paul Ryan, “The Path to Prosperity: Restoring America’s Promise”, 
http://budget.house.gov/fy2012budget/; “The Path to Prosperity: A Blueprint for American Renewal”, 
http://budget.house.gov/fy2013prosperity/; “The Path to Prosperity: A Responsible, Balanced Budget”, 
http://budget.house.gov/fy2014/; and “The Path to Prosperity: Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Resolution”, 
http://budget.house.gov/fy2015/ (all were accessed 10 July 2014).         
74However, Waddan argues that conservatives have not reached a general consensus on social 
issues. For more, see: Waddan, “Bush and Big Government Conservatism”, 168-169. I argue that conservative 
Republicanism has evolved and the majority view is one that favours a stronger government role in social 
issues. I am not inferring that every conservative takes this position but overall it is the majority view. 
However, others consider social values conservatism to be on the wane, with liberal values dominating 
America. For more, consult: John Dombrink, The Twilight of Social Conservatism: American Cultural Values in 
the Obama Era (New York: New York University Press, 2015); and David T. Courtwright, No Right Turn: 
Conservative Politics in Liberal America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010).  
75James Farney, Social Conservatives and Party Politics in Canada and the United States (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2012), 73-80.  
76Popular conservative Republican rhetoric maintains that Reagan never raised taxes. This belief is an 
essential component of the Reagan myth.  
77For more on the lasting effects of Bush’s tax cuts on Obama’s first term, see: Tim Conlan and Paul 
Posner, “A Solution for All Seasons: The Politics of Tax Reduction in the Bush Administration”, in Building 
Coalitions, Making Policy (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 2012), eds. Martin A. Levin, Daniel DiSalvo, and 
Martin M. Shapiro, 205-210; and beyond, consult: Zachary A. Goldfarb, “The Legacy of the Bush Tax Cuts, In 
Four Charts”, 2 January 2013, Washington Post Wonkblog,  
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Regarding presidents and ideology, the Bush tax cuts adhered to Reaganomics. 
Political scientist Thomas Langston considers “ideology” to have been “the driving force 
behind Reaganomics”,78 an ideology that has remained influential in American party 
politics.79 Social scientists Tim Conlan and Paul Posner argue: “Tax cuts were the 
centerpiece of George. W. Bush’s domestic agenda”, and were mirrored to emulate the 
success that the GOP associates with to Reagan’s tax legacy.80 Economic historian W. Elliot 
Brownlee argues that Reagan “wanted to cut everyone’s taxes, regardless of whether or not 
any particular economic theory supported him, and regardless of whether or not the cuts 
worsened the deficit”.81 He also went on to state: “To be sure, both Reagan and [George W.] 
Bush hoped their tax cuts would reduce discretionary spending. But Bush seemed prepared 
to go further and use tax cutting as a vehicle for containing or reducing the entitlement 
programs of Social Security and Medicare”.82  
                                                          
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/02/the-legacy-of-the-bush-tax-cuts-in-four-
charts/ (accessed 29 January 2014). 
78Thomas S. Langston, Ideologues and Presidents: From the New Deal to the Reagan Revolution 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1992), 137. Langston argues this was also true for the Roosevelt 
administration’s pursuit for the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Johnson administration’s pursuit of “a 
Model Cities Program”. For more, see pages 70-134. And Regarding Bush’s foreign policy, Langston highlights 
how neoconservatives in the Bush administration were very influential in shaping the ideological response to 
Iraq as part of the War on Terror. For more, consult: Thomas S. Langston, “Ideology and Ideologues in the 
Modern Presidency”, Presidential Studies Quarterly 42, no. 4 [December 2012]: 745-746, 749-750, 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1741-5705.2012.04015.x/pdf (accessed 3 February 2014). 
79Iwan Morgan, The Age of Deficits: Presidents and Unbalanced Budgets from Jimmy Carter to George 
W. Bush (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009), 118; Andrew E. Busch, “Ronald Reagan and Economic 
Policy”, in The Reagan Legacy: Assessing the Man and His Legacy (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
2005), eds. Paul Kengor and Peter Schweizer, 41-42; M. Stephen Weatherford and Lorraine M. McDonnell, 
“Ideology and Economic Policy”, in Looking Back on the Reagan Presidency (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1990), ed. Larry Berman, 148-151; and Robert M. Collins, Transforming America: Politics and 
Culture in the Reagan Years (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 87-91.  
80Conlan and Posner, “A Solution for all Seasons”, 181, 183.  
81W. Elliot Brownlee, Federal Taxation in America: A Short History (Washington, DC: Woodrow 
Wilson Center Press, 2004), 148.  
82Ibid., 217-218. For more on taxes and deficits during the presidencies of Reagan and Bush, consult: 
Morgan, The Age of Deficits, 76-121, 206-249; and Brownlee, Federal Taxation in America, 147-177, 217-248. 
For more on Bush’s tax rhetoric, refer to: Mark A. Smith, The Right Talk: How Conservatives Transformed the 
Great Society Into the Economic Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 145-148, 174-175.  
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In terms of ideology, some, like Waddan, maintain that Reagan was more ideological 
than Bush.83 Others, like historian Nelson Lichtenstein, argue that ideology formed part of 
the core of Bush’s entire domestic policy.84 Although both consider Bush to have posed a 
greater threat to the New Deal legacy, it is important to acknowledge how four-party politics 
hindered Reagan. During the Reagan presidency, conservatives were split between the 
Democratic and Republican parties, instead of united in a single party. Bush, on the other 
hand, had a congressional Republican Party that was controlled by conservatives, and 
became increasingly so throughout his two terms. Yet both made an effort to use the 
presidency as a way to strengthen the GOP.85      
When comparing Bush to Reagan, political scientist Stephen Skowronek’s argument 
sits alongside Barnes. Skowronek regards Bush as an “orthodox innovator” who operated 
within the dominant conservative regime that began with the Reagan presidency.86 And 
when compared to Reagan and Clinton, Bush had “neither the repudiative authority of a 
Ronald Reagan nor the mongrel license of a Bill Clinton [via preemption]. In contrast to 
both of these, he crafted a political stance that renounced flexibility in the name of 
commitment”.87 A stance that Skowronek calls “Reagan Plus” and moreover, 
                                                          
83Waddan, “Bush and Big Government Conservatism”, 167. 
84Lichtenstien, “Ideology and Interest on the Social Policy Home Front”, 169-198. 
85For more on Bush, Reagan and party building, consider: Sidney M. Milkis and Jesse H. Rhodes, 
“George W. Bush, the Republican Party, and the ‘New’ American Party System”, Perspectives on Politics 5, no. 
3 (September 2007): 461-488, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20446498 (accessed 11 July 2014). For more on 
presidents and party building, refer to: Daniel J. Galvin, Presidential Party Building: Dwight D. Eisenhower to 
George W. Bush (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).    
86Stephen Skowronek, Presidential Leadership in Political Time: Reprise and Reappraisal, 2nd ed. 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 132-149. However, others such as Curt Nichols and Adam S. 
Myers, posit that Reagan’s reconstruction was not as successful as Skowronek states is the case, some success 
yes, but the entrenched welfare state “might make reconstructive failure more likely”. For more, refer to: 
Curt Nichols and Adam S. Myers, “Exploiting the Opportunity for Reconstructive Leadership: Presidential 
Responses to Enervated Political Regimes” American Politics Research 38, no. 5 [19 May 2010]: 809-819, 829-
830, http://apr.sagepub.com/content/38/5/806 (accessed 27 January 2014).  
87Skowronek, Presidential Leadership in Political Time, 133-134. However, in terms of the War on 
Terror, Gerard N. Magliocca considers Bush’s actions to challenge the courts to have been reconstructive. For 
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hardly indifferent to the Reagan orthodoxy: On matters of taxation, defense, 
regulation, and family values the stand is ironclad. . . . however, compassionate 
conservatism was more than a simple return to orthodoxy. Among other things, Bush 
has added federally supported education programs, prescription-drug entitlements, 
faith-based welfare provisions . . . [as well as] a seemingly progressive initiative to 
“save” Social Security, and a moderate proposal for immigration reform. . . . In this, 
Bush did not offer a different order of things than Reagan had promised; rather, he 
has suggested the possibility of a higher ordering of those same values.88    
However, Reagan’s most important contribution was his rhetoric, which both challenged and 
ended the liberal dominance as the prevailing political narrative – but did not challenge the 
New Deal state.89 Moreover, a GOP congressional majority in the post-1994 four-party 
dynamic also enabled Bush to achieve more legislative success than Reagan.90 
On the other hand, some like political scientist Nicol C. Rae, posit the idea that the 
Bush presidency may signify the end of the dominant conservative regime articulated by 
Skowronek – making Bush more in the line with Jimmy Carter and Herbert Hoover as a 
disjunctive president rather than an orthodox innovator, and ending “the Age of Reagan”.91 
                                                          
more, see: Gerard N. Magliocca, “George W. Bush in Political Time: The Janus Presidency”, Law & Social 
Inquiry 34, no.2 [Spring 2009]: 483-486, onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-4469.2009.01153.x/pdf 
(accessed 25 January 2014).  
88Skowronek, Presidential Leadership in Political Time, 134-135. 
89Ibid., 98; and also Milkis and Rhodes, “George W. Bush, the Republican Party, and the ‘New’ 
American Party System”, 465.   
90Genovese, Belt and Lammers, The President and Domestic Policy, 18-19, 25-27, 100-111, 127-135, 
347-350, 360-364; and Richard S. Conley, “The Legislative Presidency in Political Time: Unified Government, 
Divided Government, and Presidential Leverage in Congress”, in Rivals for Power: Presidential-Congressional 
Relations, 4th ed. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), ed. James A. Thurber, 164-171, 178. 
91Nicol C. Rae, “The Bush Presidency in Historical Context: The Limitations of the Partisan 
Presidency”, in Ambition and Division: Legacies of the George W. Bush Presidency (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2009), ed. Steven E. Schier, 33-35. Another is Matthew Laing, who argues that Obama 
attempted to create his own reconstructive political alignment after the Bush presidency, in much the same 
way as Reagan did during his presidency. For more, consult: Matthew Laing, “Towards a Pragmatic 
Presidency? Exploring the Waning of Political Time”, Polity 44, no. 2 [April 2012]: 252-254, 
http://www.palgrave-journals.com/polity/journal/v44/n2/abs/pol201124a.html (accessed 27 January 2014). 
That may be the case, but if it was, then Obama’s attempt – to this point – has not succeeded. For more on 
Bush and the end of “the Age of Reagan”, see: Wilentz, The Age of Reagan, 454-458; Morgan, The Age of 
Deficits, 247; or for more on Bush and the end of modern conservatism, see: Farber, The Rise and Fall of 
Modern Conservatism, 207-217, 256.   
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Others like politics scholar Jon Herbert support Skowronek’s overall argument.92 Yet social 
scientists Katherine Newman and Elisabeth Jacobs, also argue that the Bush tax cuts were 
continuing the conservative Republican politics of disjunction in order to “revers[e] the 
legacy of the New Deal, rolling back government efforts at social engineering wherever 
possible”.93  
Nonetheless, as Skowronek illustrates, Bush’s compassionate conservatism and 
opportunity society went beyond mere rhetoric by using government as a means for 
conservative policymaking, with the aim of forging a conservative Republican electoral 
coalition that could rival its New Deal order precursor.94 
Bush, Big Government Conservatism and the Quest for a New Majority 
Kevin Phillips, in The Emerging Republican Majority, states: “the election of 
Richard M. Nixon as President of the United States in November, 1968, bespoke the end of 
the New Deal Democratic hegemony and the beginning of a new era in American politics”.95 
This, however, did not come to fruition.96 What is more apt is the analysis of Richard 
                                                          
92Yet Hebert pays more “attention to the need for coalition building” than Skowronek does. For 
more, see: Jon Herbert, “The Struggles of an ‘Orthodox Innovator’”, in Crisis of Conservatism? The Republican 
Party, the Conservative Movement, & American Politics After Bush (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 
eds. Joel D. Aberbach and Gillian Peele, 151-177. 
93For more, consult: Katherine S. Newman and Elisabeth S. Jacobs, Who Cares? Public Ambivalence 
and Government Activism from the New Deal to the Second Gilded Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2010), 4, 9, 113, 121, 133. The quote can be found on page 4. 
94Sidney Milkis and Jesse Rhodes share a similar view; Milkis and Rhodes, “George W. Bush, the 
Republican Party, and the ‘New’ American Party System”, 468, 470-471.  
95Kevin P. Phillips, The Emerging Republican Majority (New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1970), 25. 
This combined Nixon’s vote with that of southern Democrat George Wallace [by way of the American 
Independent Party] – both of which Phillips argues was a vote against “Democratic liberalism”. Although 
Phillips worked for the Nixon administration, he, much like Pat Buchanan, is not a supporter of George W. 
Bush (nor that of the Bush family dynasty), including “Texanomics” and “compassionate conservatism”. For 
more, see: Kevin P. Phillips, American Dynasty: Aristocracy, Fortune, and the Politics of Deceit in the House of 
Bush (New York: Viking, 2004), 111-148. 
96Phillips almost opted to call the book by a different name, “The Emerging Conservative Majority”. 
For more, consult: Kevin P. Phillips, Post-Conservative America: People, Politics & Ideology in a Time of Crisis 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1983), 53. For more on Nixon and his attempt to build a new majority, see: Robert 
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Scammon and Ben Wattenberg in The Real Majority where they argue a majority of 
Americans sat in the centre, with a combination of economic liberalism and social 
conservatism.97 Whilst Phillips agrees with the thesis of Scammon and Wattenberg, he also 
went on to argue in Post-Conservative America that the Republican move away from 
economic liberalism during the first Reagan administration – which differed from Nixon – 
was too radical, especially when combined with social conservatism, to become the New 
Majority party.98  
Bush, depending on one’s perspective, either attempted to challenge Phillips’ 
argument with a combination of economic and social conservatism that was more radical 
than Reagan’s, or he used a mix of economic liberalism and social conservatism that 
attempted to corroborate Scammon and Wattenberg’s thesis. 
What Bush was able to benefit from had eluded the GOP since the first two years of 
the Eisenhower presidency, 1953-1954, control of both the presidency and Congress. More 
importantly, however, he attempted to re-establish the GOP as the dominant party, which 
was previously the case in 1928 with Herbert Hoover’s presidential election – lost after 
Democrats won a slim House majority after the 1930 midterm elections, and further 
buttressed with Franklin Roosevelt’s defeat of Hoover in 1932.99 Such an opportunity was 
                                                          
Mason, Richard Nixon and the Quest for a New Majority (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2004).  
97Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg, The Real Majority (1970; repr., New York: Primus, 
1992), the new 1992 introduction, 72-81, 279-305. 
98Phillips, Post-Conservative America. Phillips also worries that Bush and extreme social conservatism 
may turn the party into a “Republican Theocracy”. For more, consult: Kevin P. Phillips, American Theocracy: 
The Peril of Radical Religion, Oil, and Borrowed Money in the 21st Century (New York: Viking, 2006), 208-217, 
232-250, 348, 353-357. For more on the growing influence of social conservatism within the GOP, consider: 
Ryan Sager, The Elephant in the Room: Evangelicals, Libertarians, and the Battle to Control the Republican 
Party (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2006); as well as Micklethwait and Wooldridge, The Right Nation, 262-
264, 308-312. 
99For a more in-depth analysis on how the Republican Party tried to overcome Democrats as the 
majority party, refer to: Robert Mason, The Republican Party and American Politics from Hoover to Reagan 
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partially accomplished once the GOP won control of Congress in the 2002 midterm 
elections, and gained momentum with Bush’s re-election in 2004, but was done away with 
when Democrats won control of Congress in the 2006 midterm elections.100 His attempt at a 
new majority centred on expanding support for the GOP via “compassionate conservatism” 
and “the opportunity society” – which were also referred to as big government 
conservatism.101  
Conservative political scientist Andrew Busch highlights how Bush’s domestic 
record was successful, but the nature of its success is up for debate. Although the successes 
and failures varied on the partisan scale (high, moderate, low), Busch concludes that “In the 
end, while not devoid of significant victories, compassionate conservatism failed to 
fundamentally transform the nation’s domestic policy or its politics as Bush had hoped. 
Instead, Bush appears fated to have served as merely a transitional president”.102 However, 
                                                          
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); as well as Robert Mason and Iwan Morgan, “The Ongoing 
Republican Search for a New Majority since 1980”, in Seeking a New Majority: The Republican Party and 
American Politics, 1960-1980 (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2013), eds. Robert Mason and Iwan 
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100For more, see: Philip Davies, “A New Republican Majority”? in Right On? Political Change and 
Continuity in George W. Bush’s America (London: Institute for the Study of the Americas, 2006), eds. Iwan 
Morgan and Philip Davies, 184-203; Micklethwait and Wooldridge, The Right Nation, 400-414; Critchlow, The 
Conservative Ascendancy, 280-289; and Wilentz, The Age of Reagan, 440-449. Furthermore, political scientist 
Andrew Taylor considers Bush’s attempt to turn the GOP into the majority party was a futile attempt to build 
upon the party’s strength as “a ruling party”; for more, consult: Andrew J. Taylor, Elephant’s Edge: The 
Republicans as a Ruling Party (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005). I, however, consider Taylor to be giving the GOP 
too much credit on domestic policy. The difference between Bush and congressional Republicans in key 
domestic areas, such as immigration, social security and NCLB are significant aspects that cannot be 
overlooked. This will even put the ruling party status in jeopardy. Although Taylor combines Republican 
success at the local, state and federal levels, whereas in this thesis I focus mainly on the federal level.  
101In this section I will largely focus on compassionate conservatism. Refer back to the previous two 
sections for more on the opportunity society, also see: Waddan, “Bush and Big Government Conservatism”, 
169-172. For more on compassionate conservatism, consider: Marvin N. Olasky, Compassionate 
Conservatism: What It Is, What It Does, and How It Can Transform America (New York: Free Press, 2000). 
102Andrew E. Busch, “George W. Bush’s Domestic Policy Agenda”, in Testing the Limits: George W. 
Bush and the Imperial Presidency (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), eds. Mark J. Rozell and Gleaves 
Whitney, 66-67. For an early appraisal of Bush’s compassionate conservatism up to 2003, consult: Gary 
Mucciaroni and Paul J. Quirk, “Deliberations of a ‘Compassionate Conservative’”, in The George W. Bush 
Presidency: Appraisals and Prospects (Washington, DC: GQ Press, 2004), eds. Colin Campbell and Bert A. 
Rockman, 158-190.  
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no matter one’s outlook on Bush, his tax cuts – especially the 2001 tax cuts – have left a 
lasting legacy; a way to starve the beast of big government,103 an outlook that is strongly 
supported amongst the conservative elite104 as a way to confront the New Deal legacy.105 
One possible transition is for conservative Republicans to embrace expanding 
government’s influence to enforce the concept of individual responsibility in both economic 
and cultural spheres. Instances of joint support amongst Bush and congressional Republicans 
included two tax cuts, 2001 and 2003, and on socio-cultural issues, such as a partial birth 
abortion ban, restricting embryonic stem cell research and the right to life debate in the Terri 
Schiavo affair. Yet he was unsuccessful in winning congressional conservative support for 
more government as a way to counter big government liberalism – as well as supporting 
immigration reform to broaden the GOP’s electoral appeal to Hispanics, which is something 
that has eluded Republicans overall,106 with Texas serving as an exception to the rule.107  
                                                          
103Waddan, “Bush and Big Government Conservatism”, 172-173; and Wilentz, The Age of Reagan, 
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Immigration Politics: From Proposition 187 to George W. Bush (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).   
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Aside from Busch, Hebert is another who acknowledges that “Bush’s particular 
brand of conservatism, combining “the ownership society” and “compassionate 
conservatism,” involved ideological contradictions that the maturing conservative movement 
could not absorb”.108 Moreover, Bush’s attempt to build a new GOP majority followed in the 
mistakes of the Republican controlled Congress during the Clinton presidency. Both misread 
electoral successes as a mandate for their political agendas, but Bush’s big government 
conservatism fractured the Republican Party, unlike the GOP Congress in the mid to late 
1990s.109  
Although I consider Bush to be a conservative Republican, his conservatism, which 
has been influenced by his experience as Governor of Texas,110 embraced ways to expand 
the GOP appeal to Hispanics, many of whom tend to be more economically liberal and 
socially conservative, especially on the abortion issue.111 Thus their views fit into Scammon 
and Wattenberg’s thesis. Bush’s attempt at immigration reform would have helped to win 
over more Hispanic support to the GOP, but this notion does not currently exist amongst 
congressional conservative Republicans.112 This impasse was an example of four-party 
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politics, where Bush’s position was to the left of his congressional party.113 This view has 
carried over to the Obama presidency, especially after the GOP won control of the House in 
the 2010 midterm elections.114 This is part of the divide that currently exists within four-
party politics, which is especially true of congressional conservative Republicans who reside 
in the old Confederate States of America where the Hispanic population is not yet at the 
same level as California or Texas,115 and still rely on the ‘angry white male vote’.116 
Conclusion  
This chapter addresses the difficulties in how best to address entitlements and to 
utilise political advantages. A GOP that controlled both the presidency and Congress from 
2003-2006 was grappling with how to accomplish such a feat. A unifying theme for 
conservative Republicanism has been what it opposes, rather than what unites its members. 
They are opposed to the New Deal and its ongoing political legacy, but are not united in how 
to confront it. It is easier to unite against a common foe like Bill Clinton or a Democratic 
controlled presidency and Congress, which allows them to assert their conservative position 
versus a “liberal” position. In four-party politics, it is far easier to label Democrats as liberals 
since on the whole they align to the left of the GOP - how far to the left is irrelevant.  
                                                          
113Wroe, The Republican Party and Immigration Politics, 187-217; and David Plotke, “Moving Right? 
Bush’s Decline and American Conservatism”, Dissent 53, no. 3 (Summer 2006): 33-34, 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/dissent/v053/53.3.plotke.pdf (accessed 24 May 2014).   
114However, when immigration is not a major election issue, as was the case in the 2010 Florida 
Senate election between Marco Rubio (R) and Charlie Crist (I), conservatives and Hispanics can find common 
cause; Ronald T. Libby, Purging the Republican Party: Tea Party Campaigns and Elections (Lanham: Lexington 
Books, 2014), 103-121. Nevertheless, it is important to note the Florida is home to many Cuban-Americans 
and they support the GOP more than any other Hispanic Demographic. 
115For more on America’s Hispanic population demographics, refer to: Anna Brown and Mark Hugo 
Lopez, “Mapping the Latino Population, By State, County and City”, Pew Research [Center] Hispanic Trends 
Project, 29 August 2013, http://www.pewhispanic.org/2013/08/29/mapping-the-latino-population-by-state-
county-and-city/ (accessed 1 September 2014).   
116Micklethwait and Wooldridge, The Right Nation, 250-253, 262-263; and Edsall, Building Red 
America, 39, 161-187. 
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However, when Democrats are in the minority, four-party politics takes on a different 
significance for the GOP. Within the party, whether it is between a Republican president and 
Congress, or the Senate and the House, the differences amongst them become magnified. 
And on issues where the Republican presidential and congressional parties were at odds, 
Bush’s views placed him to the left of Congress. 
Bush, however, was attempting to promote a conservative governing philosophy, but 
was criticised for championing big government conservatism instead of limited government 
conservatism. The trouble with this criticism is that many conservatives also support big 
government, as it gives them the power to uphold traditional moral values. Bush, along with 
the Gingrich and the GOP Congress during the 1990s, was far from perfect in his endeavour 
to use big government as a pragmatic approach. Yet conservatives have to come to terms 
with the reality that the American political system makes it difficult to achieve quick and 
radical change, in a way that is more feasible in a Parliamentary system. Furthermore, Tea 
Party Republicans in the 112th Congress also failed to adapt to this reality, causing their own 
leadership problems as they attempted to mount a challenge against Barack Hussein Obama, 
as well as a Democratic Senate majority.      
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“Red Fascism”? Obama’s First Term: Healthcare, the Tea Party and the Role 
of Government 
The younger generation probably doesn’t realize that the word socialism means and 
connotes a system that is profoundly un-American. Socialism has virtually disappeared from 
our national lexicon since the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) collapsed because 
of Ronald Reagan’s policies and the National Socialist (Nazi) Party was destroyed by the 
United States in World War II. . . . Socialism requires a totalitarian system – that gives the 
ruling gang the power to distribute the fruits of other people’s labor to its political pals. 
That is what is happening to the United States as President Obama proceeds with his goal of 
“Remaking America”. 
-Phyllis Schlafly1 
Conservatives – both within and beyond Congress – contend that the Democrats, and 
especially President Barack Obama, are increasing the size of government and “Remaking 
America” into a socialist country that will cause the public to become even more dependent 
on government than ever before. Phyllis Schlafly’s comment exemplifies this contemporary 
belief that Obama’s presidential agenda will result in an even more socialised America. 
Consideration must be given to how conservative rhetoric implies that Obama and 
Democratic policy initiatives are expanding the power of government, claiming it is un-
American and a threat to America itself. This rhetoric accentuates that big government is 
America’s enemy in much the same way as the “Evil Empire” was during the Cold War, as 
well as the Nazis during WWII. Similar to the way America defended itself against both 
totalitarian foes, conservatives – especially in Congress – must resist many, if not all, 
Democratic initiatives because they represent big government liberalism. Conservative 
Republicans are continuing Reagan’s ideological battle against a foreign adversary, but this 
particular conflict is domestic – a continuation of their war against the New Deal and its 
                                                          
1Phyllis Schlafly, “Obama Is Remaking America Into Socialism”, Human Events, 2 June 2009, 
http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=32095 (accessed 6 January 2011). 
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ongoing political legacy. Their strategy builds upon the conservative Republican theme that 
more taxation leads to less individual freedom and vice versa. 
The conservative strategy attempts to revive a time in American history when Nazi 
fascism and Soviet communism were both regarded as one and the same, and were the main 
threat to America. It is, however, important to note that this phenomenon has a long history. 
This allegation was also made by conservatives during the Clinton administration. Yet the 
framework behind the claims has become more significant as part of conservative rhetoric 
when taking on Obama himself, especially with regards to his race and religion, as well as 
the implications for the New Deal legacy.2          
Three questions this chapter will address are:  
1. How important is the socialist label to contemporary conservative rhetoric? 
2. How has the Tea Party intensified the conservative socialist critique since its 
emergence as a force in GOP politics?  
3. To what extent is Senator Jim DeMint (R-SC) a principal GOP rhetorician of 
socialism?  
Taxation is a theme interwoven into the above questions. Taxes played a vital role in 
the conservative opposition to the Affordable Care Act, the Tea Party and Medicare 
(entitlement) reform. The combination of the four is vital to the conservative Republican 
argument against big government – which they consider an assault against individual 
                                                          
2For more on Obama, race and religion, consult: Theda Skocpol and Vanessa Williamson, The Tea 
Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 68-70; Nicole 
Hemmer, “Shock Poll: Why Do So Many Republicans Think Obama Is a Socialist, a Muslim, or Even the Anti-
Christ?” Christian Science Monitor, 25 March 2010, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2010/0325/Shock-poll-Why-do-so-many-Republicans-
think-Obama-is-a-socialist-a-Muslim-or-even-the-anti-Christ (accessed 12 March 2013); as well as Christopher 
S. Parker and Matt A. Barreto, Change They Can’t Believe In: The Tea Party and Reactionary Politics in America 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 2, 7-9, 89, 95, 191-193, 197, 201, 209-210, 224, 253.  
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freedom via the New Deal and its ongoing political legacy. The conservative discourse 
against Obama and the Democratic Party is based on the premise that the growth of the 
American state is leading the country towards socialism, which it claims is turning America 
into a totalitarian state. The intent is provoke some fear, but mostly anger, toward 
Democratic ideals, as well as implying that the Republican alternative is the only way to 
save the country from this impending doom.    
“Red Fascism”? 
A vital element to conservative rhetoric can be traced back to World War II and the 
early Cold War periods. According to historians Les Adler and Thomas Paterson, at that 
time “many Americans blurred the ideological differences between Communism and fascism 
and tended to believe that totalitarian methods overrode the role of ideology in shaping 
political forms”, an ideology labelled as “Red Fascism”.3 I argue that the conservative elite 
employ these blurred differences to criticise Barack Obama and other Democrats on the size 
of government and the proper role it should play.4 However, conservatives have adapted the 
“Red Fascism” described by Adler and Paterson to fit into their attack against Democrats, 
asserting that many share a similar ideology with socialism. 
                                                          
3Les K. Adler and Thomas G. Paterson, “Red Fascism: The Merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia 
in the American Image of Totalitarianism, 1930’s – 1950’s, The American Historical Review 75, no. 4 (April 
1970): 1046-1064, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1852269 (accessed 24 September 2011). The quote is from 
page 1049. However, historian Thomas R. Maddux disagrees with Adler’s and Paterson’s argument by 
asserting that whilst socialism and fascism had differences there was no mistaking the similarities of the 
Russians and Nazis in the 1930s, they were both anti-Democratic totalitarian dictatorships. For more on this 
argument, see: Thomas R. Maddux, “Red Fascism, Brown Bolshevism: The American Image of Totalitarianism 
in the 1930s”, Historian 40 (November 1977): 85-103, 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/hisn.1977.40.issue-1/issuetoc (accessed 27 November 2012).  
4I consider the conservative elite to be a combination of those both inside and outside of Congress. 
Examples include individuals like Phyllis Schflay, Newt Gingrich and Dick Armey, and periodicals such as the 
National Review and Human Events, as well as think tanks like the Cato Institute and Heritage Foundation. 
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One example is Jonah Goldberg, who is the senior editor of the National Review 
online. Launched by William F. Buckley in 1955, this magazine looked to unite 
conservatives of all stripes – libertarian, traditionalist and anti-communist – in an effort 
launch the conservative revival as a legitimate alternative to the popular New Deal political 
order of the day. Goldberg states: “fascism, properly understood, is not a phenomenon of the 
right at all.  Instead, it is, and always has been, a phenomenon of the left. This fact – an 
inconvenient truth if there ever was one – is obscured in our time by the equally mistaken 
belief that fascism and communism are opposites. In reality, they are closely related, 
historical competitors for the same constituents”.5   
Goldberg goes on to speculate, “American Progressivism – the moralistic social 
crusade from which modern liberals proudly claim descent – is in some respects the major 
source of fascist ideas applied in Europe by Mussolini and Hitler. . . . The American fascist 
tradition is deeply bound up with the effort to “Europeanize” America and give it a 
“modern” state that can be harnessed to utopian ends”, which he labels as “liberal fascism”.6 
He also includes Lenin, Stalin and Trotsky in his analysis, as well as FDR, LBJ, Bill and 
Hillary Clinton, and Obama. He defines fascism as “a religion of the state”, one that “is 
totalitarian in that it views everything as political and holds that any action taken by the 
state is justified to achieve the common good”.7 The latter remark makes it possible for 
Goldberg to further claim that there are “many common features among New Deal 
liberalism, Italian Fascism, and German National Socialism”.8        
                                                          
5Jonah Goldberg, Liberal Fascism: The Secret History of the Left from Mussolini to the Politics of 
Meaning (London: Penguin Books, 2009), 7.  
6Ibid., 8.  
7Ibid., 23.  
8Ibid., 130. However, Goldberg also attacks “compassionate conservatism” as a form of 
“compassionate fascism”, yet this is only for George W. Bush’s efforts, as well as those who support similar 
policies, of pro-state “social conservative” policies, but not his attempt to privatise social security. For more, 
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Another example is Newt Gingrich, who builds on Goldberg’s definition of fascism 
as “a religion of the state” to bolster his claim that “in healthcare, the goal of the secular-
socialist machine is to use the power of government to control America’s health decisions. 
This goal is both an ideological imperative that places the power of government over the 
rights of citizens and a raw power grab. It is a symptom of secular socialism’s creeping 
totalitarianism – a mindset completely opposed to historic American values”.9 He also 
asserts: “This was their moment [Obama and the Democratic Party] to build another Great 
Society – a permanent expansion of the welfare state that would reduce ever more 
Americans into government dependence and bind them to the Democratic political 
machine”.10   
In much the same way as Goldberg and Gingrich, political scientist John Freie argues 
that the conservative media doggedly alleged that Obama was an anti-American president, 
branding him as “a socialist, a Muslim, an elitist, a radical, and a racist . . . pursuing the 
same policies that Adolf Hitler pursued”. This strategy went unopposed by Obama and as a 
result was the leading message that shaped the opposition’s perception of him.11 This belief 
was reinforced by conservative Republicans, such as Rep. Steve King (R-IA), claiming that 
the president was a “Democratic socialist”. According to historian Nicole Hemmer this 
                                                          
consult pages 15, 395-405.  This type of sentiment espoused by Goldberg is one problem of conservative 
rhetoric and the evolution of conservative Republicanism that will be mentioned in the thesis conclusion. 
Another example of the National Review using Goldberg’s logic is: Kevin D. Williamson, The Politically 
Incorrect Guide to Socialism (Washington, DC: Regnery Press, 2011). The difference in Williamson’s argument 
is that he includes an updated attack against the ACA, comparing it to the NHS in the UK; chapter fifteen, 
pages 237-263. For a conservative argument that Obama has been a socialist his whole life, consult: Stanley 
Kurtz, Radical-in-Chief: Barack Obama and the Untold Story of American Socialism (New York: Threshold 
Editions, 2010).    
9Newt Gingrich, To Save America: Stopping Obama’s Secular-Socialist Machine (Washington, DC: 
Regnery Publishing, 2010), 92.  
10Ibid., 86.  
11John F. Freie, The Making of the Postmodern Presidency: From Ronald Reagan to Barack Obama 
(Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2011), 166.   
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“Over-the-top rhetoric also means the Republican Party will move even more right in the 
coming years. Politicians who betray a hint of moderation will face Tea Party challengers as 
formerly local races become national battles to purge the party of any but the most 
conservative”.12   
Goldberg and Gingrich illustrate an evolution of the “Red Fascism” rhetoric that was 
covered in an article by Adler and Paterson. The moral implications from the 1930s to 1950s 
– as analysed by Adler and Paterson – revealed a rhetoric that was common in America. For 
example, Hebert Hoover in 1938 proclaimed: “I have visited many countries of totalitarian 
government – dictatorships, Fascists, Socialists, or Nazis. Their slogans are social 
conscience and social justice. But their outstanding characteristic is degradation of personal 
conscience”.13 And even Harry Truman in 1947 declared: “There isn’t any difference in 
totalitarian states. I don’t care what you call them, Nazi, Communist or Fascist”.14 Yet 
conservative rhetoric has evolved from that era, from a mostly economic message to one that 
now insists that liberal Democrats adhere to statism as a form of religious faith. This change 
in rhetoric alleges a moral argument which now includes both social and economic positions 
to be interchangeable as part of an all-encompassing premise.   
Gingrich’s comments are important because his influence has been vital to 
conservative Republicanism in the last thirty years, starting with the Conservative 
                                                          
12Hemmer, “Shock Poll”. 
13Herbert Hoover, Further Addresses upon the American Road, 1938-1940 (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1940), 15. 
14The quotation is from Adler and Patterson, “Red Fascism”, 1046. George W. Bush also made a 
similar remark regarding Al Qaida: “They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century. By 
sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions, by abandoning every value except the will to power, they 
follow in the path of fascism and Nazism and totalitarianism”; George W. Bush, "Address Before a Joint 
Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11", 20 
September 2001, compiled by Gerhard Peters and John T. Wolly, The American Presidency Project, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64731 (accessed 18 February 2014). 
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Opportunity Society in the House of Representatives, as well as his time as House Speaker 
from 1995 to 1998. Conservative Republicans now embody Gingrich’s fight against big 
government. However, as this chapter will highlight, the current crop of conservatives are 
bolder in their attempt to demonise the liberal welfare state and replace it with one that is 
conservative, building on the themes of the Conservative Opportunity Society and the 
George W. Bush presidency. The current conservative Republican mantra pushes for a 
decrease of government power on economic issues, whilst calling for an increase of 
government control in social-moral issues, as well as arguing for the need to turn defined 
benefit entitlements into defined contribution entitlements (social security and Medicare). A 
key component of the conservative battle against the New Deal legacy is its opposition to 
national health care reform. 
Health Care Reform 
Obamacare, as we know, is the crown jewel of socialism. It is socialized medicine. 
-Michele Bachmann15 
Rep. Michele Bauchmann’s (R-MN) comment highlights what many conservative 
Republicans thought of the passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010, also known 
as Obamacare. They also considered the ACA to have added onto the New Deal and its 
ongoing political legacy – a legacy which includes social security and Medicare. The ACA 
expanded the oversight power of government, which is something conservatives refuse to 
support. Instead, they favour a free-market based health care system, regarding a national 
health care system to be a foreign and un-American, and implying it is a form of socialism. 
                                                          
15Michele Bachmann, Thomas (Library of Congress), Congressional Record, 112th Congress, 19 




The expansion of government oversight over the American health care system is a 
battle conservative Republicans have been fighting since the presidency of Franklin 
Roosevelt. The conservative perspective regards the ACA to be yet another government 
programme which needs to be rolled back – albeit in a different manner than social security 
and Medicare. The longevity of both social security and Medicare helps both programmes 
maintain popularity with the American public in a way that the ACA does not. Therefore, 
any attempt at reforming social security and Medicare is aimed at reducing benefits and/or 
privatising the entitlement. But the ACA is not as revered as social security or Medicare, 
which is why it is an easier target for conservatives.16 They focus on the outright repeal of 
the act, but are also willing to support legislation to purge its funding.17 The rhetoric they 
employ has been consistent with the rhetoric of previous conservative Republican eras, and 
even with the passage of the ACA their rhetoric has not changed or decreased, but they now 
also face the task of battling the latest addition to the American welfare state.18   
                                                          
16However, not even social security was initially revered and had to withstand a shaky beginning. For 
more, see: Daniel Béland, Social Security: History from the New Deal to the Privatization Debate (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2005), 99-101. 
17For more, refer to: Russell Berman, “House Repeals Healthcare Law”, The Hill, 19 January 2011, 
http://thehill.com/homenews/house/138897-house-votes-to-repeal-healthcare-law; as well as Jennifer 
Haberkorn and Seung Min Kim, “House Votes to Repeal ‘Obamacare’ – Again”, Politico, 11 July 2012, 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0712/78403.html. This continued into the 113th Congress, for more, 
see: Russell Berman, “House Conservative Call for a New Vote to Repeal Obamacare”, The Hill blog, 24 April 
2013, http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/health-reform-implementation/295887-house-conservatives-
call-for-new-vote-to-repeal-obamacare20130426. On the other hand, any attempt by the House GOP 
leadership to offer any bill that amended and kept small parts of the ACA were scorned by many in the 
conservative elite, including the Tea Party. For more, see: Michael Catalini, “Explaining the GOP Split Over 
Repealing Obamacare”, National Journal, 30 April 2013, http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/explaining-
the-gop-split-over-repealing-obamacare-20130426. All of the above links were accessed 30 April 2013. 
18This is a battle that is also ongoing at the state level; for more, refer to: James A. Morone, 
“Bipartisan Health Reform? Obamacare in the States”, Issues in Governance Studies, Brookings Institute, no. 
64 (December 2013), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/12/17-bipartisan-health-reform-
obamacare-states (accessed 17 January 2015); and “Current Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions”, 
Kaiser Family Foundation, 16 July 2015, http://kff.org/health-reform/slide/current-status-of-the-medicaid-
expansion-decision/ (accessed 17 July 2015). 
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Political scientist James Morone argues that Obama’s health care reform 
achievement was not in the model of Harry Truman, who favoured a public single payer 
system, and was instead more in the line with Bill Clinton’s failed attempt at national health 
care reform. However, none of this mattered to conservative Republicans who yet again used 
the rallying cry that national health care reform was a plot to advocate for socialised 
medicine.19 Morone states that the ACA was a moderate Democratic vision for health care 
reform. “The signature move of the new Democrat, embraced by Jimmy Carter, Bill Clinton, 
and Barack Obama, is to put aside the ambitious social insurance agenda; no more universal 
programs like Medicare . . . Instead, contemporary health reforms hunt for solutions that 
might lift the debate beyond partisanship and politics”.20 
However, there were important differences between the way Clinton and Obama 
approached health care reform; differences that enabled Obama to succeed where Clinton 
failed.21 According to political scientist George Edwards, the differences between Clinton 
and Obama did not have to do with public opinion, but instead had to do with the differences 
in policy formation, handling special interest groups and working with Congress. Obama 
gave more policy control to Congress, focused the theme of health care reform on helping to 
improve the health care of those who were already insured, and worked with, not against, the 
“organized interests” involved on the issue, such as the health care industry, the AARP, the 
American Medical Association and the drug manufacturing industry. Clinton, on the other 
                                                          
19James A. Morone, “Obama’s Health Reform: The Managerial President and the Political Storm”, in 
The Obama Presidency: Promise and Performance (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2012), ed. William Crotty, 71-
83.   
20Ibid., 76. For more on this point, also consult: Lawrence R. Jacobs and Theda Skocpol, Health Care 
Reform and American Politics: What Everyone Needs to Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 67.   
21Lawrence Jacobs made a bold assertion that Obama’s health care reform was less radical than 
Clinton’s; the comment was made on 17 April 2013 at the Rothermere American Institute, Oxford University, 
during the “Governing the U.S. in Polarized Times” conference.   
222 
 
hand, created more enemies – even within his own party – who were less inclined to support 
his initiative.22 
What needs to be added to Morone’s argument is that the moderate Democratic 
option for health care reform is similar to moderate Republican proposals of the past, 
especially during the presidency of Richard Nixon and Mitt Romney – the 2012 GOP 
presidential candidate – when he was governor of Massachusetts.23 According to health care 
policy expert Stuart Altman, who has advised Nixon, Clinton and Obama on health care 
policy issues, “both Romney and Obama borrowed from Nixon”.24  
The Nixon plan, however, differed from the ACA by calling for an employer 
mandate, whereas the ACA emphasised an individual mandate. Moreover, the individual 
mandate was originally supported by the conservative elite, and was the brainchild of the 
Heritage Foundation, an influential conservative think tank.25 Stuart Butler, a former social 
                                                          
22George C. Edwards III, Overreach: Leadership in the Obama Presidency (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2012), 26-27, 51, 66, 72, 146, 152, 54-155. For more on the differences between Clinton’s 
and Obama’s health care reform strategies, consult: Jacob S. Hacker, “The Road to Somewhere: Why Health 
Reform Happened Or Why Political Scientists Who Write about Public Policy Shouldn’t Assume They Know 
How to Shape It”, Perspectives on Politics 8, no. 3 (September 2010): 863-867; The Staff of The Washington 
Post, Landmark: The Inside Story of America’s New Health-Care Law and What It Means for Us All (New York: 
PublicAffairs, 2010), 15-16, 50-51.   
23For more on the similarities between the health care plans of Romney and Obama, consider: 
Hacker, “The Road to Somewhere”, 867, The Staff of The Washington Post, 69, 90-91; as well as Jacobs and 
Skocpol, Health Care Reform and American Politics, 6-7, 87, 90, 104. 
24The comment was taken from: Jason Kane, “Conversation: Nixon, Obama and Universal Health 
Care”, PBS NewsHour, 5 January 2012, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/book-conversation-power-
politics-and-universal-health-care/#.VaEBT9VOZyU (accessed 15 July 2015). For more on Altman and health 
care reform, see: Stuart Altman, “Obama and Romney Health Plans: Both Borrowed from Richard Nixon”, 
CNN, 25 October 2011, http://edition.cnn.com/2011/10/25/opinion/altman-romney-obama-health-care/ 
(accessed 15 July 2015); as well as Stuart Altman and David Shactman, Power, Politics and Universal Health 
Care: The Inside Story of a Century-Long Battle (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2011).    
25For more, refer to: Lee Edwards, The Power of Ideas: The Heritage Foundation at 25 Years (Ottawa, 
IL: Jameson Books, 1997); and Thomas Medvetz, Think Tanks in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2012), 38, 95, 100-015, 111, 115, 120, 124-129, 136, 173, 177-178. For more on the roles of think tanks during 
health care reform, consult: Andrew Rich, Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics of Expertise (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 167-180. 
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policy expert at the Heritage helped devise the idea for the individual mandate in 1989.26 
Heritage supported this mandate as the preferable alternative to the Clinton health care 
reform plan, which supported an employer mandate.27 However, Butler argued that the 
“Heritage Foundation did not invent the individual mandate”, nor did its mandate form the 
centrepiece of the ACA.28 Whilst the latter is true, the Heritage Foundation (and Butler), did 
invent the concept.29 On the other hand, the idea of universal coverage encompassed a 
concept similar to the Heritage Foundation, the Clinton health care reform plan, and the 
ACA as well as Nixon’s national health reform plan of 1973 and 1974.30 The employer 
mandate was initially supported as a market friendly alternative to a single-payer health care 
system. The individual mandate, however, was also devised as a better alternative to both,31 
and was supported by Heritage as well as by many in the GOP when national health care 
reform was believed to be inevitable. Yet with over forty years of failure to achieve national 
health care reform, the individual mandate became the fall-back plan for Democrats. And 
                                                          
26Stuart M. Butler, “Assuring Affordable Health Care for All Americans”, The Heritage Lectures, 
Heritage Foundation, no. 218 (October 1989), http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/assuring-affordable-
health-care-for-all-americans (accessed 15 July 2015), as well as Stuart M. Butler and Edmund F. Haislmaier, 
eds., A National Health Care System for America (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 1989), 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1989/a-national-health-system-for-america (accessed 15 July 
2015). 
27Edwards, The Power of Ideas, 140-147.  
28Stuart M. Butler, “Don’t Blame Heritage for ObamaCare Mandate”, USA Today, 6 February 2012, 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/story/2012-02-03/health-individual-mandate-reform-
heritage/52951140/1 (accessed 15 July 2015).   
29For more, consider: Michael Cooper, “Conservatives Sowed the Idea of Health Care Mandate, Only 
to Spurn It Later”, New York Times, 14 February 2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/02/15/health/policy/health-
care-mandate-was-first-backed-by-conservatives.html (accessed 15 July 2015); James Taranto, “Heritage 
Rewrites History”, Wall Street Journal, 8 February 2012, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204369404577211161144786448 (accessed 15 July 2015); 
and Avik Roy, “The Tortuous History of Conservatives and the Individual Mandate”, Forbes, 7 February 2012, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2012/02/07/the-tortuous-conservative-history-of-the-
individual-mandate/ (accessed 15 July 2015).    
30Roy, “The Tortuous History of Conservatives and the Individual Mandate”; and Jill Quadango, 
“Right-Wing Conspiracy? Socialist Plot? The Origins of the Patient Projection and Affordable Care Act”, Journal 
of Health Politics, Policy and Law 39, no. 1 (February 2014): 35-56, 
http://jhppl.dukejournals.org/content/39/1/35.full.pdf+html (accessed 17 January 2015). 
31Quadango, “Right-Wing Conspiracy”, 38-39; and Cooper, “Conservatives Sowed the Idea of Health 
Care Mandate, Only to Spurn It Later”. 
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conservative Republicans were unwilling to help Democrats expand the welfare state – 
which resulted in their opposing a plan that many originally supported.32 This was the case 
for Newt Gingrich, as well as others amongst the conservative elite, including Butler and the 
Heritage Foundation.33  
Although a change of mind is possible, conservative Republican opposition to any 
expansion of the New Deal legacy runs deep. Furthermore, the Heritage Foundation was 
founded in 1973 to support conservative Republicans in their efforts to overcome 
liberalism,34 not propose a policy that would serve as major legislative achievement for a 
Democratic president. And the Heritage Foundation’s stance is unlikely to change anytime 
soon with Jim DeMint as its president.         
The change in the GOP structure has made any moderate attempt for national health 
care reform too liberal for any conservative Republican, and with conservatives dominating 
the congressional wing of the party, Obama had little hope of winning any conservative 
support.35 Moreover, the increasing conservative bent in the GOP can even influence how 
academics regard issues. One example is Edwards, who interprets Obama’s first term, 
including health care reform, as having “advanced a large, liberal agenda”.36 Others who 
share this view include political scientist Stanley Renshon and the conservative academic 
                                                          
32For more on this point, see: Ezra Klein, “Unpopular Mandate”, New Yorker, 25 June 2015, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/06/25/unpopular-mandate (accessed 15 July 2015).  
33Roy, “The Tortuous History of Conservatives and the Individual Mandate”; Taranto, “Heritage 
Rewrites History; Cooper, “Conservatives Sowed the Idea of Health Care Mandate, Only to Spurn It Later”; 
and Conor Friedersdorf, “Newt Gingrich Supported an Individual Mandate as Recently as May 2009”, The 
Atlantic, 30 January 2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/01/newt-gingrich-supported-
an-individual-mandate-as-recently-as-may-2009/252233/ (accessed 15 July 2015).  
34Medvetz, Think Tanks in America, 100-105, 115-116; Rich, Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the 
Politics of Expertise, 53-55, 152, 206; and Edwards, The Power of Ideas.  
35Nonetheless, Obama was determined to reach out to the GOP in the hope of passing a health care 
reform bill that was truly bipartisan. For more on this point, see: Edwards, Overreach, 141-143, 156.     
36Ibid., 180.   
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Andrew Busch.37 Busch made a bold assertion about the 111th Congress – “a liberal 
Congress [that] gave a liberal president more or less what he wanted”, in large part because 
it was “a solidly liberal Congress”.38   
Obama has acted as a magnet for conservative Republicans, uniting them in 
opposition against many of his achievements – especially in the 111th Congress – such as 
ACA, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010, and the American Recover and 
Investment Act of 2009. I am not suggesting that Obama’s first term did not advance the 
liberal agenda, I believe it did but to a lesser degree than what Edwards and Busch suggest. 
Overall, I believe his first term advanced a centrist agenda, with many of his policies, such 
as health care reform and the stimulus package, supported by liberals.39 Yet this does not 
mean that because policies have liberal support they also uphold bold liberal ideals,40 even if 
some, like journalist Jonathan Alter, support the notion that the passage of ACA put “Barack 
                                                          
37Stanley A. Renshon, Barack Obama and the Politics of Redemption (New York: Rutledge, 2012), 
132-134; Andrew E. Busch, “President Obama and Congress: Deference, Disinterest, or Collusion?” in The 
Obama Presidency in the Constitutional Order (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011), eds. Carol 
McNamara and Melaine M. Marlowe, 71-89. For more conservative academic perspectives on Obama, 
consider: Charles R. Kesler, I Am the Change: Barack Obama and the Crisis of Liberalism (New York: Broadside 
Books, 2012); and James W. Ceaser, “The Great Repudiation”, Claremont Review of Books X, no. 4 (Fall 2010): 
6-9, http://www.claremont.org/repository/doclib/20101201_Fall2010CRBpdfCeaser.pdf (accessed 24 May 
2013).      
38Busch, “President Obama and Congress”, 86. Busch also considers Obama’s health care reform 
initiative to have been similar to George W. Bush’s attempt to reform social security. I argue that Obama had 
more in common with Bush’s successful reform of Medicare instead of his failed attempt on social security.     
39However, Obama and the Democratic controlled 111th Congress had the most successful first two 
years of any new presidency since LBJ and the 89th Congress. For more, consult: John E. Owens, 
“Congressional Leadership in Obama’s First Two Years”, in Obama in Office (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 
2011), ed. James A. Thurber, 107-126.  
40However, some liberals conclude that Obama is one of them, but his less than liberal policies are 
due to the political realities he has to confront. For more on this perspective, see: E. J. Dionne, Our Divided 
Political Heart: The Battle for the American Idea in an Age of Discontent (New York: Bloomsbury, 2012), 11, 
97-99; as well as Eric Alterman and Kevin Matterson, The Cause: The Fight for American Liberalism from 
Franklin Roosevelt to Barack Obama (New York: Viking, 2012), 459-460. Alterman and Matterson also 
consider Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton to have been liberals in their own way, whereas in his latest book 
Dionne also argues the same for Clinton and Obama. I differ from their views by arguing that the trend 
towards moderate Democratic presidents began with Carter and continued with both Clinton and Obama.    
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Obama . . . in the company of Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson . . . in terms of 
domestic achievement”.41 
An important difference between Clinton and Obama on health care reform is that 
there were fewer moderate Republicans for Obama to court. This was due to the ongoing 
evolution of conservative Republicanism, which sees the congressional GOP ever more 
firmly under the influence of conservatives. This level of influence helps to dictate the GOP 
message, which according to political sociologist Theda Skocpol allows them to “denounce 
Democratic efforts as ultra-“liberal” even when those efforts were fairly moderate”.42       
Another point to consider, as stated by political scientist Jacob Hacker, was the 
relative unity of Democrats who were willing to work with Obama.  
No less consequential was the composition of the Democratic majority with which 
that Democratic president [Obama] was able to work. As recently as the fight over 
the Clinton health plan, the Democratic caucus featured a substantial southern 
conservative bloc that posed serious hurdles to intraparty agreement on health care.   
. . . This time after the loss of more seats in conservative Southern regions and the 
strengthening of the Democratic positions in more liberal regions, a more 
homogenous, though far from unified, caucus greeted the president.43            
The South was a Democratic one-party region from the post-Reconstruction Era (1877) to 
1964, and remained a Democratic congressional stronghold until the 1994 midterm 
elections.44 Conservative Democrats have since switched allegiances to become conservative 
Republicans. And due to population shifts, the South is an increasingly important electoral 
factor for both presidential and House congressional elections.45 It is also the most 
                                                          
41Jonathan Alter, The Promise: President Obama, Year One (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 
2011), 433.  
42Theda Skocpol, with commentaries by Larry M. Bartels, Mickey Edwards and Suzanne Mettler, 
Obama and America’s Political Future (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), 29.  
43Hacker, “The Road to Somewhere”, 863.  
44Earl Black and Merle Black, The Rise of Southern Republicans (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2003). 
45Earl Black and Merle Black, Divided America: The Ferocious Power Struggle in American Politics 
(New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2008), 62. 
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conservative region in America, as well as the most religious.46 Even though the issue of 
race sparked the exodus of southern conservatives to the GOP, shared social values have 
kept them loyal to the party.47  
Due to the vast ideological divide amongst the parties, Obama’s first term’s (as well 
as his second thus far) domestic agenda was extremely partisan.48 Although the rise in 
partisanship started well before the Obama presidency, it has gotten much worse during his 
presidency49 and has given way to hyperpartisanship.50 Moreover, in 1950 the American 
Political Science Association called for the political parties to be less ideologically 
harmonious as a way to offer the public more choice amongst opposing platforms and 
                                                          
46Glenn Feldman, “Status Quo Society, Rope of Religion, and New Racism”, in Politics and Religion in 
the White South (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2005), ed. Glenn Feldman, 288-289. For more on 
race, religion and politics in the South, see: Lyman A. Kellstedt et al., “The Soul of the South: Religion and 
Southern Politics in the Twenty-first Century”, in The New Politics of the Old South: An Introduction to 
Southern Politics, 3rd ed. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007), eds. Charles S. Bullock III and Mark 
J. Rozell, 301-320; and Feldman, “Status Quo Society, Rope of Religion, and New Racism”; and J. David 
Woodward, The New Southern Politics, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2013), 131-181, 185-227. 
47David Lublin, The Republican South: Democratization and Partisan Change (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004), xvi-xvii. For more on the historical significance of race on southern politics, refer to: 
Michael Perman, Pursuit of Unity: A Political History of the American South (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2009); V.O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation, new ed. (1949; repr., Knoxville: 
University of Tennessee Press, 1984); Alexander P. Lamis, The Two-Party South, 2nd exp. ed. (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1990); Richard K. Scher, Politics in the New South: Republicanism, Race and 
Leadership in the Twentieth Century, 2nd ed. (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997); Black and Black, The Rise of 
Southern Republicans; and Joseph E. Lowndes, From the New Deal to the New Right: Race and the Southern 
Origins of Modern Conservatism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).  
48For more, see: Richard M. Skinner, “Barack Obama and the Partisan Presidency: Four More Years?” 
Society 49, no. 5 (September 2012): 423-429, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12115-012-9577-1 (accessed 17 
January 2015); George C. Edwards III, “Obama’s Burden: Governing in Polarized Times”, in Obama’s 
Washington: Political Leadership in a Partisan Era (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, School of 
Advanced Study, University of London, 2014), ed. Clodagh Harrington, 41-70; and Christopher H. Foreman, Jr., 
“Ambition, Necessity, and Polarization in the Obama Domestic Agenda”, in The Obama Presidency: Appraisals 
and Prospects (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2012), eds. Bert A. Rockman, Andrew Rudalevige and Colin 
Campbell, 244-267. 
49For more how this relates to presidential support in Congress, refer to: Edwards, “Obama’s Burden: 
Governing in Polarized Times”, 56-57; Matthew J. Dickinson, “The President and Congress”, in The Presidency 
and the Political System, 10th ed. (Los Angles: CQ Press, 2014), ed. Michael Nelson, 412-417, 431-440; as well 
as Thomas E. Cronin and Michael A. Genovese, The Paradoxes of the American Presidency, 4th ed. (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 156-164. 
50Barbara Sinclair, “The President and the Congressional Party Leadership in a Hyperpartisan Era”, in 
Rival for Power: Presidential-Congressional Relations, 5th ed. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2013), 
ed. James A. Thurber, 113-136.   
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policies.51 Although the parties are without a doubt more ideologically opposed than was the 
case in 1950, it is worth asking if this level of partisanship is healthy for public policy and 
the American political system.52 Furthermore, the hostility between the parties is at a level 
that has not been reached since the 1890s.53    
The lack of bipartisanship on a regular basis made it vital for Democrats to first 
compromise amongst themselves before reaching out to Republicans. Even then, once a 
compromise was reached, conservative Republicans would still be in a position to gain 
further concessions in order to support a piece of legislation. This means the more 
conservative the GOP is, the more it will make concessions extremely difficult for 
Democrats, especially liberals, to accept.54 This problem did not go away and, in fact, 
                                                          
51“Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: A Report of the Committee on Political Parties”, 
The American Political Science Review 44, no. 3, part 2, supplement (September 1950), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/i333592 (accessed 13 March 2015). 
52For more, consider: William A. Galston, “Can a Polarized Party System Be ‘Healthy’?” Issues in 
Governance Studies, Brookings Institute, no. 34 (April 2010), 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/4/polarization-
galston/04_polarization_galston.pdf (accessed 12 March 2015); David W. Brady, John Ferejohn and Laura 
Harbridge, “Polarization and Public Policy: A General Assessment”, in Red and Blue Nation? Consequences and 
Corrections of America’s Polarized Politics, vol. 2 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), eds. 
Pietro S. Nivola and David W. Brady, 185-212; as well as Michael Barber and Nolan McCarthy, “Causes and 
Consequences of Polarization”, Negotiating Agreement in Politics (Washington, DC: American Political Science 
Association, 2013), eds. Jane Mansbridge and Cathie Jo Martin, 19-53, 
http://www.apsanet.org/Portals/54/APSA%20Files/publications/MansbridgeTF_FinalDraft.pdf (accessed 12 
February 2015). 
53For more, see: David W. Brady and Hahrie C. Han, “Polarization Then and Now: A Historical 
Perspective” in Red and Blue Nation? Characteristics and Causes of America’s Polarized Politics, vol. 1 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), eds. Pietro S. Nivola and David W. Brady, 119-151. 
54The 2010 tax compromise is one example where this is the case. The Bush tax cuts were extended 
for two years, as well as an extension of unemployment benefits and a two percent social security payroll tax 
cut.  Many liberals, as well as some conservatives, did not support this compromise. For more, see: Lori 
Montgomery, Shailagh Murray and William Branigin, “Obama Signs Bill to Extend Bush-era Tax Cuts for Two 
More Years”, Washington Post, 17 December 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/12/16/AR2010121606200.html (accessed 21 May 2013); and The CNN Wire Staff, 
“Obama Signs Tax Deal Into Law”, CNN, 18 December 2010, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/12/17/tax.deal/index.html (accessed 21 May 2013). Likewise, the 
fiscal cliff showdown during the 112th Congress is an example where many House Tea Party conservatives 
were not willing to compromise. This point is further analysed later on in this chapter. For more, also see: 
Michael Espinoza, “Myth, Memory and the Reagan Legacy: Taxes and the GOP”, 49th Parallel, Issue 31 (Spring 
2013): 19-26, http://www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue31/Espinoza.htm (accessed 30 May 2013). 
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became much worse once the Tea Party element became part of the GOP – moving the party 
even further to the right. 
The Tea Party and Republican Conservatism 
I hope that commonsense patriots will join me in applauding the real heroes of this election 
year: the Tea Party Americans. In 2008, we were told that we had to “move beyond 
Reagan.” Well, some of us refused to believe that America chose big-government European-
style socialism. American voters elected a politician who cloaked his agenda in the language 
of moderation. Once the mask was removed, Americans rejected his “fundamental 
transformation.” The Tea Party reminded us that Reaganism is still our foundation. 
-Sarah Palin55 
Sarah Palin’s quotation underlines contemporary conservative rhetoric and its claim 
that the modern day GOP is still constructed in Reagan’s image.56 What many Americans 
and conservatives view as some of the key elements of “Reaganism” include limited 
government and a strong national defence. A centrepiece of the conservative perspective on 
Reagan and limited government includes tax cuts, deregulation and the US economic revival 
of the 1980s – also known as Reaganomics, or supply-side economics.57 The Tea Party 
emerged at the forefront in 2009 and in the 2010 midterm elections, albeit with mixed 
success. The 112th Congress saw many Tea Party Republicans who wanted to radically 
shrink government, but this was much easier said than done, for even if a member of 
Congress is elected to limit government, a congressman/woman is still expected to govern. 
                                                          
55Sarah Palin, “The Midterms: Lessons Learned and the Way Forward”, 4 November 2010, National 
Review Online, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/252477/midterms-lessons-learned-and-way-
forward-sarah-palin (accessed 23 July 2014). 
56For more, see: Ronald T. Libby, Purging the Republican Party: Tea Party Campaigns and Elections 
(Lanham: Lexington Books, 2014), 69-70.  
57For an overly positive perspective on Reagan and supply-side economics in general, refer to: Brian 
Domitrovic, Econoclasts: The Rebels Who Sparked the Supply-Side Revolution and Restored American 
Prosperity (Wilmington: ISI Books, 2009); however, for a more balanced perspective on the Reagan 
presidency and supple-side economics in the 1980s, consider: Iwan Morgan, The Age of Deficits: Presidents 
and Unbalanced Budgets from Jimmy Carter to George W. Bush (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009), 
82-121, 271; W. Elliot Brownlee, Federal Taxation in America: A Short History (Washington, DC: Woodrow 
Wilson Center Press, 2004), 137, 142-143, 147-181; and Doug Rossinow, The Reagan Years: A History of the 
1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 32-35, 58-65, 84-100, 280-283.    
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However, given the extreme rhetoric touted by the Tea Party, it makes it extremely difficult 
to govern cooperatively and constructively when only the House of Representatives is under 
GOP control. What ensues is partisan gridlock that suits the needs of a minority party more 
than a majority party.58 But what about a divided government? The government shutdown of 
a GOP controlled Congress versus President Clinton in 1995-1996 ended in political victory 
for the Democratic president. How could the GOP expect to fare any better when they 
controlled only the House in the 112th Congress?59         
Political scientist Arthur Cyr takes a different approach and states that the Tea Party 
is not part of the GOP but is instead a third party in coalition similar to the current Liberal 
Democrat and Conservative Party coalition government in the UK. However, whereas 
Liberal Democrats are a viable third party, the Tea Party is much weaker by comparison.60 
Although this is an interesting comparison, it misses the greater differences between the two. 
The Tea Party was much stronger in the sense that it was not elected to govern, whereas the 
Liberal Democrats entered into the coalition to provide stability and avoid a Conservative 
led minority government. This made Liberal Democrats more inclined to support the 
Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron more than the Tea Party supported House GOP 
Speaker John Boehner.61 The Tea Party in the 112th Congress also had no incentive to 
                                                          
58Nolan McCarthy, Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology 
and Unequal Riches (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006), 165-166, 175-186; Alan I. Abramowitz, The Disappearing 
Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and American Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 
165-172; Sarah A. Binder, Stalemate: Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2003); Donald C. Baumer and Howard J. Gold, Parties, Polarization, and 
Democracy in the United States (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2010), 141-142; David W. Brady, John 
Ferejohn and Laurel Harbridge, “Polarization and Public Policy: A General Assessment” in Red and Blue 
Nation? Consequences and Corrections of America’s Polarized Politics, vol. 2 (Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2008), eds. Pietro S. Nivola and David W. Brady, 195-205. 
59The same could be said for the 113th Congress.  
60Arthur I. Cyr, “Third Parties and Political Dynamics in the UK and the US”, in The Legacy of the 
Crash: How the Financial Crisis Changed American and Britain (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), ed. 
Terrance Casey, 139-158.  
61The Tea Party’s lack of unity behind Boehner will be analysed in more detail later on in this section.  
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support President Obama or the Democratic controlled Senate. The Tea Party, the antithesis 
of stability, wanted radical change, and the 2010 midterm election results became its claimed 
mandate for change. 
Politics professor John White compares the 2010 midterm elections, not to the 1994 
election, but to the midterm elections of 1938.62 Similarities had to do with recession and 
economic uncertainty, as well as the GOP electoral comebacks after “Democratic 
landslides”. “The year 2010 marked the first time since 1938 that an incumbent party 
(Democrats) would lose more than sixty congressional seats”, results that signified the 
public demand for FDR and Obama to move away from big government liberalism.63 
Whereas the 1938 midterm elections proved only a setback to FDR and the New Deal order, 
how the 2010 midterms affect Obama and his party in the long-term has yet to be 
determined.64 Whilst the Tea Party helped win enough House seats to give the GOP a 
majority, its impact on the Senate is mixed. The Tea Party did not help deliver a Senate 
majority in 2010, but it still helped to get more conservative members elected into the upper 
house.   
Political scientists William Miller and Jeremy Walling argue that   
Contrary to the predictions of many, the Tea Party had a clear impact on the 2010 
elections. Whether it be by helping to unseat Democratic senators or forcing 
moderate Republican hopefuls to become more conservative in their beliefs, the Tea 
Party showed the potential to be a lasting political force within our nation’s politics.  
. . . When the more conservative, Tea Party-supported candidates proved victorious 
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elections”, in Barack Obama in the White House: Transforming America (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2011), ed. Steven E. Schier, 43-62. 
63Ibid., 45-46.  
64Ibid., 46-48, 55-57. For an even a more historical backdrop, comparing Obama’s 2010 midterm 
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in primaries across the country, moderate Republicans realized that they had been 
stuck in the middle to lose.65   
They go on to state that the Tea Party did not cost the GOP the Senate, even though they 
admit the movement cost the GOP Senate seats in Nevada, Delaware and Colorado. They 
conclude, however, that the only difference would have been in the size of their Senate 
minority, one that “would have been less conservative than the one we have today”.66 
Political sociologist Theda Skocpol and Vanessa Williamson echo this argument on the 
importance of the Tea Party moving the GOP further to the right.67 Unlike Miller and 
Walling, they assert that the importance of the Tea Party in the 2010 midterms is debatable. 
Whilst more extreme conservatives were elected, the Tea Party GOP pickups, in the House 
and Senate, were mostly in Republican areas, not swing districts or states, which resulted in 
Republican defeats in winnable seats in areas such as New York, Connecticut, Colorado and 
Nevada.68   
A larger minority would have been an asset to the GOP, especially to Senate 
Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (KY) and House Speaker John Boehner (OH), but Tea 
Party Republicans and their congressional allies like Sen. Jim DeMint (SC) and Rep. 
Michelle Bachmann wanted to adhere to a more ideological approach that favoured extreme 
                                                          
65William J. Miller and Jeremy D. Walling, “Tea Party Redux: Making Sense of the Midterm Senate 
Elections”, in Tea Party Effects on 2010 U.S. Senate Elections: Stuck in the Middle to Lose (Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books, 2012), eds. William J. Miller and Jeremy D. Walling, 351.   
66Ibid., 352. On this point, also consider: Charles S. Bullock III, “Conclusion: Evaluating Palin, the Tea 
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67Skocpol and Williamson, The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism, 155-188. 
However, some, like political scientists Christopher Parker and Matt Barreto, consider the Tea Party to be 
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Change They Can’t Believe In, 45-52. Also, consider: Edward Ashbee, “The Rise of the Tea Party Movement 
and American Governance”, in Broken Government? American Politics in the Obama Era (London: Institute for 
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68Skocpol and Williamson, The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism, 157-168. A 
similar viewpoint can also be found in Bullock, “Conclusion”, 215, 217, 223.  
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conservative tenets over helping the party leadership challenge the Obama administration 
and Senate Democrats.69 In many regards, Tea Party Republicans were uncontrollable, 
especially considering Boehner’s dilemma of having to contend with them as well as Obama 
and the Democratic Senate.70 Geoffrey Kabaservice considers this strategy to be a Rule and 
Ruin approach that is hampering the ability of the GOP to function as a governing party.71 
He also notes that the latest evolution of conservative Republicanism now makes past 
conservative icons, such as Barry Goldwater and Reagan, too moderate for the Tea Party,72 
and made a similar comment about William F. Buckley.73  
It is important to consider how the purity factor of conservative Republicanism is 
challenged once it achieves power. The Republican Congress during the Clinton 
administration and the middle four years of Republican control of the executive and 
legislative branches during the George W. Bush presidency are two relevant examples.74 At 
times, both were criticized for abandoning conservative principles along the way. Many even 
question if the Bush administration was conservative at all. This was also true during the 
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Reagan administration, but those years are now looked upon as the ideal conservative 
blueprint – the achievement of Reaganomics via tax cuts, deregulation and robust economic 
growth.75 However, Reagan’s disinterest in pursuing a social conservative agenda and his 
acceptance of raising taxes have been swept away and replaced with the notion that Reagan 
was the ideal conservative. Given the evolution of conservatism, Republicans such as Paul 
Ryan, Sen. Rand Paul (KY) and Jim DeMint now comprise the prototypical conservative.76 
Paul came to Congress as part of the Tea Party movement, and DeMint was very influential 
in helping to get Tea Party senators elected to Congress via his Senate Conservatives Fund, 
whose beneficiaries included Paul and others like Marco Rubio (FL).77 Many, especially 
within the conservative elite, made the case that the Tea Party movement was a peoples’ 
movement, a form of populism.78 But was this really the case? 
Historian Charles Postel is one who does not believe that this perception of the Tea 
Party movement is accurate, arguing, “It is difficult, however, to trace Populist ancestry in 
the Tea Party because it belongs to a different branch on the tree of American politics. While 
pundits and media analysts may describe the Tea Party as populist, the Tea Parties call 
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themselves conservatives”.79 In upholding the conservative tradition, the Tea Party should be 
compared to previous conservative elements like the Liberty League, Robert Taft and Joe 
McCarthy and the John Birch Society – all of whom were staunch opponents of the New 
Deal and its ongoing political legacy – which Postel believes is best summarised as a 
movement that has recycled support for issues such as a return to a constitutional limited 
government and “The denunciation of a moderate president as a socialist tyrant”.80 
Ironically, conservative pollsters Scott Ramussen and Doug Schoen agree with Postel 
that the Tea Party is “upholding the conservative tradition” although the tradition in their 
argument is one that focuses on mainstream conservatism, not the extremist right-wing 
examples Postel gives – which they consider to have been a hindrance, not an asset.81 
Ramussen and Schoen view the Tea Party’s conservatism as a form of “right-wing 
populism” that combines “economic conservatism, small-government libertarians, and social 
conservatism”. They also regard the Tea Party movement – not Reagan’s presidential 
election in 1980 nor even the 1994 GOP takeover of Congress – as the first time the three 
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have united under one banner.82 The difference in the two arguments is that Postel looks for 
the negative influences of the Tea Party, whilst Rasmussen and Schoen focus on the 
positive.83 What is evident from both perspectives is how the mainstream and extreme 
conservative elements have been influenced by the Tea Party,84 a view that some argue 
represents historian Richard Hofstadter’s work on The Paranoid Style in American 
Politics.85 
The importance of the Tea Party movement to the GOP was that it allowed for 
conservatism to regain the popularity it lost during the George W. Bush administration, due 
to the decrease in popularity of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well with the political 
defeat of losing control of Congress to Democrats after the 2006 midterm elections.86 
However, the Tea Party movement would not have been as successful without the help of 
conservative organisations such as FreedomWorks,87 as well as the conservative media, 
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especially Fox News.88 FreedomWorks was largely responsible for helping to organise the 
Tea Party message and Fox News was vital to its dissemination. The importance of 
FreedomWorks – at the time – was the role played by Dick Armey, who was also 
instrumental in composing the Contract With America, which served as a manifesto for the 
GOP to use against both Clinton and the Democratic controlled Congress.89 However, 
Armey (and co-author Matt Kibbe) had a clear goal in mind on the importance of the Tea 
Party movement, which was for Tea Party conservatism to become the driving force within 
the GOP.90 Moreover, Jim DeMint had a similar notion.91 Many Tea Party conservatives 
were more loyal to DeMint than they were to either McConnell or Boehner.    
According to journalist Robert Draper, from the very beginning of the 112th 
Congress, the Tea Party House Republicans presented a big problem for Boehner. Even 
during the first Continuing Resolution (CR) they were making demands to the party 
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leadership to draft a CR with at least $100 billion in spending cuts.92 Although Majority 
Whip Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) encouraged and supported the Tea Party freshmen, this did 
not ensure that he had their loyalty in the way that House Speaker Gingrich and his whip 
Tom DeLay (R-TX) had with the freshmen House members during the early stages of the 
104th Congress.93 In comparing the two whips, Draper observed that “the most important 
distinction between the two whips was this: Tom DeLay’s seventy-three freshmen were 
thoroughly beholden to Newt Gingrich – their Speaker, but also their guru. Kevin 
McCarthy’s eighty-seven freshmen had no particular allegiance to John Boehner, or even to 
the Republican Party. He had no leverage over them”.94 Nevertheless, there was more unity 
in supporting House policies that attacked both big government and spending.   
One example was when McCarthy was able to persuade Paul Ryan to lobby the Tea 
Party conservatives on why they should support his “Path to Prosperity” budget.95 Ryan’s 
budget called for cutting taxes, deficit reduction, repealing Obamacare and reforming 
Medicare.96 Likewise, an example where the Tea Party would not support Boehner was 
during the fiscal cliff,97 where a majority of the GOP (including Tea Party freshmen) voted 
against extending most of the Bush era tax cuts on a permanent basis.98 This vote, however, 
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split even the Republican House leadership. Some like Ryan sided with Boehner, whilst 
others sided with the Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-VA) and McCarthy.99 There was less 
of an upheaval in the Senate. Of the eight no votes, five were Republican, with Paul, Rubio 
and Mike Lee (UT) representing the Tea Party, and DeMint was one of three who 
abstained.100 
The broad Tea Party support for Ryan’s budget was due to its agenda of deficit 
reduction, Medicare entitlement reform, repealing the ACA and cutting taxes – all of which 
would decrease the size and scope of government. Also, Tea Party Republicans adhered to 
the conservative Republican desire to eliminate the New Deal legacy – especially social 
security and Medicare – which the “Path to Prosperity” budget set out to accomplish via 
healthcare.101 Whilst the ACA also reformed Medicare, by way of addressing the doughnut 
hole in Medicare Part D, it also reduced payments to providers of private plans in Medicare 
Advantage (Part C), as well establishing an Independent Payment Advisory Board with the 
power to devise ways to save on expenditures. Meanwhile, the Ryan plan wanted to reduce 
payments to recipients via vouchers to encourage them to purchase more personalized 
private plans, thus transforming Medicare from a defined benefit to a limited defined 
contribution where any other costs were to be paid out of pocket.102         
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If the Tea Party displayed any level of congressional partisan allegiance at all, the 
most likely beneficiary was Senator DeMint, who was labelled the “godfather” of the South 
Carolina Tea Party House freshmen.103 However, what is evident with Draper’s assessment 
is that if the Tea Party viewed their own Republican House leadership with some disdain, 
they also regarded the Democratic leadership, in the Senate and the White House, with even 
more. Furthermore, the Tea Party did not go to Washington to govern, but instead to limit 
government no matter the cost.104 For them it was more important to battle both the size and 
spending of government. One such member who followed this mantra is Senator Rand Paul.   
Paul argues that “the Tea Party sees no distinction between big government 
Republicans and big government Democrats, drawing a new dividing line between those 
who want to limit government and those who want it to be unlimited”.105 He considers both 
to be enemies of true Republican conservatism.106 Regarding big government Republicans, 
he declares: “The Tea Party is now a threat to the old Republican guard because its stated 
principles prevent it from being brought into the [progressive] neoconservative fold”.107 
However, even a conservative such as Paul views big government Democrats more 
negatively than their Republican counterparts. He avowed, “If President [George W.] Bush 
expanded government more so than any president since LBJ, Obama has now expanded 
government even more than Bush”.108 He claims his ideological views follow in the 
footsteps of past conservatives like Barry Goldwater and Ronald Reagan, as well as current 
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ones such as Jim DeMint.109 He describes his views not as libertarian, but instead as a 
“constitutional conservative” who is supportive of “libertarian principles”, such as “limited 
government, self-reliance and respect for the Constitution in the mould of the Founding 
Fathers” – who were “clearly libertarians”.110 
Paul, like many conservative Republicans, supports limited government. He also 
views the crowning achievements of the New Deal, social security, and the Great Society, 
Medicare, to be un-American. He states: “The fundamental reason why Medicare is failing is 
why the Soviet Union failed – socialism doesn’t work”, as well as advocating for the 
“privatization” of social security.111 This is similar to statements made by conservatives in 
every chapter of this thesis, including Goldwater and Reagan. Others such as Tom DeLay 
and Dick Armey have directly accused Democrats of being socialists for their steadfast 
support of the American welfare state. Although Paul is not as hostile in his rhetoric towards 
Democrats, other Tea Party Republicans in the 112th Congress were not as reserved. For 
example, Rep. Allen West (FL) was consistent in his allegations that liberal House 
Democrats in the “Progressive Caucus” had un-American sympathies. “At the turn of the 
century here in the United States of America”, he asserted, “American communists renamed 
themselves progressive, but the strategy and the tactics and the ideology still remains the 
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same”. He refers to them using a variety of labels like “Communist progressive, Marxist, 
socialist, [or] statist”.112   
Conversely, Paul’s critique of the ongoing political legacy of the New Deal is less 
inflammatory and more structured because he believes that programmes such as social 
security and Medicare are best left to be administered within the free-market. However, in 
his book, Paul’s argument omits any of his remarks that Medicare was a failed socialist 
ideal, and instead focuses on the free-market aspects for the programme, as well as for social 
security and Obamacare.113 This rationale is how many conservative Republicans currently 
argue for entitlement reform. On the other hand, he offers some positions that definitely 
provide a respite from the George W. Bush presidency, and possibly the GOP altogether, 
which may lead into the next evolution of Republican conservatism – albeit an evolution that 
may revert it to a less aggressive foreign policy, as well as supporting less pro-state social-
moral values. But how much of a change will they undergo? On foreign policy issues, the 
Tea Party is split, with the more isolationist position versus the more standard conservative 
Republican nationalistic tendencies.114 There is only so much gradual change that can occur 
without causing a major fracture amongst conservatives, as well as the party in general – 
which is why neoconservatives and southern conservatives abandoned the Democratic Party 
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for the GOP.115 The same is also true for social issues. Some issues may allow flexibility, 
such as marijuana,116 but others like immigration,117 gay marriage,118 and especially 
abortion, may not.119 Although the party may modify some of its views, in sum it will still be 
more conservative than it was in the Reagan era. 
The Tea Party views Obama and Democrats as liberals/socialists who support big 
government, in part due to their perception of the evolution of conservative Republicanism. 
As the gap between the parties increased, and the GOP moves further to the right, 
Republicans accuse Democrats of moving further to the left.120 Yet once in power, 
conservatives are faced with a dilemma; to compromise or to strive for purity that places 
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ideology over the duty and ability to govern. This is compounded by the fact that American 
conservatism is at its strongest when articulating what it is against rather than how it 
proposes to govern. For example, Reagan, the Republican controlled Congress during the 
Clinton administration and the George W. Bush presidency all faced circumstances where 
pragmatism, rather than ideology, was necessary to govern. The importance of the Tea Party 
is that they were not elected to govern, but instead vowed to reduce the scope of 
government, especially the latest addition to state power by way of the ACA. Holding 
control of only the House during the 112th Congress, as well as the 113th Congress, still 
made conservative Republicans a governing minority versus a Democratic President and 
Senate, but it was a minority that burdened them with having to articulate some kind of 
governing philosophy. The 114th Congress will allow a GOP congressional majority the 
opportunity to limit government, but they will have to be pragmatic in order to so.       
The Importance of Jim DeMint to the Evolution of Republican Conservatism  
Collectivism is anathema to freedom and prosperity. . . . forcing citizens into dependency on 
collectivist government programs. 
-Jim DeMint121 
Jim DeMint’s statement reveals his views on the New Deal and its ongoing political 
legacy, especially Medicare and social security. He and many conservative Republicans 
believe the American welfare state was the beginning of a divergent path that transformed 
America from a country of small and limited government to one of large and practically 
limitless government. His influence on conservative Republicanism needs to be considered 
alongside other contributions by the likes of Herbert Hoover, Robert Taft, Barry Goldwater, 
Ronald Reagan, Newt Gingrich and George W. Bush, as well as many others who also 
deserve recognition for their contributions to American conservatism. DeMint’s goal has 
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been to use a conservative populist approach to effect change, a mixture of the economic 
conservatism of past conservative Republicans such as Hoover, Taft, Goldwater and Reagan, 
infused with the white conservative (southern Democratic) populist appeal of George 
Wallace.122 I use DeMint as a case study, because he is now president of the Heritage 
Foundation. Understanding his perspective will shed significance on how he helped GOP 
conservatism to evolve, as well as how he will direct an increasingly partisan approach 
towards influencing conservativism for years to come.123  
DeMint has been an influential figure within the GOP and its dominant conservative 
wing. Not only have his views helped to shape conservative positions, but they have also 
fuelled his support for Tea Party candidates who shared many of his views. He was very 
supportive of the Tea Party cause from the beginning, using the movement to prop up 
conservatives who had similar ideological views. His reluctance to compromise also called 
into question whether or not his (and the Tea Party’s) extreme conservative views would 
help or hinder the party, views that led him to assert that he would "rather have 30 
Republicans in the Senate who believe in the principles of freedom than 60 who don't 
                                                          
122Ben Domenech, “Jim DeMint’s Triumph”, Real Clear Politics, 7 December 2012, 
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2012/12/07/jim_demints_triumph_116364.html (accessed 20 
March 2013). For more on Wallace, consult: Dan T. Carter, The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, the Origins of 
the New Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics, 2nd ed. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 2000); Kazin, The Populist Persuasion, 221-242; Diamond, Roads to Dominion, 88-90, 113-
115, 142-146; Berlet and Lyons, Right-Wing Populism In America, 4-6, 199, 202-205; Perman, Pursuit of Unity, 
307-319; and Thomas Byrne Edsall with Mary D. Edsall, Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes 
on American Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1992), 10, 12, 66, 74, 77-79, 85, 96-97. For more on 
Wallace and the 1968 presidential election, refer to: Lewis L. Gould, 1968: The Election That Changed America 
(Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1993); and Dennis Wainstock, Election Year 1968: The Turning Point (New York: Enigma 
Books, 2012).   
123However, at times, the Heritage Foundation under DeMint’s leadership may also ruffle a few 
feathers within the GOP. For an example, see: Anna Palmer, Lauren French and Jake Sherman, “GOP 
Lawmakers Confront DeMint over Ratings”, Politico, 27 January 2015, 
http://www.politico.com/story/2015/01/gop-lawmakers-jim-demint-heritage-foundation-ratings-
114672.html (accessed 22 July 2015).  
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believe in anything”.124 His departure from the Senate to become president of the Heritage 
Foundation, a conservative think tank, will likely not diminish his influence. This move may 
even make him more influential than his time in Congress.125  
DeMint’s conservatism best encompasses the post-Cold War evolution of American 
conservatism, fiercely anti-government economically and staunchly pro-statist on social 
issues, which he defines as “the conservative principles of decentralized federal power, free 
market economics, and individual responsibility”.126 His conservative pedigree maintains 
that compromising with Democrats leads to “compromise between freedom and socialism, 
between centralized economic planning and decentralized free markets; between 
collectivism and individualism”.127   
DeMint’s influence, however, like Taft and Goldwater (and also Wallace), did not 
contribute to conservatism as a governing philosophy, Instead it was an evolution of a more 
rigid ideological conservatism, within the confines of the American governing system, and 
ideological purity does not equate to governing. That is because it is much easier to declare 
what one is against instead of offering an alternative to the status quo. In terms of the New 
Deal and its ongoing political legacy, once a new programme has been established, an 
alternative programme must become the focus point. For example, Reagan and George W. 
Bush were conservative presidents who governed, yet the former is idolised as the ideal 
                                                          
124Carney, "The Promise And Peril Of Jim DeMint", 14.   
125For more, consider: Margot Sanger-Katz, "What Jim DeMint Wants to Do at Heritage", National 
Journal (December 15, 2012): 12, Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed April 4, 2013); and 
Domenech, “Jim DeMint’s Triumph”. Political scientist Ronald Libby is of the notion that “DeMint’s 
resignation from the Senate to take up the presidency of the Heritage Foundation in January 2013 
strengthened Tea Party influence in the Senate and the House”; Libby, Purging the Republican Party, 126. 
126DeMint, Now or Never, 240.  
127For more, refer to: Ibid., 93-117, 238. The quote is from page 238. 
247 
 
conservative and the latter is vilified for abandoning it.128 Both were pragmatic. Reagan 
raised taxes in 1982 to help offset a growing deficit, in 1983 to reform social security, as 
well as in 1986 to simplify the US tax code, whereas Bush never raised taxes but he did 
achieve bipartisanship with the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001. Neither one, however, 
turned conservatism into the equivalent of the New Deal political order, but conservatives 
attained much more political power under Bush than they did under Reagan. Bush was able 
to benefit from the post-Cold War transformation to four-party politics, which allowed him 
the flexibility to adhere more to ideology than Reagan, although Bush was still limited in 
how he could attack the New Deal legacy of Medicare and social security.  
Nevertheless, DeMint and many conservative Republicans regard the Reagan 
presidential years as the guiding light of conservatism, one of limited government, strong 
national defence and social values. In attempting to form an argument for conservatism as a 
governing philosophy, he emphasised his support of a “big tent” approach to the GOP: “But 
big tents need strong poles, and the strongest pole of our party – the organizing principle and 
the crucial alternative to the Democrats – must be freedom”.129 His concept of freedom calls 
for a weaker national government in favor of stronger states’ rights. However, in many 
regards he seemed to be doing just the opposite, going out of his way to open the “big tent” 
only to the most right-wing conservative Republicans, and viewing those who did not 
support his key issues as opponents of freedom.130 He had even more disdain for Democrats, 
particularly Obama, labelling them collectivists who wanted to turn American into a socialist 
                                                          
128For more on DeMint’s take on Reagan and Bush, see: DeMint, Now or Never, 83, 111-112; and Jim 
DeMint, Saving Freedom: We Can Stop America’s Slide Into Socialism (Nashville: Fidelis Books, 2009), 23-27. 
129Jim DeMint, “How Republicans Can Build a Big-Tent Party”, Wall Street Journal, Eastern ed., [New 
York, NY] 02 May 2009: A.9, http://search.proquest.com/docview/399103332?accountid=14511 (accessed 29 
April 2013). 
130Alan K. Ota, “Jim DeMint’s Mission: To Strike the Big Tent”, CQ Weekly, 18 January 2010, 163-164; 
and Jim DeMint, Now or Never.  
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state similar to Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union and post-war Europe.131 Whilst not 
adamantly opposed to a less hawkish foreign policy, DeMint was less flexible on social 
issues, particularly gay marriage and abortion, as well as on economic issues such as tax 
increases and the New Deal and its ongoing political legacy.132     
DeMint blamed FDR, like many conservative Republicans do, for igniting socialism 
in America. “President Franklin Roosevelt (1933-1945) used America’s vulnerability during 
the Depression to implement his New Deal. This new social agenda created the Social 
Security program, provided extensive protections of unions, and began the farmer assistance 
program. The seeds of socialism took root”.133 He also declared, “Medicare demonstrates 
why socialized medicine does not work. The expertise of doctors and the needs of patients 
are secondary to a dehumanizing, bureaucratic, inefficient government system. Medicare . . . 
forces patients and physicians to become dependent on the government”.134 Regarding social 
security, he stated: “The politics of social security are essentially the politics of socialism; 
dependent voters reward those candidates who promise more spending and more 
government-sponsored security”.135 Additionally, he considered the Obama presidency to be 
                                                          
131DeMint, Now or Never; DeMint, Saving Freedom. However, it has been suggested that DeMint has 
modified his economic conservatism, whilst also focusing on economics over social conservatism. For more, 
see: Kalefa Sanneh, “The Evolution of Jim DeMint”, New Yorker blog, 8 December 2012, 
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2012/12/the-evolution-of-jim-demint.html (accessed 16 
March 2013). I propose that he has not, although he is using an economic argument to unite conservatives 
against the state, he is not deemphasising social values or changing his economic views. His economic 
argument in favour of the free-market has increased due to how he (and other conservatives) blame the 
government for making the debt worse as a result of getting involved, instead of letting the market correct 
itself. 
132Three of the most important point views that a candidate seeking DeMint’s backing must support 
include being pro-life, as well as standing against tax increases and gay marriage. For more, consult: DeMint, 
Now or Never, 220-225. For more on his endorsement of Tea Party senators Ron Johnson (R-WI), Mike Lee (R-
UT), Rand Paul, Marco Rubio and Pat Toomey (R-PA), refer to: Ibid., 216-219; Libby, Purging the Republican 
Party, 71-72.   
133DeMint, Saving Freedom, 33.  
134Ibid., 79.  
135Ibid., 102.  
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“anti-American”, because it “is disdainful of individual decision making, the hallmark of a 
free society, yet lauds collectivist policies that create one-size-fits all solutions”, which “has 
effectively socialized American health care and nationalized our banking system”.136  
DeMint’s importance to conservative Republicanism is twofold: firstly, the rhetoric 
he emphasizes has shaped the rhetoric of the Republican Party, and secondly, he was pivotal 
in moving the GOP further to the right with his support of the Tea Party – which has made 
those influenced by Gingrich, especially in the Senate, the new Republican voices of 
moderation.137 The emphasis he places on the socialist label drives the conservative 
Republican mantra. Such an emphasis assists them in their political battle against the 
Democratic Party, a party that they maintain is dominated by big government liberals. Thus 
what ensues from the conservative perspective is a conflict between the American party 
(Republican) versus the un-American party (Democrats) – i.e. conservatives against liberals.  
Conservative rhetoric is employed to control the means of debate. Therefore, 
anything conservatives deem to be liberal can simultaneously be considered socialist and un-
American. The conservative message is one of freedom from government (individual liberty) 
which tars the opposing liberal message as serfdom via government dependency. However, 
the conservative concepts of freedom and individualism differ on issues of economics versus 
social morals. Even though freedom from government is consistent with both arguments, it 
is tied into the context of the individual. Economically this stands for freedom from 
                                                          
136Ibid., 251.  
137Sean M. Theriault, The Gingrich Senators: The Roots of Partisan Warfare in Congress (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 162-165.  
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government, but the socio-moral meaning involves government mandating individual 
freedom (or responsibility).138 
Conclusion  
This chapter addresses how conservative Republicanism has evolved from what it 
was originally in the 1930s. What has been consistent is their opposition to the New Deal 
and its ongoing legacy. And stuck within the confines of the welfare state and the popularity 
of social security and Medicare entitlements, the only realistic option is not to undo the 
programmes but instead to privatise and reduce benefits, moving them from defined benefits 
to defined contributions and thus making the individual more dependent on the free-market 
in lieu of government. On the other hand, their position on social values has evolved – 
moving from the original libertarian position to one that is more evangelical.139 Although 
many in the Tea Party, as well as other conservatives, claim that Obama and the Democrats 
are changing America into an impious and un-American socialist state, this belief is far from 
original and has been the consistent view of the GOP right. Instead of attempting to purge 
radical views from the conservative Republican fold, as the previous chapters have 
illustrated, the goal has to been to adapt their rhetoric to form the basis for a more viable 
attack against big government. However, in doing so, the extreme conservative views on 
issues such as race, voting rights, marriage and personal choice are being pushed further to 
                                                          
138For more on DeMint and individual responsibility, consider: Jim DeMint and J. David Woodard, 
Why We Whisper: Restoring Our Right To Say It’s Wrong (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008); 
and DeMint, Saving Freedom, 62-70, 154-174.  
139Although more influential to the right, evangelicalism also has a place on the left. For more on 
American evangelicalism, see: Steven P. Miller, The Age of Evangelicalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2014); David R. Swartz, Moral Minority: The Evangelical Left in the Age of Conservatism (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012); and Matthew Avery Sutton, American Apocalypse: A History of 
Modern Evangelicalism (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014).    
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the forefront – which, mixed with their economic views, makes the Democratic Party seem 
that much further to the left. 
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Conclusion – Unfinished Business: Conservative Republicans and the New Deal 
Legacy 
Social security is a collectivist system. It’s a welfare transfer system. . . . It will bring more 
government, more collectivism, more centralized government if we do not succeed in switching 
these programs and reforming these programs from what some people call a defined benefit 
system to a defined contribution system – and . . . I am talking about health care programs as 
well – from a third-party socialist-based system to an individually owned, individually 
prefunded, individually directed system.  
-Paul Ryan1 
Conservative Republicans, as Paul Ryan’s quotation highlights, still regard the New 
Deal legacy as socialist, and want to reform entitlement programmes to integrate them into 
the free-market. But as the previous chapters have illustrated, conservative Republicanism 
has evolved from the 1930s to present day. The GOP has also evolved into a conservative 
party that whilst benefits their ideology, also hinders their capacity to carry it out.  
The intent of this research has been to analyse why conservative Republicans use the 
socialist label to denigrate liberalism, and to assess the effectiveness of such a strategy. 
Socialism is a lightning rod word that they employ to discredit an opponent or issue by 
attempting to incite an emotional response to dictate political discourse. Updating James 
Burns’ four-party model was very insightful in establishing how Republicans are now 
comprised of a right-of-centre presidential wing and a right-wing congressional party. This 
presents a conservative-dominated Republican Party opposite a Democratic Party, where in 
                                                          
1Ryan’s remarks are from a February 2005 Atlas Society Event; Andrew Kaczynski, “Paul Ryan’s Ayn 
Rand Moment”, BuzzFeed, 21 September 2012, http://www.buzzfeed.com/andrewkaczynski/paul-ryans-ayn-
rand-moment (accessed 21 March 2014). For more on Ryan’s connection to Rand, consider: Jennifer Burns, 
“Atlas Spurned”, New York Times, 14 August 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/15/opinion/ayn-rand-
wouldnt-approve-of-paul-ryan.html; Tim Mak “Vice President Nominee Paul Ryan’s Love-Hate with Ayn 
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the congressional wing is left-of-centre whilst the presidential wing is squarely in the centre. 
Yet what is important is how both Democratic parties are clearly to the left of the GOP. This 
means it is still relevant for conservative Republicans to use the socialist and liberal labels 
interchangeably. Nevertheless, this does not imply that this strategy is entirely successful nor 
is it without potential future problems. One notable issue that may become a problem for 
them is that the more rightward they move, the more they run the risk of using the label too 
many times. This is especially likely if used against fellow Republicans,2 similar to when 
Robert Welch of the John Birch Society accused Dwight Eisenhower of being “a dedicated 
conscious agent of the Communist conspiracy”.3    
Conservative rhetoric is helpful in establishing a clear contrast between the 
Republican Party and Democratic Party, a contrast that is bolstered when conservatives 
claim there is evidence that “liberal” Democrats support socialism.4 However, a negative 
                                                          
2Michelle Bachmann has been the only notable conservative Republican to attempt this so far, 
presumably at Mitt Romney – boldly asserting, “We cannot preserve liberty for ourselves and our posterity if 
the choice in next November is between a frugal socialist and an out-of-control socialist.’’ However, this 
backfired and was part of her downfall in her bid to win the 2012 GOP nomination, as well as to barely being 
re-elected in 2012. She became toxic even to conservative Republicans, and finally decided against standing 
for re-election in 2014. For more, refer to: Trip Gabriel, “Michele Bachmann Warns Against Supporting ‘Frugal 
Socialists’”, New York Times blog, 7 November 2011, 
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/07/michele-bachmann-warns-against-supporting-frugal-
socialists/ (accessed 27 March 2014); Paul Kane, “Rep. Bachmann Will Not Run for Reelection in 2014”, 
Washington Post, 29 May 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/rep-bachmann-will-not-run-in-
2014/2013/05/29/eba51652-c840-11e2-8da7-d274bc611a47_story.html (accessed 27 March 2014); Jason 
Rich and Brandy A. Kennedy, “Early to Rise, Early to Fall: The Short Lived Hope of Michelle Bachmann”, in The 
2012 Nomination and the Future of the Republican Party: The Internal Battle (Lanham: Lexington Books, 
2013), ed. William J. Miller, 77-101. 
3David W. Reinhard, The Republican Right since 1945 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983), 
174; Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays (London: Jonathan Cape, 
1966), 28; as well as Chip Berlet and Matthew N. Lyons, Right-Wing Populism in America: Too Close for 
Comfort (New York: Guilford Press, 2000), 180. 
4This is a notion aided by opinion polling data, which supports the claims of conservatives that 
liberals have a positive view of socialism – yet they also support capitalism, but this does not deter them from 
making such claims. This also affects the public perception towards Obama and the Democrats. For more, see: 
“’Socialism’ Not So Negative, ‘Capitalism’ Not So Positive”, Pew Research Center, 4 May 2010, 
http://www.people-press.org/2010/05/04/socialism-not-so-negative-capitalism-not-so-positive/; Carroll 
Doherty, “Describing Obama, Bush in a Word”, Pew Research Center, 1 July 2013, 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/07/01/describing-obama-bush-in-a-word/; “Midterm Election 
Challenges for Both Parties”, Pew Research Center, 12 February 2010, http://www.people-
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outcome allows Republicans to be viewed as ultra-conservative, even more so than the 
average American. Moreover, when conservative Republicans are in a position to dictate 
possible reforms, they still have to grapple with pragmatism versus ideological purity. 
The efforts of conservative Republicans to use the socialist label to attack “liberal” 
Democrats encourages partisanship above all else – a stance that political scientist Thomas 
Langston views as evidence of “one-sided” polarisation, where “the Right . . . continues to 
be substantially far to the Right of center, while the “Left” can only be spoken if in 
association with the Democratic Party through the use of quotation marks”.5 This has led 
some, like political scientists Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein, to state: “The Democrats 
under the presidencies of Clinton and Obama, by contrast [to Republicans] have become the 
more status-quo oriented, centrist protectors of government”.6 Views such as these can lead 
to a belief that Democrats are embracing centrism whilst Republicans are embracing 
conservatism. Yet this notion, whilst correct in my view, overlooks how conservative 
Republicanism has been moving further to the right. But what is also striking is how 
                                                          
press.org/2010/02/12/section-3-views-of-the-parties/; “Little Change in Public’s Response to ‘Capitalism’, 
‘Socialism’”, Pew Research Center, 28 December 2011, http://www.people-press.org/2011/12/28/little-
change-in-publics-response-to-capitalism-socialism/; Frank Newport, “Democrats, Republicans Diverge on 
Capitalism, Federal Gov’t”, Gallup Poll, 29 November 2012, http://www.gallup.com/poll/158978/democrats-
republicans-diverge-capitalism-federal-gov.aspx; Lydia Saad, “Obama Praised for Efforts, Knocked for 
Spending”, Gallup Poll, 15 July 2009, http://www.gallup.com/poll/121685/Obama-Praised-Effort-Knocked-
Spending.aspx. Examples of the conservative media using polling data as proof that liberals support socialism 
include: Jennifer Harper, “Gallup: Yes, Democrats, Liberals Favor Socialism”, Washington Times blog, 30 
November 2012, http://www.washingtontimes.com/blog/inside-politics/2012/nov/30/gallup-yes-democrats-
liberals-favor-socialism/; Andrew Rugg, “Gallup: Half of Democrats Think Positively About Socialism”, 
American Enterprise Institute, 30 November 2012, http://www.aei-ideas.org/2012/11/gallup-half-of-
democrats-think-positively-about-socialism/; Guy Benson, “Poll: 53 Percent of Democrats Hold Favorable 
View of Socialism”, Townhall blog, 29 November 2012, 
http://townhall.com/tipsheet/guybenson/2012/11/29/53_percent_of_democrats_three_cheers_for_socialis
m (all links accessed 31 March 2014). 
5Thomas Langston, “Making Stale Debates Fresh Again: The Causes and Consequences of the 
Defense of Ideology as a Regime Imperative”, 20; a paper from the “Governing the U.S. in Polarized Times” 
conference, Rothermere American Institute, University of Oxford, 17 April 2013, 
http://www.rai.ox.ac.uk/sites/rai/files/Langston%20paper%20040313.pdf (accessed 10 March 2014). 
6Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, It’s Even Worse than It Looks: How the American 
Constitutional System Collided with the New Politics of Extremism (New York: Basic Books, 2012), 56. 
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conservative positions that were once deemed to be part of the radical right in the 1960s are 
now accepted as centrist, helping the conservative push to privatise social security and 
Medicare.7 
The outcomes of the 2012 presidential and congressional elections further illustrate 
this trend. Obama was re-elected as president and the outcome of the 2010 midterm 
elections, a Democratic controlled Senate and a Republican controlled House, remained the 
same. Furthermore, it is unlikely that anything besides continuous Democratic victories for 
the presidency combined with a Democratic dominated Congress will force the GOP to 
completely rethink how the party should adapt and change. I am not suggesting that no 
change will occur, but it could take at least eight years of total Democratic dominance (and 
possibly more), and very little else will force them to do anything more than soften their 
image just enough to win elections. A change to embrace immigration reform is one topic 
they would be wise to consider – following in the footsteps of previous conservative 
Republicans who supported such a measure, including Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush. 
However, immigration reform was a toxic issue for the GOP leading into the 2014 midterm 
elections,8 and continues to trouble the new GOP congressional majority.9 Moreover, the 
2014 midterm election results do not suggest any drastic changes in ideology, policy or 
rhetoric. 
                                                          
7For more, see: David Plotke, “Introduction to the Transaction Edition”, in The Radical Right, 3rd ed. 
(New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002), ed. Daniel Bell, xxx-xxxiii, lxvii-lxx. 
8An August 2014 Gallup Poll survey highlighted that Republican supporter’s listed immigration as the 
most important problem America had to address. For more, refer to: Frank Newport, “Republicans More 
Focused on Immigration as Top Problem”, Gallup Poll, 22 August 2014, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/175310/republicans-likely-view-immigration-top-problem.aspx (accessed 1 
September 2014).  
9Alex Isenstadt and Kyle Cheney, “The Anxieties of the GOP Majority”, Politico, 23 November 2014, 




Regarding the implication that liberals are socialists, Langston rightly criticises 
conservative Republicans for their “rhetorical campaign to equate modern liberalism with 
socialism and Leftism” as an absurd claim that is only possible due to the lack of an 
influential American Socialist Party.10 This argument, however, has been important to them 
since the FDR presidency, evolving over time as the two political parties have changed 
throughout contemporary America. Conservative Republicans and other members of the 
conservative elite, William F. Buckley and the National Review in 1955, for example, 
wanted to transform the GOP into a conservative party, a feat that was largely accomplished 
after the 1994 midterm elections. However, during that period, conservative Republicans 
came to embrace the conservative label whilst also attacking the liberal label and “me-too” 
Republicanism. Reagan was very important in this regard. 
Reagan’s long career, as an actor, business spokesman for GE, as well Governor of 
California and president of the United States, presented him with the time and experience to 
establish conservative Republican talking points, a type of rhetoric, so to speak. His career 
spanned more than four decades and helped to hone his fervour in attacking Democrats for 
implementing socialist policies like “the progressive income tax” and “socialized medicine” 
(what later became Medicare). Reagan was also the party leader as president and his rhetoric 
successfully merged liberalism with socialism. When discrediting liberalism proved 
successful for the GOP, they learned to embrace it. As moderates have left the Republican 
Party, a conservative led GOP can use the liberal/socialist label(s) to smear the entire 
Democratic Party, even though this tactic is far from being accurate. Therefore, when 
                                                          
10Langston, “Making Stale Debates Fresh Again”, 21, 23-24. 
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conservative Republicans use the liberal label, they are also referring to the socialism label – 
for they consider them to be one and the same.  
The rise of conservative media outlets, especially AM talk radio and Fox News11 
helps to further support this strategy by spreading this view across the country – and in some 
instances this rhetoric has even crossed the Atlantic.12 Where Reagan left off, Newt Gingrich 
and the Conservative Opportunity Society continued in the House, followed by the George 
W. Bush presidency and four years of a conservative led GOP Congress (2002-2006). Now 
the Tea Party continues to alter the GOP with the likes of Rand Paul and Ted Cruz13 in the 
Senate, the GOP House majority of the 112th Congress and 113th Congress, as well as a new 
GOP congressional majority for the 114th Congress. 
                                                          
11Fox News became a vital conservative media outlet during the Clinton presidency, where the new 
Fox News started out as an “anti-Clinton news network”. For more, see: Gabriel Sherman, The Loudest Voice 
in the Room: Roger Ailes, Fox News and the Remaking of American Politics (London: Virgin Books, 2013), 223-
256. 
12For an example, see: Robert Winnett, “‘Socialist’ Vince Cable Is Not Fit For Office, Says Adrian 
Beecroft”, Telegraph, 22 May 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/9283748/Socialist-Vince-
Cable-not-fit-for-office-says-Adrian-Beecroft.html (accessed 25 March 2014).  
13Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) continues to be a thorn in the side of the Republican congressional 
leadership, even for House Speaker John Boehner (R-OH). He encouraged and assisted GOP House members 
of the Tea Party Caucus in refusing to support the Senate immigration bill and instead pressured Boehner to 
pass an alternative bill that more than likely squandered any chance for immigration reform before the 2014 
midterm elections. Although popular with the grassroots, he is making enemies within the GOP 
establishment. For more, consult: Jeffrey Toobin, “Ted Cruz’s Canny Strategy”, The New Yorker, 7 August 
2014, http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/ted-cruzs-canny-strategy (accessed 7 August 2014); 
and Jay Newton-Small, “Republicans Seek Revenge Against Ted Cruz”, Time, 8 June 2014, 
http://time.com/2842539/ted-cruz-republicans-2016/ (accessed 5 August 2014). Toobin also has an 
interesting article on Cruz’s brash and confrontational persona; for more, see: Jeffrey Toobin, “The 
Absolutist”, The New Yorker, 30 June 2014, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/06/30/the-
absolutist-2 (accessed 7 August 2014).  
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How long the Tea Party will remain relevant is debatable.14 Challenging the 
conservative GOP establishment is not a long-term political strategy,15 although Richard 
Viguerie believes this is a viable strategy.16 Yet even though former House Majority leader 
Eric Cantor (R-VA) was defeated in the 2014 Virginia primary,17 another target Senator 
Thad Cochran (R-MS) defeated his Tea Party challenger.18 However, it is without a doubt 
that Tea Party members in Congress have made the GOP more conservative, as well as a 
more confrontational.19  
Even more remarkable is how the conservative elite is working to make conservative 
Republicanism a viable alternative to Democrats and moderate Republicans. In order to 
                                                          
14For an example, consider: Christopher S. Parker, “Wither the Tea Party? The Future of a Political 
Movement”, Brookings Institute, no. 66 (June 2014), 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/06/04-tea-party-parker/parker_teaparty.pdf 
(accessed 17 January 2015); and Rupert Cornwell, “Lost? The Tea Party Has Already Won, and Its Influence 
Will Be Felt for Years to Come”, The Independent, 11 May 2014, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/lost-the-tea-party-has-already-won-and-its-influence-will-
be-felt-for-years-to-come-9349649.html (accessed 17 January 2015). 
15For examples of the GOP establishment pushing back against Tea Party Republicans, see: Manu 
Raju and Burgess Everett, “Senate Smackdown: Ted Cruz, Mike Lee Efforts Squelched by Leaders”, Politico, 26 
July 2015, http://www.politico.com/story/2015/07/senate-obamacare-repeal-ted-cruz-mike-lee-120637.html 
(accessed 27 July 2015); as well as Jake Sherman and Anna Palmer, “Behind Boehner’s Crackdown on 
Conservatives”, Politico, 24 June 2015, http://www.politico.com/story/2015/06/john-boehner-crackdown-
conservatives-richard-nugent-gop-119389.html (accessed 25 June 2015). 
16Richard A. Viguerie, “We’re Coming for You, John Boehner”, Politico Magazine, 17 April 2014, 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/04/were-coming-for-you-john-boehner-105781.html 
(accessed 10 July 2014). 
17Gloria Berger, “How Eric Cantor’s ‘House of Cards’ Fell Apart”, CNN, 12 June 2014, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/11/opinion/cantor-house-of-cards-shakespeare/index.html (accessed 7 
August 2014); Jay Newton-Small, “How Eric Cantor Lost”, Time, 10 June 2014, http://time.com/2854761/eric-
cantor-dave-brat-virginia/ (accessed 11 June 2014); as well as Jack Fitzpatrick and Alex Roarty, “Eric Cantor 
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accomplish this, conservative Republicanism has had to shrink its tent and exclude the 
fringe, but as the tent expanded in size, the fringe has been welcomed back into the tent with 
open arms. This party would now be alien to conservative Republicans from previous eras 
like Herbert Hoover, Robert A. Taft, Barry Goldwater and Reagan, and more at home to 
those from the South like Strom Thurmond (SC), Jesse Helms (NC) and Phil Gramm (TX) – 
southern conservative Democrats who later became Republicans. Hoover, Taft, Goldwater 
and Reagan stressed economic conservatism (classical liberalism), whereas Thurmond, 
Helms and Gramm stressed traditionalism via social (class) conservatism – which has 
included issues such as segregation, states’ rights, voting rights, unions, abortion and 
homosexuality. The latter five are becoming more important to the GOP nationally as it 
continues to become an increasingly conservative party.  
Southern traditionalism supports both economic and social conservatism – with 
Reagan serving as a bridge between the two – a mixture of Suburban Warriors, White 
Flight, southern rage, the Silent Majority and the rise of the Sunbelt.20 But what unites them 
all is the disregard for the New Deal and its ongoing political legacy, a view that remains 
unchanged, but has progressed over time as four-party politics has evolved and altered the 
                                                          
20References to the above include, amongst others: Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: The Origins of 
the New American Right (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Kevin M. Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta 
and the Making of Modern Conservatism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Dan T. Carter, The 
Politics of Rage: George Wallace, the Origins of the New Conservatism, and the Transformation of American 
Politics, 2nd ed. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000); Elizabeth Tandy Shermer, Sunbelt 
Capitalism: Phoenix and the Transformation of American Politics (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
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Democratic and Republican Parties, as well as how America has changed from the 1930s to 
the post-Cold War era.    
The goal of the previous chapters was to address how the socialist label is more than 
mere vernacular; it is strategic. At a secondary, but still important, level is the relationship 
between how the socialist label, polarisation and four-party politics presents opportunities 
for conservative Republicans to grasp power and change America into a socio-moral and 
free-market society. However, there are important challenges that need to be overcome. 
When conservatives control both the executive and legislatives branches, they can be at odds 
with one another. I discussed in chapter four how this was the case with Bush and the GOP 
majority Congress. Furthermore, conservative rhetoric is strongest when it opposes 
something, usually big government in some way, such as opposing national health care 
reform. On the other hand, once conservative Republicans are in a position of power, they 
have to scale back their anti-statist rhetoric in order to focus on legislation that can lead to 
lasting accomplishments, instead of railing against government and shirking the 
responsibilities of governing.   
As I progressed with this scholarship, there were other points I wanted to address – 
but due to the word limit, and my approach, I had to exclude – that would make for 
interesting future research. Firstly, how does four-party politics correspond to other 
countries, particularly, countries that use the Westminster model, especially Canada? Due to 
its close proximity to the Unites States, and how I interpret the current Conservative 
majority government, this would be a very interesting project. Secondly, the “fear” factor is 
still very relevant to conservative Republican rhetoric. I am not implying that Democrats are 
immune from this tactic, but conservatives use this emotion as an important part of their 
strategy. This was a vital part of the (RNC) Republican National Committee’s financial 
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strategy approach for the 2010 midterm elections – which involved a combination of fear, 
anger and the socialist label,21 an agenda that many in the RNC consider a mainstream party 
message.22 
Thirdly, given the polling data I have read, it is clear that the American public does 
support government, and government programmes in general.23 However, its lack of trust in 
government casts an ominous shadow over what can be accomplished. As mentioned in the 
introduction, this is a continuation of the contradicting dual “symbolic conservative” and 
“operational liberal” public mindset. Political scientist Marc Hetherington in Why Trust 
Matters highlights how Americans’ decrease in trust hinders what government can do to 
help a misanthropic public. He also argues that the rise in distrust relates to a decrease in 
trusting liberalism, and not a rise in trusting/supporting conservatism.24 Yet I want to stress 
how important the combination of fear and mistrust of the liberal label is used to great 
                                                          
21Ben Smith, “Exclusive: RNC Document Mock Donors, Plays on ‘Fear’”, Politico, 3 March 2010, 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0310/33866.html. The article contains the following link: 
http://www.politico.com/static/PPM136_100303_rnc_finance_leadership.html. Refer to slides 29-31. Both 
links were accessed 9 December 2013. For more on fear, see: David H. Bennett, The Party of Fear: From 
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influence when not enough Democrats are willing to defend the label and the GOP has carte 
blanche to attack it, enhancing the negative perception of the label.25  
Moreover, given how the conservative message is dominant, anything tainted with 
the liberal/socialist big government agenda takes precedence over actual policy proposals.26 
Even conservative academics are not immune from making such allegations. A comment 
made during the Clinton presidency in 1998 by conservative political scientist Charles 
Kesler compares liberalism to communism: 
A great deal of the galvanism of the conservative movement was in this combination 
of its opposition to Communism abroad and to liberalism at home, which was seen as 
a kind of domestic version of Communism abroad. . . . 
After Communism's collapse, beginning in 1989, this link with liberalism — 
this link between Communism and liberalism — began to decay. . . . 
Therefore, many American conservatives were led to believe that the 
decisive, political contest had already been won, or at least was about to be won . . . 
It has become clear now that these conservative optimists, of whatever stripe, 
overestimated conservatism's successes. 
. . . One of the great failures of conservative statesmanship today is to 
underestimate our enemy, to not see how deeply American politics and society have 
already been transformed by a century of liberalism.27 
A more recent example is from another conservative political scientist, Paul Kengor. During 
the 2013 government shutdown, he claimed “Obama’s exploitation of the government 
shutdown (never let a good crisis go to waste) is a classic old method mastered by the likes 
of CPUSA [Communist Party USA]. It’s standard operating procedure. What you’re 
witnessing is Barack Obama’s “shutdown campaign” -- and with the liberal media dutifully 
                                                          
25Also consider the view of Howard Gold in Hollow Mandates where he asserts that any shift to 
conservatism was done so by politicians and not the public; Howard J. Gold, Hollow Mandates: American 
Public Opinion and the Conservative Shift (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 145-161. However, William Mayer 
in The Changing American Mind contends that the change from economic liberalism to socio-cultural 
liberalism benefited conservatives due to the natural conservatism of Americans on non-economic issues; 
William G. Mayer, The Changing American Mind: How and Why American Public Opinion Changed Between 
1960 and 1988 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992), 318-340.   
26For examples, refer to footnote four for more on how the public perceives Obama and Democrats, 
as well as how conservatives further push this view.   
27Charles R. Kesler, "Statesmanship for America's Future: The Value of Conservatism." Vital Speeches 
of the Day 64, no. 20 (1 August 1998): 616 and 620, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/221463666?accountid=14565 (accessed 12 April 2014). 
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on his side to amplify the effort”. He went on to state: “So, enjoy the spectacle of Obama’s 
shutdown campaign. For the extreme left, it’s really nothing new -- though, sadly, it’s totally 
new to have this emanating so egregiously from the White House. But, hey, this is the 
fundamental transformation that oblivious Americans elected”.28 
Kengor’s dismissive comment of elector intelligence rejects the GOP’s claim to be 
the voice of the American people, and in fact highlights the party’s disdain for the public it 
allegedly represents. In sum, Americans do not share GOP hatred of government, but they 
fear it enough to oppose legislation that is associated with big government liberalism. 
Nonetheless, conservative Republicanism does have an Achilles’ heel, and it is the possible 
over dependency on southern conservatism.  
In 1949, political scientist V.O. Key stated in Southern Politics in State and Nation: 
“The South may not be the nation’s number one political problem, as some northerners 
assert, but politics is the South’s number one problem”.29 Whilst his statement referring to a 
one-party white minority dominance over southern politics may be outdated, the rationale 
for it remains a concern. According to journalists John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldrige, 
there “is a recurring fear that an overdominant Southern wing will drag the GOP onto the 
cliffs of extremism in the same way that the McGovernite wing pulled the Democrats too far 
Left during the 1970s”.30 Journalist Michael Lind echoes this sentiment: “The failure of the 
Nation to Americanize the South has made it possible for the South . . . to attempt to 
                                                          
28Paul Kengor, “Obama's Shutdown Campaign”, American Spectator, 7 October 2013, 
http://spectator.org/articles/56009/obamas-shutdown-campaign (accessed 7 October 2013). 
29V.O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation, new ed. (1949; repr., Knoxville: University of 
Tennessee Press, 1984), 3. 
30John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, The Right Nation: Why America is Different London: 
Penguin Books, 2005), 263.   
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Southernize the United States”.31 Furthermore, any discussion on the South, conservatism 
and politics would be incomplete without noting the importance of race in America – as well 
as during the Obama presidency and into the future.32   
As stated in this thesis, Republican conservatism now embraces both economic and 
social conservatism, placing it in line with traditional southern conservatism. Whilst the 
elitist views of conservatism have more opponents than supporters, conservatism itself still 
garners more support than liberalism as an ideology.33 Without an unlikely liberal 
resurgence, the onus remains that conservatives have to deter enough voters to support 
Democrats in the House, Senate and White House on a consistent basis. And with the new 
GOP congressional majority of the 114th Congress, Republican conservatism is still stronger 
in Congress than the presidency. Nevertheless, the ongoing power struggle with the Tea 
Party may help to decide if the GOP becomes too extreme for America.  
In the end, unless extreme socio-morals or changing demographics lead conservatism 
into political oblivion for a prolonged time, fear and distrust of government will be enough 
to make GOP conservatism a force to be reckoned with. Moreover, in combination with 
four-party politics, conservatism remains both the GOP’s strength and its weakness. Yet how 
                                                          
31Michael Lind, Made in Texas: George W. Bush and the Southern Takeover of American Politics (New 
York: Basic Books, 2003), 193.   
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Movements in Postwar America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); Enid Logan, “At this Moment”: 
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2011), 107-128; M.V. Hood III, Quentin Kidd and Irwin L. Morris, The Rational Southerner: Black Mobilization, 
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Press, 2014); as well as Matthew W. Hughey and Gregory S. Parks, Wrongs of the Right: Language, Race, and 
the Republican Party in the Age of Obama (New York: New York University Press, 2014). 
33For more on southern elitism, consider: Augustus B. Cochran III, Democracy Heading South: 
National Politics in the Shadow of Dixie (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 30-33, 41-43, 48-49, 61-
63; and David Lublin, The Republican South: Democratization and Partisan Change (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004), 2, 15-20, 28, 66, 70-72, 93-95, 113-115, 132, 159-162, 189-192, 218-219.      
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successful conservatism becomes will be determined in part by its rhetoric and how it will 
adapt to change and opportunity.    
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